

**INTERSUBJECTIVITY, LIFE – WORLD AND
SOCIAL CONTEXT IN EDMUND HUSSERL’S
PHENOMENOLOGY**

**THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN PHILOSOPHY**

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PREFACE

The present work is an attempt to make a study of the tie up between Husserl's phenomenological account of intersubjectivity, life-world and social context in the light of his phenomenological account of

intentionality and the method of reduction. It starts with an account of the background, the developmental stages and the significance of Husserl's Phenomenology. After making a detailed statement of the concepts of intentionality and the method of reduction, it moves to a discussion of the concept of intersubjectivity and the concept of life-world as given in his original works, bringing in a variety of problems and issues. The concept of social context in Husserl's Phenomenology is attempted in the light of Schutz's Social Phenomenology and thoughts of other sociologists. The interrelation between the concepts of intersubjectivity, life-world and social context is attempted. The question whether Husserl has developed a full-fledged notion of sociality within his phenomenological outlook is still an open one. However, our inquiry focus on some of the major issues that we encounter in locating social context as a logical culmination of Husserl's Phenomenology. We end up with considering the critical remarks against Husserl's stands and the solutions proposed for them. To some extent we will be able to show how the possible solutions has bearings on the tie-up between concepts of intersubjectivity, life-world and social context.

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEMATIC

INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEMATIC

1. Preliminary Focus
2. Phenomenology as a Philosophical Movement.
3. Stages of Phenomenology.
4. Antecedents and Consequents of Phenomenology
5. Conclusion.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEMATIC

1. Preliminary Focus

It is proposed to start with the hypothesis that there is a tie-up between Husserl's concepts of intersubjectivity, life-world and his notion of social context. Taking social context as the central problem of Husserl's phenomenology, the different ways in which the problem can be studied is examined with special reference to the notions of intersubjectivity and life-world. It is proposed that the above tie-up requires the highlighting of different problems underlying the above concepts along with examining the related concepts such as the method of phenomenology and the concept of intentionality. It is proposed to highlight the inherent controversies and the solutions advanced in this connection towards the end.

First of all, the background of phenomenology along with a general introduction to the phenomenological investigation of Husserl giving space to the chief influences on Husserl and Husserl's impact on later thinkers apart from discussing the important stages of Husserl's thought is intended. In the following chapter, the concept of intentionality and the

method of reduction shall be discussed. Husserl's phenomenology is identified with the phenomenological method. The significance of the method of phenomenology goes along with the concept of intentionality explained in his own way. The intentional structure of consciousness and the phenomenological method are recognized as significant events in the history of philosophy. Though Husserl himself is ambiguous in his notion of reduction in the method of phenomenology, attempt is made to give an account of the significant stages of reduction. The method of phenomenology have helped to reveal the rich and pure structure of consciousness leading to the discovery of transcendental consciousness intersubjectively constituting the objective world as life-world.

This shall be followed by the transcendental constitution theory of the other as the theory of intersubjectivity. An attempt is made to explicate the concept of intersubjectivity as it is available in Husserl's own work. Reduction to the sphere of ownness is discussed in order to throw light on the intersubjective nature of the transcendental ego. Mediacy of intentionality, pairing, intentional modification, assimilative apperception and appresentative apperception are discussed for making clear the exact connotation of the term intersubjectivity. The notion of monad is made use by Husserl for explaining the equalization of the primordial ego with other egos and understanding of other egos by

penetrating into their own ownness. The intersubjective transcendental ego and the common life-world are suggested as important steps in Husserl's phenomenology. Transcendental phenomenology and the experience of the other are monadologically explained objectively unlike speculative metaphysics. Intentional explication of the primordial sphere is emphasized for establishing the possibility of transcendental intersubjectivity. Transcendental phenomenology is equated with intersubjective phenomenology.

Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity is criticized by thinkers such as Habermas, Schutz, Sartre etc.... on various grounds. Max Scheler have a different version of intersubjectivity, claiming human consciousness as a-priori intentional and social in nature. Hildebrand, Reinach and Paul Ricouer disagreed with Husserl on intersubjectivity. Fuchs along with Cunningham criticized Husserl's version of intersubjectivity on different grounds. Whether Husserl succeeds in establishing intersubjectivity on the ground of empathic experience based on intentionality needs to be worked out in detail. The problem of intersubjectivity being a complicated issue in Husserl's phenomenology as a whole, solutions are offered in this connection.

Following this an exposition of Husserl's concept of life-world is attempted as presented in his writing. The crisis of sciences and the crisis of humanity are identified resulting in the concept of life-world as an answer to the crisis in sciences and philosophy. Phenomenology is explained as a universal philosophy with respect to the problem of becoming a real philosophy in the light of the concept of life-world. The life-world epoche with deeper and intense reflection needs adequate explanation. The epoche helps to establish a new way of thinking based on the life-world certainty by inquiring into the intentional structures where the objective world becomes the transcendental phenomenon with subjective manners of givenness. It is claimed that only a transcendental understanding of the apodictic ego gives genuine explanation in contrast to scientific explanation. Phenomenology as transcendental philosophy is discussed as genuine and radically presuppositionless philosophy.

This shall be followed by a discussion of social context in Husserl's phenomenology. Phenomenological sociology is an outgrowth of phenomenological insights especially on intersubjectivity and life-world notions. Martin Heidegger, Merleau-ponty, Schutz and other sociologists have worked on Husserl's doctrine of the life-world for an understanding of the social reality. The need to analyse social phenomena on phenomenological grounds is emphasized by thinkers. The

contribution of Alfred Schutz in this respect needs to be examined. Peter L. Berger, Thomas Luckmann and Harold Garfinkel emphasized the role of social phenomenology in the construction of social reality. Ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism are developments of social phenomenology emphasizing sociality.

In the final evaluation, we shall be examining the exact correlation between the concepts such as intersubjectivity, life-world, and social context and whether Husserl was in a position to place himself as an advocate of sociality. The interrelation between the concepts of intersubjectivity, life-world and social context is attempted as a logical development of Husserl's thought. The phenomenological method of reduction and the concept of intentionality are interpreted as providing the background for the concept of intersubjectivity. Reduction to 'the sphere of ownness' reveals the intersubjective nature of consciousness. The studies of Watarukuroda and Keiichi Noe are providing support to the relation between reduction and intersubjectivity. The life-world is explained as intersubjective. Intersubjectivity and social context are intersubjectively explained linguistically. The studies of Cunningham, Fuchs, Hutcheson, Mohanty, Jacques Derrida and other thinkers throw light on this issue, though most of them are critical of Husserl. The implications of the concept of intentionality is to be fully worked out

inorder to discover the social aspect of phenomenology through the concepts of intersubjectivity and life-world. Whether Husserl succeeds in establishing social context in phenomenology is to be workedout.

2. Phenomenology as a Philosophical Movement

Edmund Husserl, German Philosopher, born on April 8th 1859 in Prossnitz, (Austrian Moravia) Czechoslovakia, had his initial studies in mathematics and physics at Leipzig and Berlin, developed interest in the philosophy of mathematics and in philosophy. Husserl studied Astronomy in the years 1876-1878 in Leipzig, also attended lectures in mathematics, physics and philosophy in the years 1878-1881 in Berlin. At the University of Vienna, he was attracted towards philosophy, though he took his doctor's degree in mathematics in 1882 with a dissertation entitled "Contribution to the Theory of Calculus of Variations". Husserl returned to Berlin and became assistant to the mathematician Weierstrass. He went back to Vienna, studied philosophy with Franz Brentano from 1884-1886. Brentano's lectures on psychology and logic had a great influence on Husserl. Husserl's shift from mathematics to philosophy was because of the influences of Brentano and Bolzano. The mathematician and logician Gottlob Frege criticized Husserl for his psychologism followed by Husserl's re-examinations leading to his subsequent philosophical career. At Gottingen he joined the philosophy faculty in 1900 and became professor in philosophy. Taught at the University of Freiburg from 1916 to 1929. Full Professorship was honoured to him in 1916 at the University of Freiburg where he worked until his retirement,

lived in Freiburg involving in informal teaching and writing and died in 1938.

Edmund Husserl is known as the father of phenomenology, father of the phenomenological movement. Phenomenology as an unprejudiced and descriptive study of whatever appears to consciousness, originated at the end of the 19th century in the school of Franz Brentano which was renewed and developed by Edmund Husserl during the 20th century. Phenomenology propagated a counter theory of the naturalistic approach towards consciousness and meaning. Husserl was an important European thinker of the 20th century, and inspired thinkers from different streams. Though thinkers like Kant and Hegel used the term phenomenology in their writings, Husserl used it in a more systematic way developing it into a systematic philosophical attitude with definite goals. To Husserl phenomenology was a foundational science and a presuppositionless philosophy. Phenomenology as a new way of thinking was one of the most influential movements of Western Philosophy. Phenomenology as a structural analysis of consciousness is a study of consciousness as it is experienced involving the object of consciousness given in experience. Edmund Husserl's phenomenology is a radical movement involved in the programme of freedom from presuppositions. It proposes a new method in search of absolute knowledge which is

radical and evident in all possible ways. The watch word of phenomenology is ‘to the things’¹, a presuppositionless approach, a return to the things themselves, things referring to that which is strictly evident in consciousness. Husserl’s phenomenology was in search of original phenomena called as the ‘things themselves’.The phenomenological movement has been characterized as the ‘movement towards objectivity’². A quest for certainty prevails in all of Husserl’s investigations. The realm of transcendental consciousness is the realm of ‘absolute’ Being in which all regions of Being have their root³.The slogan of Phenomenology, “to the things themselves” deals with the Phenomena, the objects as experienced in conscious acts related to objects through intentionality. Husserl defined phenomenology as the science of the essence of conscious experience, intentional experience, consciousness characterized as pure consciousness.

Phenomenological standpoint is aimed at returning to the ‘things themselves’, things and meanings given in self-evidence as constituted by consciousness. Phenomenology is a way of clarification, a description of the experience of objectivity emerging from subjectivity. Husserl understood objectivity in terms of subjectivity of consciousness by means of his concept of intentionality, the lived consciousness of anything. Phenomenological description is concerned with the essential

nature of experience of consciousness. Phenomenology claims the status of a presupposition- less philosophy. Phenomenology is a science of transcendental subjectivity as object- constituting subjectivity with acts of consciousness in which objects are given in self-evidence, a founding discipline claiming to be a rigorous science. In Husserl's later thought the ontic apriori and the constitutive apriori forms an inseparable unity corresponding to the noetic and noematic aspects through a process of ideation. Husserl's theory of genetic constitution is a result of his theory of ideation which uncovers the historicity of intentionality, rejecting both psychologism and subjectivism. Pure geometry, pure logic and pure mathematics are grounded on phenomenology being genetic and eidetic in nature, the transcendental and immanent ground.

Phenomenology, as a philosophical movement was founded by Edmund Husserl and was later expanded by a group of his followers at the universities of Gottingen and Munich in Germany. A systematic reflection on the structures of consciousness was the main concern of phenomenology. The objective study of consciousness and the contents of conscious experiences was the main concern of phenomenology. Investigating the essential structures of experience through systematic reflection was taken up by phenomenology. Phenomenology works out the essential correlation between subjectivity and objectivity, the noetic-

noematic correlation, the intentional acts and their objects. Phenomenological reflection helped in having a critical approach towards sciences establishing a definite relation between philosophy and science. Husserl treated phenomenology as the first and only genuine philosophy, the first rigorous science, the absolute foundation philosophers have been searching. Levin⁴ recognizes three stages of understanding, the naive or natural, the scientific and the phenomenological. The phenomenological world is the absolute, epistemologically prior requiring no ground. Phenomenology is conceived as the rigorous apodictic science leading to social autonomy. Socrates's examined life is exemplified in Husserl's phenomenology⁵.

3. Stages of Phenomenology

The Development of Husserl's Phenomenology have been interpreted in different ways involving two or three stages. Eugen Fink characterized Husserl's philosophical development involving three stages, the first stage of psychologism and anti-psychologism (1887-1901), the second stage of descriptive phenomenology (1901-1913) and the third stage of transcendental phenomenology (1913-1938)⁶. These three stages correspond to his stay at Halle, Gottingen and Freiburg. According to another interpretation, Husserl's phenomenology involved two stages, the earlier stage of descriptive psychology and the later stage of transcendental phenomenology. The earlier stage of the *Logical Investigations*⁷ is descriptive psychology which differs from empirical psychology that is concerned with causal explanation and not concerned with describing the essence of psychological acts. But phenomenology at this stage is not concerned with causal explanation but concerned with describing types of psychological acts. The later stage of phenomenology starting with *The Idea of Phenomenology*⁸ marks a transition to a radical version of Husserlian phenomenology. Many of the major themes of Husserl's later radical phenomenology is introduced in this book. The radical phenomenology includes themes such as phenomenological reduction, eidetic abstraction of the pure phenomenon, different kinds of

immanent and transcendence and the theory of constitution. The early stage studies essences that are unreduced. The later stage of phenomenology studies phenomenologically and transcendently reduced and eidetically abstracted pure phenomena presented to consciousness. The essences studied in the later stage of phenomenology are intentionally inexistent. The concept of the transcendental ego is central in Husserl's later thought that he wrote an article on "phenomenology" in the fourteenth edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*⁹ in 1929 where he described transcendental subjectivity. According to another interpretation, Husserl's phenomenology contained three stages, the first stage is anti-psychologistic establishing objective foundations of logic and mathematics, the second stage is transcendental idealism, a metaphysical position moving away from Brentano's descriptive psychology, the third stage is a phenomenology of intersubjectivity leading to an ontology of the life-world which is a social world of culture and history. The *Philosophy of Arithmetic*¹⁰ was the first book published by Husserl in 1891 which is a form of psychologism reducing mathematics to psychology. This book attempts to provide a psychological foundation of Arithmetics, combining his mathematical, psychological and philosophical ideas. Gottlob Frege, professor of mathematics at Jena, one of the greatest logicians in history wrote a

critical review of *Philosophy of Arithmetic* criticizing the book on the ground that it reduced logic and mathematics to psychology. Husserl was influenced by Frege's anti-psychologism which have contributed much for further development of his thinking.

In 1900-1901, the first phenomenological work was published, *Logical Investigations* in two volumes. The first volume contains an attack on psychologism, the second volume contains six descriptive-psychological and epistemological investigations. It is Publication of *Logical Investigations* led to his appointment as the associative professor of the University of Gottingen. Husserl developed the method of bracketing around 1906. The method of bracketing can be regarded as a development of the preliminary methodological ideas already contained in the *Logical Investigations*. The manuscript of the three books of the *Ideas*¹¹ though completed in 1912, the first book was published in 1913. In the *Ideas* (1913), Husserl developed a radical view on the inter-relations between the world and the cogito in the realm of intentional consciousness. From 1910/1911 and 1913 respectively, he was the co-editor of *Logos* and the *Year Book For Phenomenology and Phenomenological Research*. The *Logos* first issue contained the article "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science". Husserl was in Gottingen till 1916. In the year 1916, Husserl became a full professor in Freiburg. In the

Ideas, Husserl demanded bracketing the existence of objects for a phenomenological description. The method of bracketing focused on the contents of intentional acts for a phenomenological description of the intentional acts. Before the publication of *Ideas I*, two texts leading to the *Ideas* were published, *The Idea of Phenomenology* and *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*¹². The idea of reduction and the associated ideas is contained in detail in *Ideas I*. In 1923, though he was invited to Berlin, remained in Freiburg writing and completing works on which he was engaged. Husserl retired from his professorship in Freiburg. In 1929, he went to Paris, his lectures were published as *Cartesian Meditations*, in 1931. He published the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*¹³. *Cartesian Meditations*¹⁴ was published within the period of his 'genetic' phenomenology. The first four Meditations consist of a restatement of the basic themes of phenomenology and the Fifth Meditation deals with the theory of intersubjectivity. In 1935 November, Husserl delivered a series of lectures in Prague on the topic "Crisis of European Sciences" which was published as his last work *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*¹⁵ in 1936. In the *Crisis*, Husserl dealt with his conception of the life-world in detail and modified his method of phenomenological reduction and criticized the mathematization of nature

in physical science. Husserl died on 27th April 1938 in Freiburg. In 1939 *Experience and Judgement*¹⁶ was published in Prague.

According to Husserl, the world of everyday life is forgotten in the scientific world view and the human aspect is also neglected. The *Crisis* analysis of the life-world is more humanistic in its approach. The two parts of the *Crisis* was published in 1936, the later parts were published in 1954. The life-world was already discussed in Husserl's *Ideas II* written in 1912, but the new approach with a humanistic colouring appeared only in the *Crisis*. The life-world is the ground of scientific experiences. The laws of science describe the world of ordinary experience where as the life-world forms the fundamental experience which is different from the world of ordinary experience. In the *Crisis* Husserl was concerned very much about the scientific consciousness of every day lived world. The scientific world was based on the life-world, not the other way. The scientific outlook required an investigation of the life-world. The life-world forms the universal framework for human experiences. The life-world conception have helped to overcome the opposition between subject and object. The concept of subjectivity for objectivity became the ground for intersubjectivity, and phenomenology as an environmental description resulted in Husserl's concept of life-world. Husserl's concept of intersubjectivity resulted in the concept of

Life-World. The problem of intersubjectivity and the idea of empathy with other's that one's own experience similar to other's experiences, is emphasized by Husserl. The other is grasped analogically and grasped within the ownness of the ego.

Generally speaking, different periods are distinguished, the earlier period of psychologism, descriptive phenomenology which is phenomenology in a narrower sense, and the later transcendental phenomenology. Of these three periods, the earlier periods are of secondary importance, and are simply stages of development towards phenomenology proper which is transcendental phenomenology. The two important stages distinguished in Husserl's phenomenology are, the descriptive stage of the earlier period, descriptive phenomenology, and the transcendental stage of the later period, transcendental phenomenology. *Logical Investigations* characterizes phenomenology as a descriptive psychology intended to get rid of all assumptions of psychology and metaphysics. The *Ideas* provides a systematic presentation of transcendental phenomenology. The method of phenomenology aimed at presuppositionless philosophy, establishes phenomenology as 'first philosophy'. The method of reduction, paves way for transcendental phenomenology, pure consciousness or transcendental consciousness being the residue of the 'epoche'. Essences

at the transcendental level are ‘intentionality inexistent’ and ‘existentially dependent’ upon the transcendental ego. Transcendental phenomenology is characterized as a science of transcendental subjectivity. The transcendental subjectivity is the source of all knowledge forms, with the denotation of totality of actual and possible life of knowing. The world has its meaning as existing as the intentional meaning product of the transcendental subjectivity¹⁷. Descriptive and transcendental phenomenology may either be analysed as types or simply as stages in Husserl’s phenomenology. Taking it in the former may mean that these two turns are somehow opposed to each other, and taking it in the latter may mean that the transcendental turn is more matured than the descriptive turn. The latter view as complementary has been advanced by J.N.Mohanty in his recent work on transcendental Phenomenology¹⁸.

In the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl was a realist, objects exists independent of the mind. In the *Ideas* Husserl was an idealist, the world being constituted by transcendental subjectivity. In the *Cartesian Meditations* and the *Crisis*, Husserl claims to be a pluralist emphasizing intersubjectivity and life-world. In the early phase of Husserl’s thinking he was concerned with the phenomenological descriptive analysis of experience and describing the general structures of consciousness. In the later phase of the genetic phenomenology he was concerned with

clarifying the experience of pure ego and the transcendental community of egos or monads and the constitution of the world, the world common to all. The influence of Husserl on 20th century European thought have felt not only on phenomenology and existentialism but also areas such as hermeneutics, post-structuralism and deconstruction. Among the thinkers influenced by Husserl include Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Paul Ricoeur.

Carrying out a phenomenological investigation is of utmost importance. Only Husserlian phenomenology began a systematic study of the essential properties of consciousness in Western Philosophy. Suggestion regarding carrying out a Phenomenological investigation has been given by Don Ihde in his books such as *Experimental Phenomenology*¹⁹, *Existential Techniques*²⁰ and *Consequences of Phenomenology*²¹. Pursuing phenomenology in practice enables to enter transpersonal domains of experience. Husserl has emphasized that phenomenology is a method of self discovery leading to self-knowledge. Works by Husserlian scholars²² suggests that he has a unique position in the history of western thought.

4. Antecedents and Consequents of Phenomenology

Antecedents of Phenomenology

The origin of phenomenology has been traced in the ancient Greek Philosophy, scholastic philosophy and Cartesian philosophy. It is stated “Brentano’s theory of mind was developed under Aristotelian, scholastic, and Cartesian influences and centered on the scholastic concept of intentionality”²³. Phenomenology originated as an epistemological movement whose impressive nature can be traced even in ancient Greek philosophy, though Husserl used the word phenomenon in his own way having a connotation different from the Greeks. St Augustine, the medieval thinker had his own notion of Phenomenology. “St. Augustine was not only the first forerunner of Husserl’s

phenomenology and of existentialism but also a forerunner of psychoanalysis”²⁴. Christoph Fredrich Oetinger introduced the term phenomenology in 1637 as the study of the relation between things in the visible world. In the 18th century Johnn Heinrich Lambert characterized phenomenology as the theory of appearances fundamental to empirical knowledge. It is stated that as a student of Stumpf and Brentano, Husserl was very much influenced by both. Stumpf (1898-1936) was earlier influenced by Brentano by about 1865. The influence of Stumpf on Husserl was so strong that Husserl dedicated his first phenomenological work *Logical Investigations* to Stumpf. To Stumpf, phenomenology was only a propaedeutic science, but to Husserl phenomenology was a science of the description of the pure Being. Stumpf was a psychologist, an experimentalist and also a philosopher.

In 1889 Franz Brentano used the term as descriptive phenomenology and thereafter Husserl developed his own conception of phenomenology as a philosophical discipline concerned with study of consciousness, intentionality and meaning. Husserl’s phenomenology developed out of descriptive psychology or descriptive phenomenology of Brentano. Immanuel Kant used the term followed by Johann Gottlob Fichte and G.W.F.Hegel. Late in the 19th century, the term was used in the technical sense in which Husserl used it. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*

clarifies the term phenomenology as follows: “A term used in philosophy and psychology to denote a study of the verifying forms in which something appears or is manifested, as opposed to studies of causal origins, real constitution, significance etc... which go beyond what is apparent”²⁵. Husserl introduced his phenomenology in the introduction to his *Ideas* as follows: “pure phenomenology, to which we are here seeking the way, whose unique position in regard to all other sciences. Now differently as the phenomenon may be used in such contexts, and diverse as they may be the meanings which it bears, it is certain that phenomenology also deals with all these ‘phenomena’ and all their meanings, but from a quite different point of view, the effect of which is to modify in a determinate way all the meanings which the term bears in the old established sciences. Only as thus modified do these meanings enter the phenomenological sphere”²⁶. In the same work, Husserl characterizes phenomenology as an eidetic science. “Pure or transcendental phenomenology will be established not as a science of facts, but as a science of essential Being (as eidetic science), a science which aims exclusively at establishing knowledge of essence and absolutely no facts”²⁷. Husserl have established phenomenology as a rigorous science, a science which is the common foundation of all the sciences.

a) Direct influences

Franz Brentano is an immediate predecessor of Husserl, who influenced Husserl to a great extent in the development of phenomenology. From Brentano and Meinong, Husserl developed a set of necessary structural relations between the ego and the objects of experience, the relations characterized as intentionality. The traditional notion of mind as an inner self-contained realm was rejected by Husserl. Mind is directed to objects external to it. Following the Austrian psychologist and philosopher Brentano, Husserl calls the object-directedness intentionality. According to Husserl, consciousness is not in the mind, but conscious of something.

The concept of intentionality played an important role in Husserl's phenomenology, the idea of intentionality being borrowed from Brentano, but Husserl used it in his own way for his philosophical thought. Husserl distinguished between his phenomenological psychology which emphasized an a priori psychology concerned with the structures of transcendental subjectivity and the psychology of intentionality advocated by Brentano. Brentano was influenced by the scholastic concept of intentionality and developed his psychology from which Husserl's phenomenology emerged as pure psychology distinct

from Brentano's psychology. Brentano was an advocate of descriptive psychology. Husserl was influenced by Brentano's philosophical discipline called 'descriptive phenomenology'²⁸ rather than his 'empirical psychology'. Brentano names the relation in which mental and physical phenomena stand to one another as 'intentional inexistence', physical phenomena intentionally in-exist in mental phenomena. The concept of 'inexistence' was used by medieval thinkers, and Brentano also used the concept which influenced Husserl considerably. Though Husserl was also concerned with analyzing and describing the experience of the external world which causes the experiences, but employed the method of bracketing by putting them into brackets and called his investigations phenomenology instead of descriptive psychology. The slogan of Husserlian phenomenology is 'Back to things themselves' which make possible the infallible and immediate self-evidence of inner perception.

Husserl in investigating the rich structure of conscious acts with different modes of clarity and modes of givenness distinguished between empty intentions and fulfilled intentions. Rejecting the causal mode of explanation framework of Brentano's intentionality, the method of reduction introduced by Husserl made possible the development of the concept of noema. The noesis-noema correlation is an important relation in Husserl's phenomenology with much implications, developing into the

concept of constitution in Husserl's later philosophy. Brentano was confused between the content and the object of representation. Following Hofler²⁹, Twardowski attempted to remove this confusion. It is as if to prove his point, he devoted a whole monograph to the topic. Twardowski and Meinong were the first generation of Brentano's disciples.

Alexius Meinong (1853-1920), the Austrian philosopher was an important figure who influenced Husserl in his phenomenological development. Meinong was a student of Brentano at the University of Vienna. An equivocal relation between objects and minds is worked out by Meinong. Meinong was influenced by Brentano's principles 'No act without an object' and distinguished between content and object. The problem of referring to non-existent objects was dealt by Meinong by stating that mental acts referred to non-existent objects having content but no object. The essential nature of objects was called 'Sosein' by Meinong which he maintained as independent of its 'sein' or existence. For example, Golden Mountain has 'sosein' but does not exist, does not have existence or 'sein'. Accordingly, sentences stating properties to non-existent objects are meaningful and are either true or false. According to Meinong, two different contents refer to two referring expressions with two different meanings as in the case of 'evening star' and 'morning star'.

Every expression carrying a thought of property refer to an object along with it.

Twardowski starts one of his books with “it is one of the best known positions of psychology, hardly contested by anyone, that every mental phenomenon intends an immanent object”³⁰. Meinong also tells us that it is essential for everything psychic to have an object. In his treatise titled “Towards a theory of content of objects of presentation”, Twardowski distinguishes three distinct elements namely, the ‘mental act’, the ‘content’ and the ‘object’. ‘Object’ stands for ‘intentions’ in the sense in which it is used by both Meinong and Husserl. Both Husserl and Meinong, following Twardowski, maintained that the object of an intentional act need not have any being, but has the subjective correlate of the object as a lived experience³¹. The subjective correlate is called the ‘content’ in Twardowski’s sense. An unreal thing, according to Twardowski must exist. It is to be related to noema in Husserl’s sense. Meinong distinguished ‘content’ and ‘object’. Meinong contended that there must be ‘something’ in the mental act which correspond to the object which he called the ‘content’. It is the quality of mental act which enabled it to point to a specific object. Object is defined as that towards which mental act is directed.

Regarding the exact relation between Brentano, Twardowski and Husserl, Coffa³² considers how Twardowski has examined Brentano's idea of 'improper representation' in order to establish that Bolzano was wrong in denying that "there corresponds to every part of the content of representation a certain part of the object which is represented through it"³³. This conveys the idea of its bearings on what phenomenologists call the 'principle of phenomenological accessibility', according to which no state of affairs is thinkable that would be in principle unknowable, in the sense of not being presentable in intuition. Intuitions of evidence becomes the most important problem for Husserl also.

Both Husserl and Meinong shared certain issues in common. Both admitted phenomena other than physical and psychical. Both emphasized the need to study type of objects neglected in ontology. Both asserted the need of disregarding the question of existence to these objects. Meinong's distinction of 'content and object' led to a new discipline called the 'theory of objects'³⁴ which as it is evident from his account does not mean to talk about a theory of individual things. What he had in mind is a general theory of intention, a theory of entities. He stated that some objects are existing, some are not existing but subsisting, while some are neither existing nor subsisting but real of which we can

think about. Meinong stated that it is due to the prejudice in favour of the actual which leads to suppose that all objects must be actual. Meinong also distinguishes between objects which are 'objectives' and objects which are not 'objectives'. In the case of the former, existence is non-sensical, it is only a fact. In the latter case, the object exists but not a fact.

Bolzano and Frege had influence on Husserl's theory of intentions. Frege's idea of 'sense' of a linguistic expression is identical with Husserl's notion of 'reference' which is the same as intention for Husserl. Frege's notion of reference Husserl calls the object intended through the intention. But Husserl differs from both Bolzano and Frege in that whereas Bolzano's 'representation-in-themselves' and Frege's 'sense' are Platonic entities, Husserl's 'intentions' are not Platonic entities but mental. Bolzano distinguishes between 'propositions which are uttered', 'propositions which are thought' and 'propositions in themselves'. 'Propositions which are uttered' is any utterance by which something is asserted as either true or false. Propositions which are not formulated in words but simply thought are called 'apprehended propositions'. The 'proposition in-itself', Bolzano means 'any assertion whatever that something is or is not regardless of whether that assertion is true or false, is formulated in words by anyone or not, even whether thought or not'. The 'proposition-in-itself' is the content of the thought.

Bolzano also distinguishes three types of ideas, ‘uttered idea’, ‘apprehended idea’ and ‘ideas –in-itself’. ‘Uttered idea’ is the linguistic expression, ‘apprehended idea’ is the subjective thought and ‘idea in itself’ stands for objective-thought-content. An ‘idea-in-itself’ is not the same as its object. An ‘idea in itself’ may have no object, may have one object or more than one objects. Singular ideas stand for one object, general idea stand for more than one objects. The relation between ‘idea-in-itself’ and ‘object’ leads to semantics which has some features of Frege’s view. Frege’s distinction between ‘linguistic expression’ ‘sense’ and ‘reference’ finds similarities to the three-fold scheme of Bolzano, ‘linguistic expression’, ‘idea-in-itself’, ‘object’. Husserl credits Bolzano as one of the greatest logicians of all times. Husserl’s pure logic have a two-level-structure. The first level is that of propositions, the logic of statements consisting of meanings and their various combinations. The second level consists of the ‘things’ to which statements refer, a formal ontology. The two-level structure of pure logic incorporates two one-level conceptions of Bolzano and Meinong respectively³⁵. Bolzano’s conception of pure logic is based on the propositional level involving representational ideas, propositions and truths. Meinong’s conception of pure logic is based on things level involving object like entities and other categories of formal ontology. In the further development of Husserl’s

pure logic, a third level of logic, logic of speech and even an apriori grammar for all possible languages. Husserl's later phenomenology of meanings includes the theoretical insights from which rules concerning legitimate and illegitimate meanings could be derived. Husserl was mainly concerned with the study of propositional meanings and ontological objects meant through them.

b) Indirect Influences

In the history of philosophy, the term phenomenology was used by thinkers in different ways. Rene Descartes (1596-1660), David Hume (1711-1776), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), and Hegel (1781-1848) were some modern philosophers who influenced Husserl in different ways. Husserl's work *Cartesian Meditations* proves his essential connection with Descartes, the aim of the work being total revolutionary discovery of a science grounded on absolute foundations, a total reformation of all the sciences, philosophy as an all inclusive unity of sciences with absolutely rational grounding.

Husserl was a radical follower of Rene Descartes in the search for an epistemological foundation for sciences. Husserl took up the Cartesian goal in a new way by exploring the essence of the cogito. A rational humanistic and scientific world was aimed at by Husserl for

which only phenomenology was eligible as a philosophical movement. Disinterestedness and detachment was the phenomenological attitude adopted by Husserl for concentrating on the nature of conscious experience. The essential relation between man and environment was seriously taken up by Husserl especially in his later writings. Descartes was a revolutionary thinker giving proper attention to the subject, and inaugurated the idea of founding knowledge in the pure immanence of the ego cogito. But he did not recognize the ego cogito as a field of transcendental experience. Descartes' method of doubting aimed at absolute foundation for knowledge finds a progressive radicalization in Husserl's philosophical development of transcendental idealism during the period between 1900 and 1913. Husserl based on his rule of transcendental subjectivity, the apriori structure and content object constituting subjectivity, founded a new scientific philosophy. Husserl as a radical thinker was interested in providing a firm epistemological foundation for sciences. The Cartesian goal of founding sciences on absolute certainty is very evident in Husserl's project to explore the essence of the cogito through phenomenological reduction as a radical modification of Cartesian method of doubt, and developing philosophy as a rigorous science on the basis of absolute evidence. Husserl's ideal of

certainty is not Descartes mathematical certainty but apodictic certainty claiming ultimate rigour.

As an original Philosopher, Husserl understands epistemology in a rigorous way than any philosopher. Descartes proceeded with the method of doubt and arrived at cogito, but did not analyze it further. To Husserl, an understanding of the nature of cogito or consciousness, a detailed description of consciousness was of utmost importance. According to Husserl, Descartes separated the world from the ego and treated the world as an illusion. The intersubjective character of experience was not recognized by Descartes. To Husserl, the world is the horizon of our experiences shared and confirmed by not only the ego but other egos also. Husserl wanted to explore the phenomenological field of pure consciousness. Descartes was aware of the richness of the ego as the source of validity, but did not get rid of the psychological and empirical nature of the ego. According to Husserl, only transcendental ego can establish the objective reality of the world. The transcendental ego constituting other egos as equal partners constitute transcendental intersubjectivity providing the foundation for the objective intersubjective world.

Hume is another thinker who influenced Husserl, having positive and negative impacts. Husserl was in search of the source of valid and certain knowledge. Intuition of essences was the fundamental aspect of the possibility of knowledge for Husserl, but Hume as an empiricist was against essences and denied essences. The positive impact of Hume on Husserl can be stated with respect to Hume's psychology as an attempt to provide a pure phenomenology, a philosophical transcendental philosophy. Husserl understood transcendent in terms of the immanent, but Hume tried to describe the world in terms of impressions and ideas. Hume's theory of knowledge can be taken as an anticipation of intuition oriented philosophy of immanent consciousness which phenomenology worked out. Husserl wanted to overcome the positive attitude of empiricism. The empiricist failed to understand the nature of facts, and rejected essences which were genuine data given to consciousness. The empiricist positivism of David Hume have influenced Husserl in establishing phenomenology as genuine positivism meaning the absolute unbiased grounding of all science on clear apprehension. Hume reduced the objective world to a series of discrete sensations resulting in fictionalism which led to the subjective explanation of reality by the categories of understanding of Kant and ultimately to the truth of the transcendental ego of Husserl. Hume's

psychological explanation of sciences finds him connected with Brentano and Husserl. According to Husserl, Hume had the phenomenological insight that the life of consciousness is an act sense giving constitution.

Immanuel Kant used the term phenomenology as a science dealing with things as they appear to us. Phenomenology was understood by Kant as an enquiry into the conditions of the possibility of objectivity as experienced subjectively, also understood by Hegel and later by Heidegger but did not influence Husserl in terms of terminology. Like Kant Husserl was also concerned with inquiring into the fundamental conditions of the possibility of experience. To Kant the condition of knowledge is contained in the subject. Kant emphasized two factors of knowledge forms of sensibility and categories of understanding the former being attributed to object and the latter that of mind. To Husserl, transcendental subjectivity constituting the world has some parallelism with Kant's analysis of experience in which a synthesis of the apriori pure forms of sensibility with empirical data and the categories of understanding occurs as a contribution of the intellect. But Husserl's analysis of transcendental subjectivity does not involve any apriori forms imposed on the sense experience. Similarly, Kant did not mean any method of reduction as in the case of Husserl suspending belief in the reality of the world. Phenomenology is different from phenomenalism as

a doctrine that all that exists is the appearance to the senses and also different from Kant's distinction between phenomena and noumena. Husserl solves the problem of dualism in Kant by returning to a universal knowledge of 'things in themselves' apprehended by consciousness with a purpose to have a scientific grounding for philosophy. By his method, Husserl seeks a scientific foundation for universally objective knowledge. Kant's Copernican revolution consists in his transcendental theory regarding the phenomenal world constituted by the knowing subject confirming to the apriori principles contained in the subject. Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is different from that of Descartes and Kant with his theory of transcendental constitution.

Hegel used the term phenomenology as an approach to philosophy exploring phenomena in order to understand the Absolute, logical, ontological and metaphysical spirit underlying phenomena. Husserl used the term phenomenology as the reflective study of the essence of consciousness as experienced from the first - person point of view. Hegel used the word phenomenology in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*³⁶. He understood phenomenology as an ascent of consciousness from the Sensuous Stage to Absolute knowledge, a discipline that describes the unfolding of consciousness. Hegel's phenomenology also deals with phenomena, but understood as appearances of the Absolute

Mind. To Hegel, phenomenology was a programme for overcoming Kantian skepticism, by demonstrating the possibility of knowing things in themselves. Hegel was very much specific on “a programme for the phenomenology: the overcoming of Kantian scepticism, the demonstration of the possibility of knowing things in themselves”³⁷. It is stated that Husserl, when he was involved in formulating the concept of phenomenology, knew nothing about Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Hegel’s phenomenology is a phenomenology of spirit, not phenomenology of consciousness.

Consequents of phenomenology

Husserl’s phenomenology was criticized and developed by Husserl himself and his students such as Edith Stein and Roman Ingarden, by existentialists such as Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty and by other philosophers such as Max Scheler, Paul Ricoeur, Immanuel Levinas and sociologists, such as Alfred Schutz and Eric Voegelin.

Existential phenomenology rejects the concept of transcendental ego. Heidegger changed the direction of phenomenology from consciousness to existence. He was interested in conceptualising experience by analysing the different aspects of human existence.

Heidegger treated phenomenology as a means to understand the nature of human existence. Heidegger felt that phenomenology was inadequate as a philosophical enquiry, and he moved towards existentialism. The concept of freedom was emphasized by Heidegger. Husserl was not interested in the category of possibility while Heidegger was concerned with the category of possibility, the future and choice. Husserl was mainly concerned with investigating, consciousness and the intentional correlation between conscious acts and objects, and understanding the transcendental constituting consciousness. Heidegger had a different concept of phenomenology from that of Husserl and did not give attention to consciousness and intentionality. Heidegger was interested in the human 'being-in-the world' through a special type of inquiry into the nature of human existence (Dasein). Heidegger's *Being and Time*³⁸ gave importance to human 'being-in-the-world'. Heidegger made use of phenomenology to deal with the problem of meaning of Being, a fundamental ontology. Heidegger claimed a hermeneutic type of phenomenological development, a hermeneutical understanding of phenomenology.

Jean Paul Sartre acknowledged his connection with phenomenological philosophy though he is recognized as an existentialist. His existential philosophy was worked out in his best

known work *Being and Nothingness*³⁹ Sartre, the phenomenological philosopher was particularly associated with existentialism as a philosophical movement. The concepts of freedom and responsibility were the central concerns of Sartre's existentialism. For Husserl, the meaning of human existence and the concept of authentic existence was as a result of the transcendental attitude of reflection. To Sartre, man is 'condemned to be free'. Though Sartre was influenced by Husserl, he deviated from phenomenology and argued against the phenomenological method of reduction as a psychological process not having any effect on the existence of the being of the world. Husserl's method of reduction aiming to separate the realm of consciousness is viewed by Sartre as meaningless. Later, existentialism having its roots in phenomenology paved way to subsequent movements such as post-structuralism and deconstruction.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the author of the book *Phenomenology of Perception*⁴⁰ argued against Husserl's phenomenological reduction. According to Merleau-Ponty, consciousness is inseparable from body, and is grounded in perception. There is no pure self consciousness; self consciousness is depending on the body. Consciousness without body is impossible. Husserl's transcendental pure consciousness is meaningless for Merleau-Ponty.

In various autobiographical works, Paul Ricoeur refers to the influences he received in his first years of philosophical searching from Edmund Husserl. According to Ricoeur, it is the intimate relation between person and community that humanizes intersubjectivity in Husserl's phenomenology. Paul Ricoeur's philosophy cannot be understood without recognizing the influence he received from Husserl's phenomenology. He dedicated many articles to phenomenology in various philosophical journals beginning in the late 1940s. He translated from German the text *Ideas* which appeared in 1950. Paul Ricoeur was influenced by Husserl's phenomenology in shaping his thought, in his reflexive rigour, great analysis and radical articulations within the matrix of phenomenology. Paul Ricoeur thought about hermeneutic phenomenology as an improvement of pure phenomenology following Gadamer. Paul Ricoeur and Derrida added a linguistic dimension to the analysis of phenomenological consciousness and intentionality as a further development of phenomenology. The intentional nature of consciousness is applied to Paul Ricoeur's hermeneutics of understanding linguistic expressions in communication having intentional meaning for speakers.

5. Conclusion

A general discussion of the significance and contribution of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology though not exhaustive is intended to throw light on the problematic in a preliminary way. The need of modifying the method of phenomenology was not felt until the publication of his *Crisis* in which he understood the concept of life-world in a detailed and concrete sense. The scientific view lacked a humanistic colouring which he tried to regain through his concept of life-world. The concept of subjectivity for objectivity directed towards an intersubjective explanation of conscious experience is to be discussed which will throw light on the rich content of the life-world experience. The problematic of the tie-up between the concepts of intersubjectivity, life-world and social context needs throwing light on the concepts in detail and interrelated issues.

The concept of intentionality as a consequence of the method of phenomenology plays an important role in establishing phenomenology as a significant movement of the 20th century. The method of phenomenology and the concept of intentionality provides a background for phenomenological investigations. The depth of these concepts and the implications are to be worked out in detail. In the next chapter the explication of these concepts are attempted aimed at throwing light on the relation between these two concepts in order to measure the gravity of the relation within the framework of the problematic discussed.

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CHAPTER II

**THE CONCEPT OF INTENTIONALITY
AND THE METHOD OF REDUCTION**

THE CONCEPT OF INTENTIONALITY AND THE METHOD OF REDUCTION

1. Brentano and Husserl on Intentionality.
2. The Structure of Intentionality: Noesis and Noema.
3. Natural Standpoint and Phenomenological stand point.
4. The Method of Reduction- Different Stages.
5. Reduction and Constitution.
6. Conclusion.

CHAPTER II

THE CONCEPT OF INTENTIONALITY AND THE METHOD OF REDUCTION

1. Brentano and Husserl on Intentionality

The common use of the word intentional means 'done on purpose' which is not to be confused with the word intentional in intentionality so that to say that a mental state is intentional does not mean that the mental state is brought about in purpose. The word intentional in Phenomenology have a definite meaning that every mental state is directed towards object. Intentionality is taken as object directedness of consciousness, and consciousness not taken as self-enclosed. In intentionality, the intentional object is analyzed as intended by the intentional act. The act-object relation, the correlational structure of intentionality, forms the necessary structural relation, the noesis (the mental act Intending the object) and the noema (the object as experienced). The noema is the object phenomenologically understood, Phenomenologically experienced. The noema is grasped only in the phenomenological attitude.

The term intentionality is derived from the Latin word 'intentio' derived from the verb 'intendere' meaning being directed towards something. There is difference between the words intentionality and intensionality. Intensional is used with reference to sentences so that sentences are intensional.

Intentional is used with reference to mental states so that mental states are intentional. Mental states have intentionality, but no physical states have intentionality. In the phenomenological tradition, the importance of the concept of intentionality is identified. Husserl was influenced by Brentano's concept of intentionality having the notion of intentional in-existence. Brentano used the term intentionality as a philosophical conception distinguishing between mental phenomena and physical phenomena. Brentano formulated his notion of intentionality influenced by the traditional scholastic notion of intentionality. Brentano re-introduced the medieval concept of intentionality in his book *Psychology From An Empirical Standpoint*¹. Brentano viewed intentionality as a necessary and sufficient condition of the psyche. According to Brentano, objects of intentional states have a special type of existence, intentional inexistence being the characteristic of mental phenomena, containing the object within the mental phenomena. Apart from distinguishing between mental phenomena and physical phenomena, Brentano's theory of intentionality also explains the independence of intentional property of mental phenomena from the existence or non-existence of objects. Husserl's theory of intentionality was developed under the influence of both Brentano and Frege. It was Brentano who shifted Husserl's attention from mathematics to philosophy. Brentano wanted to shape psychology as a science for which he distinguished between psychical phenomena and physical phenomena and also explained the independence of

intentional property of mental phenomena from the existence or non-existence of objects.

Aristotle defined psychology as the science of the soul. Psychology was defined as the science of the human soul distinguishing between psychology and natural sciences. While psychology studied human soul, natural sciences studied physical bodies. Brentano gave a modern definition to psychology as the science of mental phenomena so that no metaphysical assumption is involved. Brentano was in search of a criterion that distinguished mental phenomena from physical phenomena. The scholastics of the middle ages described mental phenomena as intentional inexistence of object meaning mental phenomenon including object within itself. Like scholastics, Brentano distinguished between mental phenomena and physical phenomena characterizing mental phenomena as intentional meaning directed towards objects in contrast to physical phenomena lacking intentionality. Husserl accepted Brentano's concept of intentionality stating that 'consciousness is consciousness of something'. But Husserl did not mean all mental phenomena as intentional but only conscious acts are intentional. To Brentano, objects are immanent, within the mind, mental entities. Husserl is critical of Brentano's thesis that objects are immanent. Objects, according to Husserl are abstract, neither in the mind nor extra mental, which he calls as 'noema'. The conscious act is within the mind which is called noesis, the object of conscious act is not within the mind which is called noema.

Meinong and Twardowski were influenced by Brentano's doctrine of intentionality. Meinong following Brentano stated that every psychic phenomena have an object. Twardowski also stated that every mental phenomena intends an immanent object². Husserl investigated the rich structure of conscious acts in order to explore the different modes of givenness and modes of clarity. Husserl investigated intentionality as the unique characteristic of conscious act by recognizing phenomenology as a philosophical method which ultimately led to the transcendental ego and the formal structure of conscious experience, the intentional structure of consciousness. Husserl was critical of Brentano's idea of intentional inexistence. Brentano conceived the object as contained in the mental act. Husserl postulated independent existence to the object, not as contained in the mental act. In the first edition of the *Logical Investigations* of 1900, a descriptive psychological account of the way in which an act intends an object is given. In the second edition of the *Logical Investigations* a change in the treatment of intentionality occurs due to the introduction of the method of reduction in *The Idea of Phenomenology* and explained in detail in the *Ideas I*. The terms 'noesis' and 'noema' are used for conscious acts and intended objects respectively. The noesis and noema are correlative terms, the noema necessarily following from the noesis. Noema is not an empirical object but essence given in originary way and evident which is grasped in primordial intuition in contrast to empirical intuition. Empirical intuition is transformed into essential intuition or primordial intuition through a

process of ideation³. The essence is grasped in its primordial form from intuition of an imaginative order⁴, with reduction, transcendental consciousness which is absolute is arrived at. Essences are intentionally inexistent and existentially dependent upon the transcendental consciousness.

2. The Structure of Intentionality : Noesis and Noema

The intentional structure of consciousness characterized as noesis-noema correlation is investigated through which the rich content of consciousness is explicated discovering the inner horizon of consciousness. Noema is the object of consciousness having bracketed out its transcendental status, a meant object constituted by the intentional consciousness. An understanding of the noema is of great importance because the concept plays an important role in Husserl's philosophy. The term noema refers to the objective correlates of intentionalities, the objective correlates of the transcendental attitude. The noema is like a concept different from the object of consciousness that refer to a particular thing. This way of understanding noema as a mediating entity is taken to be incorrect⁵. The noema is the object of intentionality, the objective correlate as experienced in the phenomenological attitude. It is neither a copy nor a substitute of the object. It is even not a sense referring to the object

but the object itself from the phenomenological standpoint. The noesis refer to the intentional acts by which objects are intended from the phenomenological standpoint. Noesis and Noema in phenomenology have Greek origin, the verb 'noein' means 'to think'. The suffix 'ma'- added to the verb means the effect of the action. The term noema means the object thought of. Generally noema is mistakenly taken in a psychological sense.

The Fregean reading of Husserl and a comparison between Fregean Sinn and Husserl's noema is proposed by Dagfinn Follesdal⁶. The two interpretations have given rise to a controversy in which Smith, Mc Intyre, Sokolowski and many others figure. The controversy appeared in the Symposium on Husserl and Frege's in which Sokolowski and Mc Intyre clashed on points of detail⁷. John Drummond⁸ makes a distinction between the interpretation by Frege and the interpretation by Dagfinn Follesdal. Drummond is infavour of Follesdal's account of noema in the background of Husserl's idea of reduction. Drummond is critical of Frege's interpretation stating that the notion of noema needs an independent evaluation from that of Brentano and Frege. According to Frege noema as explained by Husserl is an abstract entity but only related to transcendental reduction. According to Drummond, consciousness is itself intentional so that it does not need a mediating entity. The noema is the object viewed from a Philosophical attitude. Drummond distinguishes between sense and noema, the propositional attitude and the Philosophical attitude.

Smith, Mc Intyre and Follesdal consider noema to be an abstract intentional entity mediating between conscious act and object. Conscious act as intentional referring to object in a certain way is explained by noema⁹. According to them, noema is different from the object and conscious act but comparable to Frege's sense. They view noema as a mediating entity between act and object. To Husserl objects are related to conscious acts and intentionality in a new Philosophical attitude. Sokolowski is critical of the interpretation given by Follesdal, Smith and Mc Intyre relating Husserl's noema with noematic sense. Sokolowski views the interpretation as incorrect because of not correctly understanding Husserl's noema, intentionality and reduction¹⁰. J.N. Mohanty and Drummond accepts Sokolowski's view.

Smith and Mc Intyre interprets noema as a device to explain the intentional nature of consciousness. The views of Mc Intyre and Sokolowski are different. To Mc Intyre noemata are identical with senses and to be distinguished from objects. Sokolowski is against identifying noemata with senses. Sokolowski did not consider noema as a mediating entity between act and object. To Follesdal noema is an abstract entity like Frege's sense¹¹. Follesdal viewed noemata as non-spatial, timeless and similar to Frege's sense. Cunningham is critical of Follesdal stating that noemata do not have the 'general' and repeatable nature of Frege's 'sense'. Follesdal views noema as a mediator so that consciousness is related to the object through the noema¹². Cunningham rejects Follesdal's view of noema as a

mediator and treats noema as the product of the perceptual act, not a general and timeless object¹³. Cunningham views noema as a result of the interaction between consciousness and object. Cunningham views noemata as referring to objects unlike Frege's sense.

3. Natural Standpoint and Phenomenological Standpoint

There was a period of Psychologism in Husserl's early development of Phenomenology, as pointed out by different thinkers. According to Beth, Husserl was doing at this period in his Phenomenological investigation something analogous to Phenomenological Physics or Chemistry as propounded by Duhem, Mach, Ostwald and Viogt¹⁴. Husserl studied under Brentano, the leading proponent of Psychologism, a theory in which all necessary truths including the basic principles of arithmetic were reduced to empirical laws of psychology, in Brentano's sense. Husserl in his early works argued that the laws of arithmetic are nothing more than causal laws governing our experiences of 'counting' and 'collective association'¹⁵. Husserl moved away from the grip of psychologism only after having been criticized by logicians like Frege. The outlook of anti-psychologism and the famous Phenomenological method of reduction, bracketing arises from this¹⁶.

According to Husserl, our first outlook is that of natural human beings 'from the natural standpoint'¹⁷. The world as we experience it in the different ways of sensory perception is there as a possible object of perception. The spatio-temporal fact-world is given as something that exist out there¹⁸. It is present there whether the individual perceive it or not. Each ego-subject has a unique way of experiencing the world, according to the way in which each ego-consciousness is affected by the world. There are differences in the ways of apprehending the world with differences in clearness. What is given from the natural standpoint is characterized by Husserl as the 'general thesis' of the

‘natural standpoint’. The general thesis states that the world is known by us as a fact-world, that has its being out there¹⁹. A radical alternation of the natural standpoint is brought about by the method of Phenomenology called ‘epoche’ ‘bracketing’ or ‘reduction’.

Brentano distinguished between Psychological and the Physical, the Psychological characterized by intentionality. Brentano’s descriptive Psychology is characterized by the thesis of intentional directedness. To Husserl, consciousness is intentional and refers to something objective. Objects are revealed from a perspective but transcending the perspective objects are given as a full three dimensional object. For example, in seeing a tree, a whole tree is given to the consciousness as an intentional object. Husserl proposed a method to isolate the object as the directly given essence. To Husserl, intentional experience give meaning to the essence, the Phenomenon as meant. The essence of consciousness is pure consciousness which is arrived at by excluding the natural attitude. The natural attitude is presupposed by science and day to day life. The natural attitude is overcome by a process called Phenomenological reduction which involves a process of bracketing or epoche, involving a neutralization of belief concentrating on the essence of conscious acts. The unreflective posting of the world as something existing ‘out there’ is characterized by Husserl as the ‘natural attitude’. The ‘phenomenological attitude’ consists of a stepping back from the natural attitude without denying it, for investigating the very experiences of the world. The phenomenological

attitude is the genuine Philosophical attitude and critical non-dogmatic open attitude. The givenness of reality, the way in which reality is given to experience is the subject matter of investigation. The correlational structure of subjectivity is the focus of investigation, Phenomenological reduction being the name for the Philosophical method by which the correlational structure is investigated.

With reference to the development of Phenomenological reduction, the transformation of Husserl's thought from the early phase to the late phase occurred between 1900 and 1913. The two volumes of *Logical Investigations* were published in 1900 and 1901, *The Idea of Phenomenology* was published in 1907, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science" was published in 1911 and *Ideas I* was published in 1913. It was in the article-"Philosophy as a Rigorous Science" his epistemological concern found expression as a critique of the natural Sciences and Psychology leading to a technique which later resulted in his 'epoche' or 'reduction' with the publication of *Ideas I*. Natural Sciences deal with empirical facts. Laws of thought are empirical laws of nature. Natural law is justified by induction which gives only probability. But the laws of pure logic are not justified by induction but apodictic inner evidence. The laws of pure logic have apriori validity. Thus naturalism refutes itself. The science of nature is not a rigorous science and lacks absolute foundation.

The idea of Phenomenological reduction is introduced for the first time in *The Idea of Phenomenology*²⁰. The systematic account of the method of

bracketing is available in the *Ideas*. The term 'Phenomenological reduction' is used by Husserl in two senses. It means both the process of reduction or the beginning stage of reduction. The whole process is having the character of a graded reduction. Different thinkers²¹ interpret the whole process involving different stages, differing themselves regarding the number and order of stages. These interpretations however do not contradict Husserl's own account, because Husserl himself is not consistent in his account. The Phenomenological reduction is a technique that enables conceptual cognition through intentional analysis. The Phenomenological reduction is a radical standpoint on the world Phenomenon having rigorous perspective by which all other perspectives are grounded. The radical nature of the Phenomenological reduction is to be understood in the correct way. The Phenomenologist by gaining a certain perspective on the world Phenomenon through the method, becomes a genuine Philosopher. The Phenomenological reduction provides an adequate epistemological foundation for sciences by returning to the 'things themselves', the epoche, the Greek term stands for abstention, an inquiring back into consciousness.

The Phenomenological method or Phenomenological reduction is an essential procedure to free from prejudices and to encounter things as they are in themselves. The method is used as an inquiry of pure consciousness, the relation between noesis and noemata. The Phenomenological reduction is a new way of analysis in which the natural attitude is transformed into the

transcendental attitude in order to explore the spatio-temporal world as it is given to consciousness. Through the Phenomenological attitude, the intentional acts of presentation is arrived at through which awareness of the givenness of objects is made possible. Reduction is a procedure for attending to the act of experiencing the objects. In the natural attitude the things of the world is accepted as belief. The Phenomenological attitude is radical and comprehensive view involving a complete turning away from the natural attitude and focusing reflection on everything in the natural attitude including the world belief, so that the Phenomenologist in the Phenomenological attitude is a real Philosopher. The Phenomenological attitude is that of a detached observer, a Philosophical attitude arrived at by Phenomenological reduction. Reduction with the Latin root 're-ducere' means a leading back, a with-holding or withdrawal. The process of neutralization is called epoche, a term from Greek scepticism meaning refraining from judging until clarity is attained. The natural attitude is the world- directed outlook indenting things facts and other kinds of objects. The Phenomenological attitude is reflecting upon the natural attitude and all the intentionalities within it. The Phenomenological attitude in which Philosophical analysis takes place is also called the transcendental attitude characterized by Phenomenological reduction.

4. The Method of Reduction-Different Stages.

Sokolowski distinguishes between two ways to reduction, the ontological and the Cartesian²². The ontological way to reduction is aimed at a true and complete science, Phenomenology as a rigorous science. The Cartesian way to reduction is modeled on Descartes' method of doubt. The Cartesian way to reduction in Phenomenology is a neutral stance, suspending our belief in judgements, reflecting on intentionalities. There is distinction between Descartes' method and Phenomenological method. The ontological and the Cartesian ways to reduction are to be distinguished. The ontological way being a slow process attains certainty. The Cartesian way being hurry is risky. The proper way is using both by correcting the weaknesses and employing the strengths of both.

Generally, three important stages are recognized in the whole process of reduction Phenomenological, eidetic and transcendental. Phenomenological reduction is suspension of judgement about the existence or non-existence of the external world, or suspension of the natural attitude in order to focus on the Phenomena. Eidetic reduction is analyzing essences by changing different elements of the object to know which characteristics are necessary. Transcendental reduction is reduction to pure consciousness, intentionally purified of all psychological and all worldly interpretations and

descriptions. Transcendental reduction makes possible the study of the intentional constitution of things.

The first stage called Phenomenological reduction consists in suspending all beliefs characteristics of the 'natural attitude', beliefs given by senses as well as science. What is transcendent is excluded. Judgements concerning the world given by the senses is held in suspension. Phenomenological reduction does not deny the existence of the objects of experience but only the beliefs characterizing the 'natural attitude'. They remain what they are in themselves like the bracketed in the bracket, like the disconnected outside the connective system²³. The Phenomenological reduction does not deny the world, but restricts from using any judgement concerning spatio-temporal existence. The second stage is called eidetic reduction. Husserl distinguishes between real objects and ideal objects. A real object is that which is both temporal and spatial, an ideal object is that which is both non- spatial and a temporal. The aim of eidetic reduction is to reduce real objects into ideal objects or what are called essences. The essences have existence in the particulars. The particularity is already bracketed in the Phenomenological reduction. With eidetic reduction, the realm of essences is uncovered. 'Free imagination variation', is the process by means of which eidetic reduction is carried out. It is a process of generalization in order to uncover the essence. The process involves varying the objects of perception and noting the elements of the act of perceiving and entering into the realm of pure possibility, the realm of essences. Both the act of consciousness

and the object of consciousness enter into the realm of pure possibility, the realm of essences. In the realm of essences, the awareness is of a new mode of experience characterized as eidetic intuition or intuition of essences. In eidetic intuition, the particular is perceived in its generality, a 'seeing' of general in the particular. Eidetic intuition is an insight into essence in which the essence is grasped. It is a special kind of intentionality analyzed by Phenomenology. Eidetic intuition is an identity synthesis involving three levels of intentional development²⁴. In the first level similarities are experienced. In the second level, identity synthesis occurs, empirical universal is arrived at. In the third level eidetic universals are arrived at, a kind of Philosophizing called eidetic intuition occurs. Imaginative variation is the process central to eidetic intuition by which deeper insight occurs. Eidetic intuition requires great effort of imagination, a very difficult process. In the process of eidetic intuition the first stage focuses on similar things, the second stage focuses on empirical universals, the third stage focuses on eidetic universals, essences. Imaginative variation and eidetic insight are worked out within the natural attitude. Eidetic reduction focuses on the essential form of things. Eidetic reduction is different from the transcendental reduction which reduces the natural attitude into the Phenomenological attitude. Both transcendental reduction and eidetic reduction are employed by Phenomenology. Transcendental reduction helps to contemplate intentionality exploring the eidetic structures of noesis and noema by way of eidetic reduction. Transcendental reduction is a necessary principle

and constitute being in general and the transcendental world. It is an independent unifying principle of all sorts of being. Pure consciousness is a 'Self-contained system of Being', or system of 'Absolute Being'²⁵. After the transcendental reduction, what remains as 'Phenomenological residuum' is 'Pure consciousness in its own Absolute Being'²⁶. Phenomenologically speaking, after the entire process of reduction nothing is lost but won the Absolute Being of consciousness within which all transcendences are being constituted. The basic field of Phenomenological inquiry is Pure consciousness with its intentional structure²⁷.

In Phenomenological reduction, the natural attitude is bracketed. It opens the gate to the Phenomenological attitude. In eidetic reduction, the individual existence of the object is bracketed to arrive at the character in common or essence of the object by free imaginative variation of the object. In transcendental reduction, the isolation of the transcendental subjectivity is aimed at. The realm of Pure consciousness is where the essential formations take place which is studied by Phenomenology. Isolating the transcendental ego by bracketing the ego is the ultimate aim of Phenomenology which occurs in the final stage of reduction called transcendental reduction. The existence of the ego as a Psychological reality is bracketed and the transcendental ego is arrived at. To Husserl, the transcendental ego or pure ego is a necessary principle. With transcendental reduction, the domain of meaning, not of any particular individual human but the universal domain of meaning is arrived at. Husserl has

stated that even after his death, his transcendental ego might exist being eternal. The transcendental reduction gives a new definition of Philosophy as Phenomenology. The transcendental reduction helps to look at things in their truth and evidencing, thus helping to look at them in their being. The self is also looked at its truth and evidencing, in its being. Human beings are looked at in their truth and evidencing as placed in the world. The self taken as one of the things in the world is called the empirical ego. The transcendental ego is the agent of truth, the cognitive owner of the world, not simply a part of the world. The two, empirical ego and transcendental ego are not two entities, but one and the same being considered in different ways. Phenomenology is against the psychologistic interpretation of truth, reason and the ego. Psychology naturalizes reason and truth. Psychologism treats truth as empirical. Phenomenology tries to show achieving truth as a domain of rationality. Entering into the domain of rational, going beyond subjectivity is done by the transcendental ego as the agent of truth and reason, and Phenomenology is an exploration of the transcendental ego in its intentional forms. Rationality involves the intentionalities by which objects of experience are identified and transcendental ego being the agent of truth Phenomenology provides a clear description. The transcendental ego lives a life of reason that is public.

In the Phenomenological attitude, the natural attitude is put in bracket, and in Phenomenological reflection becomes agents of truth in a

Philosophical way. Phenomenology is a new way of entering Philosophy different from the older way of beginning within the natural attitude, and distinguishing the Philosophical from the natural. Phenomenology is a clarification of the intentionalities within the natural attitude. Phenomenology is a type of Philosophical realism and ontology. The Phenomenological movement provides valuable data for an authentic Philosophy. In the natural attitude, the object exists independent of consciousness. In the Phenomenological attitude, the naive concept of reality undergoes transformation by referring back to consciousness to which the reality appears reality, becoming an ideal noema and consciousness becomes reflective in character. Phenomenological investigation is directed towards the immanent contents of consciousness, and the naturalistic concept of experience becomes the Phenomenological concept of 'lived experience'.

The new outlook towards natural attitude is the starting point of Philosophy, transcendental reduction being the way to the new outlook. Within transcendental reduction, eidetic reduction is carried out. The Phenomenological reduction transforms objects into noemas. The world is bracketed in Philosophical reflection so that what is bracketed is taken as a noema. It is stated that Phenomenology has a very different understanding of Philosophy²⁸. Phenomenology as a modern Philosophy contemplates the Pre-Philosophical intelligence. It seems that Phenomenology is a continuation of the rationalist

motive in modernity. One claim is that Phenomenology is bracketing away from modernity²⁹. The aim of Husserl's Philosophical method was certainly. Husserl was influenced by Descartes's method of doubt for the ideal of certainty but he applied it in a different way, suspending the belief in the reality of the world. The method of reduction for Husserl is a device for concentrating on the act of consciousness and on the correlated objects as they are experienced. The method of bracketing is not concerned with whether the object of experience is really existing or not. The intentional character of consciousness has an important place within Husserl's Phenomenological method. It was Franz Brentano, who revealed the intentional character of consciousness to Husserl.

Husserl himself is not clear in distinguishing between the different stages of reduction. Husserl first introduced 'Phenomenological reduction' in *The Idea of Phenomenology*. He speaks of epistemological reduction and also speaks of 'Psychological reduction'. He treated Phenomenological reductions in the plural in *Ideas I*. Often Phenomenological and transcendental reductions are indifferently dealt with. In the *Cartesian Meditations*, he speaks of 'transcendental Phenomenological reduction'. Different kinds of reduction have been dealt with in the *Crisis*, as many as eight. Different models of reduction such as Cartesian way, way from intentionality, way through critique of the natural sciences, and through ontology or through searching for the given elements of the life-world, has been listed by Iso kern³⁰. Through

Phenomenological reduction, the actual character of experience is stripped away and pure Phenomenon is grasped. The world appears in a new way, having a peculiar mode of being, a peculiar mode of self-givenness. A shift of attention occur from the object given in consciousness to the contents of consciousness. A move occurs from empirical judgement to self-certain and adequately grasped judgements. In the *Crisis* the method of reduction consists in leading the ego to the original Pre- givenness of the world.

The ambiguity of the term reduction is evident in his use of the term inconsistently concerning different things at different times. Reduction reduces real transcendental object to real immanent object, transcendent reality to immanent reality, thus reducing to immediately self-evident. Husserl was mainly concerned with the structure of conscious experience. Phenomenological reduction and transcendental reduction are treated as two separate reductions or transcendental reduction as an elaboration of Phenomenological reduction. In the *Crisis*, the two are referred to as “first level reflection and second level reflection”. Sometimes the two are referred to as transcendental-phenomenological reduction. Transcendental reduction uncovers the Transcendental Ego as the meaning-giver to all objects of consciousness. The method of Phenomenology uncovers the transcendental ego with its correlative meanings and structures. In Phenomenological reduction, spatial limitations and existential commitments of the object are bracketed. Eidetic reduction makes

possible access to the ideal realm of consciousness bracketing the real and temporal limitations. In the ideal realm, only what is indubitable and undeniable is present, and 'intuition of essences' is made possible, the awareness of what is presented to consciousness have degrees of clarity ultimately leading to total clarity. With the eidetic reduction, the ego conscious acts and it's objects are reduced to the ideal realm of pure possibilities, the realm of apodictic certainty. By reduction consciousness is isolated which is certain and the objects of consciousness are Phenomena rebuilt on absolute foundations. The acts of consciousness plays an important role in constituting the objects. The way in which the object is intended or meant is a contribution of the intending conscious act. Husserl's analysis of constitution is an investigation of the acts of consciousness making the possibility of intending the object in a particular way. The experienced lived world is the foundation for all meanings constituted.

Husserl distinguishes between reduction such as Philosophical, Psychological, eidetic, Phenomenological and transcendental. Philosophical reduction requires a neutral position and personal insight based on immediate intuition so that the Phenomena are taken as they are presented themselves and establish a true beginning in Philosophy and constitute the fundamental principles of Philosophy without any presuppositions. Eidetic reduction provides essences avoiding particulars. Psychological reduction is based on a distinction between phenomenological Psychology and empirical psychology.

Empirical Psychology is concerned with Physical entities, is concerned with the fundamental types of Psychological Phenomena by a reduction of the objective facts to essences and meanings. Phenomenological reduction, according to Speigelberg, can also be called transcendental reduction, whose function is to reduce the transcendent as the intentional correlate to 'immanent' or 'transcendental' acts, in which they have their origin. Not only belief in the reality is bracketed but also the acts which give transcendent meanings is bracketed. According to Speigelberg, 'intentional analysis' and 'transcendental reduction' are equivalent. Transcendental reduction uncovers hidden intentional acts.

According to Smith and Mc Intyre³¹, Husserl's Phenomenological reduction consists of three stages, Psychological, transcendental and eidetic reductions. Psychological reduction brackets out the judgements about the world from the natural standpoint, thus limiting Phenomena to immanence. Transcendental reduction reduces the subject of consciousness into transcendental ego or Pure ego. Eidetic reduction is reduction on both subject and object of consciousness arriving at a direct seeing of essences.

Phenomenology is characterized as a study of the intrinsic structures of consciousness. Transcendental Phenomenology is distinguished from empirical Psychology in that transcendental Phenomenology studies structures of consciousness independent of naturalistic assumptions where as empirical

Psychology is connected with naturalistic assumptions. A purification of naturalistic assumptions is affected in Phenomenology by transcendental Phenomenological reduction which involves three stages, Psychological or Phenomenological-Psychological, transcendental and eidetic reduction. Psychological or Phenomenological-Psychological reduction aims at concentrating on consciousness and conscious experience. Transcendental reduction eliminates all empirical assumptions. Eidetic reduction generalizes to yield a general science of consciousness. Psychological reduction is bracketing the natural thesis. Transcendental reduction yields pure or transcendental ego. The apprehension of essences in eidetic reduction is also called essential insight, eidetic intuition or ideation. Elizabeth Stroker stated, "But up to the beginning of our century everywhere in philosophical thinking the everyday world was identified with the world as a scientific object. Their distinction became not apparent until Husserl, with his Phenomenological method and with his analyses of intentional consciousness discovered that the form of reality science talks about is not the world we live in as actual human being"³². Husserl was in search of a common originary ground for Philosophy and Science. In the article "Philosopher and Sociology", Merleau-Ponty wrote "The great merit of Husserl, as his Philosophy came to maturity, and to an ever greater extent as he continued his effort, is to have defined, with his 'Vision of essences' morphological essences and Phenomenological experience, a field and an attitude of investigation in which Philosophy and Science could actually meet

together”³³. Husserl found the common originary ground of Philosophy and Science in the transcendental subjectivity. Husserl was able to discover the common transcendental original ground for knowledge in Phenomenology.

Husserl’s reductions have been viewed as the real discovery of his Phenomenological Philosophy. He formulated the method of reduction as a necessary condition for discovering the essence of intentional consciousness and transcendental subjectivity. The subjective life of consciousness, the life-world is revealed through the experience of reduction, according to Husserl; the subjective realm of transcendental consciousness is wide open through the method of reduction. The transcendental ego constitutes the world which is grasped through the possibility of reduction. Phenomenology is stated to be anti-reductionist, a better understanding of the workings of consciousness. The aim of Phenomenological method is to understand the different ways in which the actual thing experienced by the person experiencing it is constituted. Phenomenology as a method of Philosophy go against the rationalistic prejudices and is a method of reflective attentiveness discovering ‘lived experiences’³⁴. Phenomenology is a science of experience having a method rooted in intentionality.

Husserl’s method of Phenomenological reduction is basic to Husserl’s Phenomenology since all fundamental concepts of Phenomenology are implied by his method. The natural attitude and the Phenomenological

attitude are stated as Pre-transcendental and transcendental attitudes respectively. The natural attitude views the world as nature existing independent of the experiencing agent which Husserl calls the 'general thesis of the natural standpoint'³⁵. It is also to be noticed that the reduction does not deny the world but puts out of actions to pay attention to what is unbracketed. The residue of reduction is the transcendental ego, the transcendental consciousness with the totality of the field of intentionality correlated to the world of totality given in intentional acts. Epoche is treated as a turning away from the world of experience to the realm of pure consciousness, a move from transcendence to pure immanence. Founding apodictic evidence in the self-evidence of the ego is the main motivation of reduction.

In the *Logical Investigations* a Psychological analysis of consciousness is available. But Phenomenology as a rigorous science moves from facts to essences as an eidetic Science of consciousness having the structure of intentionality, cogito-cogitatum. The shift from Phenomenological psychology to transcendental Phenomenology is affected by reduction. The reflective attitude of the philosophizing ego after reduction is a radical one not being interested or unparticipating in the general thesis of the natural standpoint. Phenomenological Psychology after reduction reform itself into a science of transcendental subjectivity transforming into a universal transcendental philosophy. The transcendental subjectivity constitutes the world a fresh.

Gaining access to the transcendental sphere of experience opens the way to transcendental intersubjectivity, a community of subjects constituting a common world. The way into Phenomenology through psychology is made possible through reduction for founding transcendental Phenomenology as a scientific discipline. The world is constituted as life-world which is the product of transcendental constitution. Transcendental consciousness is having intersubjective and genetic dimensions and transcendental Phenomenology has a real understanding of the world as life-world.

In the *Crisis* Husserl have established that the crisis in modern European Sciences and culture can be solved by a critique of positive sciences rendering a real understanding of the world as life-world and establishing Phenomenology as a rigorous science. A universal ontology of the life-world is the main theme in the late Husserl. A full analysis of transcendental subjectivity reveals the world as the product of constitution, the world as ultimately it is, a historic world of life. Reduction is the greatest discovery and the most difficult part of Husserl's Philosophy leading to the transcendental ego as the basis for apodictic evidence for building sciences, and the life-world as the constitutive product of the transcendental subjectivity. Reduction yields transcendental intersubjectivity, transcendental life as such, the life-world so that the danger of solipsism is avoided. The sense of the world is philosophically elucidated through Phenomenological Explication³⁶. The highest realization of human life

being the Scientific and Philosophical activity is stated as the role of the Philosopher, in the *Crisis*. Landgrebe pointed out that the issue of life-world in late Husserl is a departure from Cartesianism and that it is the actual working field of Phenomenology³⁷. Sebastian Luft is of the opinion that Landgrebe's assessment of Husserl is incorrect and that Cartesian account and life-world ontology are two separate programmes in Husserl's Phenomenology³⁸, the life-world being a hermeneutics of the world of everyday life. The reduction has enabled Husserl to have a transcendental and life-worldly analysis complementing each other.

The Phenomenological reduction is a radical, rigorous and transformative meditative technique. It is a self-meditation that has been radicalized. In self-meditation, self-realization of the spirit takes place. Scientific inquiry lacks Philosophically rigorous foundation. What is needed is a careful examination of consciousness as it is in itself, free from scientific framework and Psychological assumptions. A reflective enquiry into consciousness in itself is called Phenomenological reduction, an enquiry conducted by consciousness itself. Self meditation is the procedure to be undertaken for maintaining rigour in the course of action in which the ego envisages a movement towards itself. The attainment of the new perspective through Phenomenological reduction requires rigorous persistent effort, a type of meditation which brings about a radical transformation of the entire

individual similar to a religious conversion³⁹. The technique of reduction is to be understood and performed as religious conversion, meditation and fundamental transformation requiring Strenuous effort. Performing reduction implies experiencing religious transformation. Just as in the case of religious conversion, the Phenomenological method prepares the Philosopher to be a Phenomenologist.

The reduction requires training to realize the radical shift of consciousness, and may be compared to the Buddhist traditions of contemplation. Reduction is a process involving stages for the discovery of the constitution of the world leading to clear reflection required for the apprehension of the Phenomena and meaning produced by consciousness. In the process, the empirical ego is replaced by the transcendental ego, in Buddhist term 'the builder' that constitutes the world.

5: Reduction and Constitution

Husserl's main objective was to provide scientific rigor to Philosophy. For this an account of the constituting transcendental consciousness was needed. The concept of transcendental subjectivity as constituting consciousness with intersubjective horizon is developed. To Husserl, consciousness is intentional. The method of reduction purifies the structure of intentionality and uncovers transcendental subjectivity. Genetic Phenomenology reveals the constituting transcendental subjectivity in its relation to intentional objects.

The method of reduction is a technique that helps to change the sense of object as existing in the world to the object correlated to and constituted by consciousness. Natural objects are changed into Phenomena given to consciousness so that consciousness has an important role in constituting the sense of the object. Husserl's concept of intentionality evolves along with his method of reduction matures. The method of reduction helps to describe Phenomena with scientific rigour by concentrating on the manners of givenness of the Phenomena and the guiding rules behind it. Husserl's genetic Phenomenology is a deep search into the theory of constitution by giving a genetic dimension. In *Ideas* constitution is explained in terms of matter- form schema. The constitution of objects by matter- form schema cannot explain the

constitution of meaning. This limitation is overcome by genetic phenomenology. Genetic Phenomenology involves both active and passive genesis, unifies all constitutional events into one whole inter-relation, constitutes horizons and thereby the world. The theory of genetic constitution made possible the introduction of his new Phenomenology in his last work.

Phenomenology is a constitutive analysis, objectivity constituted in consciousness. The basic theme of Phenomenology is the constitution of the world as a 'Phenomenon' which in his later years Husserl called the life-world. The life-world is the world of constitution with an enriched meaning. Thus constitution and life-world are essentially related. In Husserl's *Philosophical Journey*, Phenomenological method is the starting point and life-world is the end point. The natural attitude is the attitude prior to Phenomenology taking things existing without any relation to consciousness. The manners of givenness is brought out by Phenomenological reflection made possible through the method of reduction. The originary manners of givenness is revealed which marks the beginning of constitution so that constitution is the process of construction performed by consciousness. Phenomenology is transcendental Philosophy in the sense that it is a transcending activity of consciousness as an analytic of constitution.

According to Husserl objectivity pre-supposes intersubjectivity, inter-relation of subjects. Objective is the same in the intersubjective manners

of givenness. Apperception is experiencing a thing as a whole. The manifold of sensory content is objectified and apprehended as belonging to the unity of an object. Something is apperceived when objectivity presents itself in it. Appresentation is having co-present in presentation. Appresentations belong to apperception and apperception establishes horizons for consciousness. Constitution of an object thus involves both apperception and appresentation. Apperception is the first step of the constitution of intersubjectivity. All forms of socialization is built upon the experience of living together in a shared world.

6. Conclusion

The method of reduction and the concept of intentionality are strictly related in Husserl's phenomenology that the phenomenological standpoint is a result of Husserl's noetic-noematic correlational explanation made available through the phenomenological method. To Brentano intentional inexistence was the characteristic of mental phenomena, containing the object of consciousness within the mind. To Husserl, the conscious act was within the mind called as noesis, the object of consciousness was not within the mind and called as

noema. To Husserl, the rich structure of conscious experience was revealed through the method of phenomenology. The views of Frege, Smith, Mc Intyre, Follesdal, J.N.Mohanty and Sokolowski on the concept of noema throws light on the exact nature of conscious object as envisaged by Husserl. The phenomenological standpoint is claimed to be the genuine philosophical standpoint and the phenomenologist in the phenomenological attitude is a genuine philosopher. Three important stages of reduction are recognized, phenomenological, eidetic and transcendental.

The phenomenological reduction restricts from making judgements about spatio-temporal existence. Eidetic reduction reduces real objects into ideal objects or essences through a process of generalization. The transcendental reduction brings about pure consciousness with its intentional structure of reflective consciousness and ideal noema. The phenomenological method transforms the naturalistic concept of experience into the phenomenological concept of 'lived experience'. The subjective life of consciousness, the life-world is revealed through reduction. Apodictic evidence is the main motive of reduction. The life-world is the constitutive product of transcendental intersubjectivity.

It is the method of reduction that changes the object as existing in the world to the object as constituted by consciousness. The world as 'phenomenon'

is the world of constitution later called as life-world. The phenomenological method culminates in the constitution of the life-world.

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CHAPTER III

THE CONCEPT OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY

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1. The Sphere of Ownness and The Other.
2. Mediacy of Intentionality, Appresentation and Apperception.
3. Pairing and Intentional Modification.
4. Assimilative Apperception and Appresentative Apperception.
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7. A Critical Estimate of Husserl's Doctrine of Intersubjectivity.
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CHAPTER III

THE CONCEPT OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY

An account of the concept of intersubjectivity as given in the *Cartesian Meditations* is attempted. The main issue discussed in the fifth meditation of *Cartesian Meditations* is the uncovering of the sphere of pure transcendental subjectivity, what is called monadological intersubjectivity. The main objection faced by phenomenology that phenomenology involves solipsism is answered by the concept of intersubjectivity explained as the problem of experiencing someone else. The objections concerning the absolute transcendental ego arrived at by phenomenological reduction is treated as solipsistic so that phenomenology as a philosophy is labelled as transcendental solipsism¹. The problem is concerning other egos that are 'others'. It is stated that immanency of the ego leads to the transcendency of the other.

The alter ego is the main issue of phenomenological explication. The implications of the explicit and implicit intentionality of the transcendental ego in the phenomenological sphere is of great importance for phenomenology. The other as the object of consciousness is explained as a solution for the transcendental constitution theory of the experience of the other. The transcendently reduced pure conscious realm is described not as private synthetic formation but as an intersubjective world including others as experienced and accessible to everyone. Each individual experience of the world is unique though the world experienced exists independent of each experiences of the world phenomena. A transcendental

theory of experiencing the other called empathy² leads to a transcendental theory of the objective world. The transcendental constitution of other subjects and objective world is questioned. Husserl recommends a special kind of reduction as necessary within the universal transcendental sphere. This reduction to the transcendental sphere of ownness presupposes an essential structure of the transcendental ego constituting the other and the objective world. The transcendental ego has a concrete being as a monad with an ownness of its own, its intentionality being directed towards the other. A new existence-sense is constituted that goes beyond the monadic ownness, an ego constituted as mirrored in the concrete ego, the other ego, constituted as 'alter ego' in the ownness of the concrete ego. The other is a mirroring and an analogue of the concrete ego in a specific sense³. The problem is regarding the concrete ego with its peculiar ownness constituting the other. It is stated that the ego's sphere of ownness is made available by the new epoche. But this does not mean a mere phenomenological epoche, the sense of the new epoche is to be clarified .

1. The Sphere of Ownness and the Other

The transcendental ego is delimited to what is peculiarly its own characterized as non-alien. The transcendental world is given in harmonious direct experience. The characteristic of being-there and accessible to everyone is a characteristic of all objects belonging to the primordial world which should be abstractively excluded. In the abstraction process, a unitary coherent stratum of the

phenomenal world is retained as the correlate of continuously harmonious continuing world- experience. This stratum is the founding stratum without which the objective world cannot be experienced. By means of the abstraction, a substratum of the phenomenal world becomes separated which is itself objective and experienceable by everyone. The ownness purification of the external world has been effected, and the natural sense of the ego and the natural sense of the world are excluded. Accordingly, in the spiritual ownness, the Ego-Pole of the pure subjective processes of passive and active intentionality is made available.

The specific abstraction process of sense exclusion of alien provides a peculiar world, a reduced world of ownness. The ego's own world experience is included in the unitary intuition and spatio-temporal world is reduced to the ownness of the ego. The ownness of the ego includes the world experiencing life of what is other. The constitution of what is included in the ego's peculiar ownness and the constitution of what is other are distinguished⁴. The ego constitute everything intentionally within itself. Everything constituted as part of the Ego's peculiar ownness including the reduced world belongs to the constituting subject with internal determinations. The Ego's peculiarly own world would be inside and the ego as a member among its externalities would be distinguished as itself and the external world.

The human ego reduced to its ownness is included in the reduced world phenomenon, related to one another. The transcendental ego reduces the objective world as a phenomenon included in the peculiar ownness. The whole

transcendental field of experience of the transcendental ego can be divided into the sphere of ownness consisting of the experience of a world reduced to what is included in the Ego's ownness and the sphere of what is other. Every consciousness of what is other actually belongs to the sphere of ownness. The transcendental ego in the sphere of ownness constitutes whatever belongs to it as a component of its concrete essence which is inseparable from the ego's concrete being. By means of its ownness, the transcendental ego constitutes the objective world and the other, alter ego⁵.

The concept of the sphere of ownness presupposes the concept of other ego. The transcendental ego is given in a grasping perception as an object of original intuition with an open infinite horizon undiscovered internal features of itself. The transcendental ego, its original sense is made available when it is directed to itself, and apodictically given itself, a continuous unitary synthesis of original self-experience. The transcendental ego is given to itself and can explicate its own essence in acts of consciousness, the stream of subjective processes in which the transcendental ego live and become accessible to itself in respect of its actualities and potentialities of its own essence⁶. Apodictic evidence self-explication uncovers the all embracing structural forms only in which the transcendental ego exist with an essentially necessary all inclusiveness which include the mode of existence in the form of the continual self-constitution of its own life-process. The transcendental ego's own essentially belonging to itself constitutes more than the actualities and potentialities of the stream of the subjective processess, the constituted unity inseparable from the constitution itself

with an immediate concrete ownness. The entire reduced world obtained by reduction belongs to the sphere of ownness and is included in the concrete transcendental ego as something peculiarly its own⁷. The transcendental concrete ego has a universe peculiarly its own discovered by an original explication of the apodictic ego. The transcendental ego in its full concreteness is itself a monad⁸.

The transcendental ego's own essence can become aware of other egos, the ego's own modes of consciousness and also others. The transcendental ego has intentionalities of a different kind by means of which the transcendental ego transcends its own being, and experience an objective world and others in it, the other Ego. The ownness reduction performed on these experiences brought out an intentional subtraction in which a reduced world shows itself as an immanent transcendency⁹. In the constitution monads exist with each for each other. The community of monads is communalized intentionally. It constitutes one identical world. In the intentionally constituted community of monads, all egos are presented in an objectivating apperception. The communalization of constitutive intentionality gives the transcendental intersubjectivity an intersubjective sphere of ownness in which the objective world is constituted¹⁰. The objective world inheres in the intersubjective sphere of ownness as an 'immanent transcendency'. The constitution of the world involves a harmony of the monads, not a metaphysical hypothesizing of monadic harmony, but being part of the explication of the intentional components implicit in the experiential world .

2. Mediacy of Intentionality, appresentation and apperception

In the transcendental clarification of experiencing the other ego, there are certain steps involved leading to the other ego. In experiencing the original world, a world of other egos external to the concrete ego, the reduced world is the primordial transcendency, a determining part of the concrete ego. At the higher level of transcendency the constitutionally secondary objective transcendency as an experience is to be examined and uncovered intentionally. The objective world as an actual existent can be experienced and verified only in the essence of the experiencing what is other involving a procedure having a number of steps. The first one is the constitutional level regarding the other egos. The constitution on the basis of the pure others, the other egos forms an ego community including the primordial ego becomes constituted as a community of egos, a community of monads in a communalized intentionality. Anything belonging to the other's own essence would be directly accessible, and the transcendental ego's own essence and the other's own essence would be the same. Here it is important to notice a certain mediacy of intentionality reaching out from the primordial world, the substratum, the underlying basis which make present to consciousness the other ego¹¹. The kind of appresentation in the case of experiencing someone else is different from external experience. There is no possibility of verification possible here. Experiencing someone else plays a role in the constitution of primordial nature, and appresentation involved here has the possibility of verification by a corresponding fulfilling presentation. Appresentation involved in experiencing someone else lead into the original sphere of the other. The appresentation of the

original sphere of the other become motivated as appresentation in the original sphere of the ego.

The other ego is constituted within the primordial ownness of the transcendental ego. The primordial ego is a concrete intentional life of a psychic sphere related to the transcendental ego and the world. The intentionality by which the other egos become constituted is a highly complicated process. The other entering into the perceptual sphere becomes primordially reduced, becomes a determining part of the transcendental ego, an 'immanent transcendency'¹². The other is constituted originally as a functioning organ, deriving its sense by an apperceptive transfer from the transcendental ego. A similarity connecting the other with the transcendental ego exists within the primordial sphere of the transcendental ego which acts as the influential factor for the analogizing apprehension of the other¹³.

Apperception is different from inference, not a thinking act. Apperception is an act which we apprehend at a glance, grasp the objects given beforehand. Each experience involves a transfer from an originally instituted objective sense to a new sense, and are similar. Each new experience involves an anticipative apprehension of the object having a similar sense. There is givenness at the stage of primal instituting, but there is a transfer from this stage to the stage of apperception. The sense component of the new experience function as institutive and founding a pre-givenness that has a richer sense. There are different levels of apperceptions corresponding to the differences in their sense. There is radical

differenciation of apperceptions, according to their genesis, belonging to the primordial sphere and those that present themselves with the sense 'other ego'. Upon these a new level is built, a higher one.

3. Pairing and Intentional Modification

Analogizing apprehension is described as an act in which a body within the primordial sphere of the transcendental ego which is similar to the transcendental ego's own body becomes apprehended¹⁴. What is apprehended by means of analogizing apprehension is never an object of perception proper. The primal instituting living present involves the ego and the other ego inevitably given

in an original pairing. Pairing is a universal phenomenon of the transcendental sphere, actually present in the primal instituting of analogizing apprehension, a characteristic emphasized in the peculiarity of experiencing the other ego¹⁵. An intentional over reaching is essentially present in pairing. The intentional overreaching is coming about genetically as an essential necessity, as and when the data undergoing become prominent and intended. A living mutual awakening and an overplaying of each with the objective sense of the other is particularly noticed. The overlaying in the paired data brings about mutual transfer sense of the other. This means that an apperception of each according to the sense of the other takes place.

The sense transferred in apperception is involving existential status, but belonging to the primordial sphere they themselves can never show because the only available is the primordial sphere. The appresentation gives the component of the other which is not accessible originally, is combined with an original presentation. In the original presentation, the other as part of the nature is included in the sphere of ownness. In the original presentation, a unitary transcending experience is present characterized with the other's animate body and the transcendental ego given in a combination. Every unitary transcending experience, points to experiences which would verify by means of fulfilling the appresented horizons which are potentially verifiable synthesis of harmonious experiences. In the case of the experience of the other, the verification by fulfilling is by appresentation in a synthetically harmonious fashion. And it is the manner of these appresentations owing their existence value to the motivational connection with the

presentations proper of the sphere of ownness that concern them. It is the harmonious behavior that is to be present in the fulfilling act of the original experience. If the harmonious behavior is disagreeing, then the other is experienced as a false organism. That which is presented and verified originally belongs to the sphere of ownness of the transcendental ego. That which is experienced having the characteristic of primordial fulfilling experience is the other, an analogue in the sphere of ownness occurring as an intentional modification of the transcendental ego which is to be objectified as an intentional modification of the primordial world. The other as a phenomenological modification of the transcendental ego is a characteristic gained by the constructive pairing that takes place with the constitution of the other ego by way of appresentation and analogizing modification, everything belongs to the concrete ego¹⁶. The other monad is constituted by way of appresentation in the transcendental ego.

Intentional modification is a past present in which within the sphere of living present, the past is given by way of modification that takes place in harmonious synthesis of recollection and the past becomes verified. The memorial past being a modification of the living present, the appresented other transcends the pure being included in the primordial sphere of ownness. Here intentional modification is included in the sense itself as a sense component. The intentional modification is a correlate of the intentionality constituting the same. The past becomes constituted by means of the harmonious memories occurring in the present, the living present. In the same way, in the primordial sphere by the

appresentations and its contents, the other ego becomes constituted. An explanation of the noematic complexes involved in the experience of the other is necessary for a clarification of the constitutive experience by constitutive association. Here lies the scope and importance of a transcendental phenomenological idealism in which a transcendental constitution of the objective world becomes evident¹⁷. The interconnections, the instances of belonging together involved in the primordial constitution of the nature belonging to the ego is characterized as associative and are very essential to the clarification of the associative performance experiencing the other. The other is appresentatively apperceived as the Ego of the primordial world, and it is apperceived as alter ego's living body, the living body experienced by the ego in the monadic sphere of the ego¹⁸. Further it is the concrete body with all the constitutive intentionality of the mode of givenness in the other ego's experience.

4. Assimilative apperception and appresentative apperception

The process of assimilative apperception becomes possible and established, the process by means of which the other body receives analogically from the ego the sense of animate organism belonging to another world similar to the primordial world¹⁹. In assimilative apperception, an associative overlapping of the data founding the apperception takes place and an association at higher level also takes place. Here one datum being a particular mode of appearance of an intentional object pointing to an associatively awakened system of manifold appearances showing itself, the other datum is added to it as an appearance of an analogous object. The analogically apprehended object and the system of appearances are analogically adapted to the analogous appearance which awakened the whole system. Every overlapping takes place by means of associative pairing, an assimilation, an accomodation of the sense of the one to that of the other. In the case of the apperception of the other ego, what is appresented by the body in the primordial surrounding world is not the psyche of the ego in the sphere of ownness. The ego is bodily present being the center of a primordial world and the whole primordial sphere of ownness of the ego as a monad has its content of the

transcendental sphere and belonging to the other. The ego's experience of the co-existing in the mode of the other. The individual ego, the ego given in self-perception is having the content belonging to the transcendental ego. The primordial ego constitutes the other ego by an appresentative apperception.

Husserl explains the notion of the community of monads involving various levels of development, the community of monads established between the primordial ego and the appresentatively experienced other, the community established between the transcendental ego which is also monadic in nature. The foundation for intersubjectivity is the psycho-physical ego of the other²⁰. The subjectivity of the other ego produced by appresentation within the subjectivity of the transcendental ego originates with the status of a subjectivity that is other than its own essence. The other ego appearing in the primordial sphere of the transcendental ego is a synthetic unity belonging to the transcendental ego included in its essence and inseparable from it. The other ego in union with the transcendental ego functioning appresentatively becomes an object of consciousness for the transcendental ego. The two primordial spheres, the original sphere of the transcendental ego and the appresented sphere of the other ego are involving a separation. An explanation of the intentionality of experience of the other and the exact nature of intentionality involved are important in this context. Appresentation presupposes presentations. Experiencing someone else appresent because it presents. Further, appresentation exist in the functional community with presentation. Experiencing someone else presents that which belong to the unity of the object appresented. With association and appresentation, the primordial nature

of the transcendental ego, and the primordial nature of the other egos, the concrete ego and the other concrete egos are not separate. The natural body belonging to the primordial sphere of the transcendental ego appresents the other ego by means of pairing association with the bodily organism of the transcendental ego which is within the primordially constituted nature of the transcendental ego. Thus the transcendental ego appresents all the other egos that appears to the transcendental ego perceptually. It is identical with the nature to which the other egos belong, identical with the Nature that is the primordial nature of the transcendental ego. The whole nature of the transcendental ego is the same as the other egos. In the primordial sphere of the transcendental ego, the whole nature is constituted as an identical unity in the manifold modes of givenness of the transcendental ego, an identical unity within the animate organism of the transcendental ego.

The identity of the primordial nature of the transcendental ego and the presented primordial nature of the other egos is produced by the appresentation along with presentation. It is by means of the appresentation co-functioning with presentation of other egos, the concrete egos are there for the transcendental ego. It is in this context that it is stated that the objective world, the other egos, the same world is perceived by the transcendental ego. This perceiving goes on within the sphere of the transcendental ego. The transcendental ego constitutes within itself the other egos. In the intentional essence of the perception of transcendental ego of the other ego, a distinction is made between the primordial sphere of the transcendental ego and the presented primordial sphere of the other ego. It is also to be noticed that the peculiarities of the division into two noetic

strata can be traced and the complexes of associative intentionality can be explicated. The objective Nature is having the primordially constitutive stratum originating from the experience of the transcendental ego of the other Ego. Every natural object experienced by the transcendental ego has an appresentational stratum, a stratum united in an identifying synthesis with the stratum given to the transcendental ego in the mode of primordial originality. The concrete objective world is constituted as it exists for the transcendental ego, as a world of men and culture²¹.

In the successful apperception of others of the transcendental ego, the world of the appearance system of the other egos must be experienced as the same world belonging to the appearance system. The objective world has existence on the basis of a harmonious confirmation of the apperceptive constitution. In any case it is intentional modifications in the sense- structure that is important. It is through the medium of presentation that objective unity acquires sense and being for the transcendental ego. The notion of a connection is constituted through the medium of presentation. An identifying synthesis connects them in the intentional consciousness which implies an identical intentional object of separate conscious processes. Another case in this respect is the constitution of objects that are ideal, logically ideal objects. Through the medium of recollective presentations, the synthesis extends from the living present to the relevant pasts making a connection between the present and the pasts. With this the transcendental problem of ideal objectivities is made clear. The constitution of the objective world leads to ideal structures as objectivated. It is in this way that the

contrast between the ideal structures and the objective realities becomes understood.

5. Primordial monad and Transcendental Intersubjectivity

In the case of the experience of someone else similar connection mediated by presentations, a connection between the living self-experience of the concrete ego, the primordial sphere of the ego and the sphere of the other, is presented. The co-existence of the transcendental ego and the other ego, the concrete ego and the other ego, the intentional life of the transcendental ego and the other ego, the realities of the transcendental ego and the other ego is instituted.

The initial communalization between the primordial monad and the other monads constituted in the primordial monad as existing for the primordial monad appresentationally is so far discussed. The other monads constituted are existing for themselves as the primordial monad exist for itself. They exist in communion with

the primordial monad. The other monads are different from the primordial monad with respect to the real inherent connection existing between the subjective processes of the other monads and the primordial monad. There is separation between the primordial monad and the other monads with respect to the psycho-physical existence. Though each monad is an absolutely separate unity with an intentional reaching of the other into the primordial monad, an intentional communion exists that makes transcendently possible the being of the world that is common²².

The initial level of communalization and the constitution of objective world starting from the primordial world leads to the higher level. The primordial monad acquire the other monads as psycho-physical subjects and objectivating equalization of the existence of the primordial monad with all other monads occur. With an understanding of the other monads by penetrating into their own ownness, a mutual and reciprocal understanding between monads occur. Nature as an open community of monads with subjects of possible intercommunion labelled as transcendental intersubjectivity is constituted in every monad in intentional processes with systems of intentionality. Such intentional experience of each man implying the open horizon with vast accessibilities forms the constitution of the objective world which is intersubjective. The pure psyche is viewed as a self-objectification of the primordial monad. A theory of transcendental phenomenology, a theory of transcendental constitution of the objective world becomes a theory related to internal psychology, a pure psychology that explicates concrete human Ego in its intentional essence through transcendental investigation²³.

The acts of the ego reaching into the other ego through the medium of appresentative experience of the other having the character of the social acts by means of which human personal communication is possible is to be studied and the essence of all types of sociality is to be transcendently understood so that social communalization involving social communities become constituted²⁴. The concrete world is given to the transcendental ego and to every other ego as a cultural world accessible to everyone. Different worlds of culture are constituted as concrete life-world's in which separate communities live their lives. Each individual human being understands his surrounding world, his culture as a man belonging to the community. But in the case of the ego sharing its own culture, another culture is accessible by a type of empathy which helps to reach into the other culture. This experience is based on intentional experience which needs to be investigated.

An exploration of the world of humanity and culture with definitive spiritual predicates psychologically constituted is suggested by Husserl. The origin of spiritual predicates and the origin of intersubjective acceptance of the common life-world are important steps in the suggested investigation. The transcendental phenomenological account of the apodictic ego with its full concreteness is called the life-world which is necessarily related to the transcendental intersubjectivity of the transcendental ego through transcendental constitution which will provide a firm justification for discovering the essential forms of transcendental constitution²⁵. Transcendental intersubjectivity is the relationship between the ego and the other that can be analyzed within the relationship. Intersubjectivity is to be understood from the egoic experience. The transcendental ego constitutes the world as presented to everyone objectively. The

world experienced by the ego and the world as such may seem to be different, but intersubjective experience overcomes the opposition. The reality of intersubjectivity lies in the fact that intersubjectively structured transcendental subjectivity is involved in the phenomenological construction of intersubjectivity establishing the concrete experience of the other. The constitution of the reality of transcendental subjectivity is directly related to the view of the transcendental ego determined by the method of phenomenology.

Husserl speaks of primordial reduction as intersubjective reduction for accessing the other as explained in the Fifth *Cartesian Meditations*. Primordial reduction as a new methodological process reduces the ego to its ultimate immanence, the ego constituted in its ownness with its intentional sphere, the primordial sphere of the ego related to the world. The primordial ego is attributed with objective, intersubjective character. The primordial reduction is a radical one making access to the primordial sphere which is the base for the experience of the other, the experience of the objective world²⁶. Primordial ego is the 'original ego' of the ultimately immanent sphere of ownness, the functional center, the ultimate constitutive level of intersubjectivity. The primordial ego has primordial transcendence, a constitutive stratum constituting immanent transcendence. Secondary transcendence constitutes consciousness of the other. The primordial sphere is not solipsistic and dogmatic but is involved in the concrete constitution of the other. Intersubjectivity, according to Husserl, is a community of monads founding objectivity. Intersubjectivity is constituted genetically in relation to objective experience and scientific activity, the world of experience constituted in an intersubjective way. Phenomenological

construction involves the experience of the other in which the primordial ego establishes a monadic community and the world of primordial ego is established as an intersubjective community, an objective world for everyone. The experience of the other is characterized as objective and unique for everyone. The monadological intersubjectivity is constituted as a sphere of intersubjectivity, as the intersubjective correlate of the objective world. Husserl distinguished between the ego consciousness and consciousness of the other within the intersubjective constitutive sphere of ownness of the ego. The phenomenological experience of the other is constituted as the alter ego. The other ego constituted is the ego itself. The constitutive intentionality of intersubjectivity involves a mediatedness having two intentionalities in the consciousness of the other, the ego given and the alter ego appresented. Analogical apprehension presupposes pairing of the ego and the other ego. Pairing involves an intentional overreaching, an overlying of ego with the objective sense of the other. There is an analogy based on intentional modification, the other as a modification of the ego. Experience of the other involves the constitutive function of the primordial sphere in the apperception of the other. The primordial sphere is structured in an intersubjective way. The experience of the other involves two types of association, immediate association having direct connection between the ego and the other, and mediate association having indirect connection only. Analysis of intersubjectivity also involves analysis of the constitution of objectivity.

The sense of the other is constituted within the primordial sphere as an identical unity in which the ego and the other ego are involved. An identity of the primordial ego and the other ego take place by appresentation. Within the sphere of

ownness of the ego, the ego and the other ego are having the same world of experience²⁷. There is an identity of experience of the world with respect to the ego and the other ego. The world of the intersubjective community is characterized as harmonious which is also constituted. The sphere of the primordial ego and the sphere of the other ego presented are having real connection. The uncovering of the other in the sphere of ownness of the ego is made possible through objectification on the transcendental intersubjectivity, the ego and the world transcendently constituted within the primordial ego. Thus transcendental intersubjectivity is grounded in the transcendental ego deriving its sense through a necessary construction, transcendental phenomenological construction.

6. Intentional Explication and Transcendental Phenomenology

The apriori of constitution explained by transcendental phenomenology is a new one. The total constitution, the self-constitution of the ego and the constitution of the other egos by the ego forms the constitution of the objectively existing world, and is apriori and universal and intentionally included in the ego. An apriori ontology of the real world, of sociality and culture, is of importance. But an apriori of the transcendental involving both noetic-noematic aspects is necessary for uncovering the total constitutive programme by tracing the

constitution having monadological implications²⁸. The purely intuitive, concrete and apodictic phenomenological way of explicating the experience of the other is not speculative metaphysics but having monadological implications involving a plurality of monads, a community of monads that constitute the objective world²⁹. Pluralities of monads co-existing though having their own worlds are aspects of a single objective world common to them. The different groups of monads having different worlds are belonging to an objective world common to them³⁰.

The primordial ego constitution and phenomenological theory of association applicable to all other egos has not been discussed by the philosophical tradition. The intentional clarification of the objective world, a structural articulation of the primordial sphere are uncovered in the transcendental attitude³¹. A clarification of the constitution of the primordial unity requires further investigations of the problem of intentional explication. The problems of intentional constitution are to be investigated according to intentional method, the constitutions as explications of the primordial ego and other egos. Phenomenology as apriori pure intentional psychology effects a ‘copernican conversion’ a completely radical transcendental consideration of the world³². The intentional explication of the world of universal experience, an intentional explication of the primordial sphere of the phenomenal world are to be investigated which underlie the phenomenology of objective and pure nature which is different from the concrete world³³. Intentional psychology comes within transcendental phenomenology as a development of the latter.

The theory of experiencing others arising from the constitution theory involving harmonious synthesis is explained by the intentional experience of the ego³⁴. The transcendental ego become aware of itself, grasped apodictically and become aware of others appresentatively within the sphere of transcendental ego³⁵. Everything is constituted by the transcendental ego being part of its essence. The self-explication of transcendental ego leads to understanding others appresentatively. Phenomenological transcendental idealism is a monadology, adopting Leibnitz's doctrine of monads, but interpreted phenomenologically. Phenomenological explication is devoid of any metaphysical implications, but is based on pure intuition, pure explication with fulfilling givenness of sense³⁶. The sense of the world is phenomenologically explicated objectively.

Phenomenology is characterized as a re-fashioned science by its self criticism seeking apodictically absolute foundation. The method of phenomenology and the intentional self-explication of the transcendental ego have made possible the constitutive capacity of the transcendental ego possible establishing transcendental intersubjectivity. Transcendental phenomenology is conceived as the origin of genuine concepts fundamental to all sciences. The transcendental constitution of the world have contributed much in the radical clarification of the fundamental concepts of sciences. In this sense transcendental phenomenology is characterized as the genuine universal ontology grounded on absolute foundation for sciences, intersubjective phenomenology being the foundation for genuine sciences and genuine philosophies. Phenomenology is derived from the egology of the primordially reduced ego, phenomenology being

the foundation for genuine sciences and genuine philosophies. Phenomenology has a metaphysics bearing the objectivity of the world as transcendental intersubjectivity. Phenomenology actualizes the idea of all embracing philosophy through the path of universal self-knowledge, monadic and inter-monadic.

7. A Critical Estimate of Husserl's Doctrine of Intersubjectivity

Intersubjectivity could be treated as the common ground on which an originary interdisciplinary study of human sociality could be founded. The implications of the concept of intersubjectivity has been worked out by interpreters such as Schutz and Garfinkel. Schutz understood very well the implications of Husserl's concept of intersubjectivity for social sciences. Schutz made use of Husserl's notion of intersubjectivity as the base for Max Weber's interpretive social science. Schutz understood that for Husserl intersubjectivity is the universal condition of human existence and humanity as a whole. Our surrounding world could be experienced and given meaning on the basis of intersubjectivity.

Habermas criticizes Husserl's discussion of intersubjectivity for giving an important role to perception and the perceptual focus, and not giving importance to language and speech. Schutz criticizes Husserl's discussion of the reduction to the sphere of ownness in the *Cartesian Meditations*³⁷, stating that a definition of the sphere of ownness is lacking. Further, consciousness as monadic cannot be self-consciousness. Schutz criticizes Husserl's view of analogy between perception of one's own conscious life and the perception of the other, his account of pairing. Philosophers generally consider the problem of intersubjectivity as the problem of

other minds. The phenomenologists take up the issue of intersubjectivity in a way different from this rejecting the view that one's own mind given to one as internal consciousness and that in perceiving the other one has direct access to the other's bodily movements. One's own subjectivity is not revealed to oneself as a pure internal phenomenon and the other's body is not revealed to oneself as a pure external phenomenon. In phenomenology intersubjectivity means not an encounter with the other in which one is faced with a body or a hidden psyche, but means an encounter with a unified whole. According to Husserl the other is given as a lived body in a mode of consciousness called empathy³⁸. Empathy is a form of intentionality in which one is directed towards the other's lived experiences. Empathy is an intentional act that reveals the other's subjectivity. Intersubjectivity demands going beyond empathy. There is also a very rich relation between intersubjectivity and objectivity. The objectivity of the world is disclosed or is intersubjectivity constituted.

The possibility and limits of intersubjective relationships is discussed by Sartre in his work *Being and Nothingness* presenting an ontology of human existence making use of Husserlian insights. The relationship between ego and consciousness, the ego reflecting on the structure of consciousness was explained by Husserl. The immediate awareness of conscious ego was a necessary and unquestionable fact for Husserl. But Sartre denied consciousness of the ego as an important fact. According to Sartre, consciousness of the ego is not a structure of consciousness but a structure in consciousness, a product of consciousness and not the source of consciousness. The ego is the object of consciousness, not the owner

of consciousness. Consciousness is a 'nothing' not 'something'. Phenomenology of the human subject is the conscious being whose meaning is to introduce nothingness into being, 'man nothingness'. Sartre is advocating dualism of unconscious and conscious being, being and nothingness. Sartre's existential phenomenology analyzes human existence and investigates the possibility and limits of existential intersubjectivity.

According to Max-Scheler, man is essentially social, sharing a common and universal life stream. Max-Scheler, the phenomenologist, differ from Husserl's notion of intersubjectivity in that he is not concerned with justifying the existence of the other epistemologically as Husserl does. Husserl was concerned with the phenomenological possibility of intersubjective relationships and the social nature underlies his phenomenology of intersubjectivity. The social nature of man constitutes man's very being, man has social apriori. The problem of intersubjectivity is interpreted by Scheler as very essential in the search for the foundations of social sciences. The social apriori in man, according to Scheler, is the fact that an individual having not encountered another man, not perceived other human beings, will be able say that he belongs to a human community. Such apriori knowledge is possible because it is based on intuitive certain evidence, not an innate idea nor a transcendental experience but based on intense personal experience. Man is always conscious of living in community with others. The uniqueness of social acts as intentional in an apriori sense is claimed by Scheler. Given the essential structure of human consciousness, society exists in the interior of each individual. Man and society are interrelated essentially, both being

complementary to each other. Sartre's analysis of the ontology of nothingness does not establish anything. The intersubjective context has been studied by Sartre who denies subject to subject relationships. Scheler's theory in which all subjects are ontologically related to one another through participation leads us to nowhere.

Dietrich Von Hildebrand had his phenomenology of intersubjectivity inquiring into the structures of man's lived world of experience. Von Hildebrand did not agree with Husserl's turn towards idealism and his theory of transcendental ego. Von Hildebrand was an eidetic phenomenologist holding a realistic viewpoint. Von Hildebrand explains intersubjectivity from a realistic viewpoint stating that certain acts of the human subject creates a unique radiating social field of force which is real and objective creating social bonds or interpersonal relationships that are real and objective as physical ones. The invariant structures of our lived experience are apriori and accessed only through careful reflection on the varying contents of conscious acts. Von Hildebrand's attempt to discover and describe the invariant structures of the bonds of personal relations in the community and to identify the essence of human acts underlying communal relationships constitutes his investigation of intersubjectivity. Hildebrand tried to explore the different essential types of intersubjective situations. An analysis of the social act that creates an intersubjective context was made by Adolph Reinach, a contemporary of Hildebrand who followed him. Husserl's treatment of intersubjectivity teaches us an important lesson, that the other is determined by epistemological considerations. According to Fuchs, Husserl's failure at resolving the problem of intersubjectivity

lies at this point. What Paul Ricoeur attributed for idealism, Fuchs attributed to an epistemology based on the metaphysics of presence.

Intersubjective experience is very important with respect to the constitution of individual egos as objectively existing subjects, other experiencing subjects and the objective spatio-temporal world. Transcendental life-world is the world in which we live and intersubjectivity is the kind of intentionalities that functions in the experience of the ego about other egos, other persons. Phenomenology claims that the exact sciences are within the life-world. Phenomenology provides a classification of the exact science regarding their origin. Phenomenology being a science about science is also a science of the life-world showing the life-world as a foundation for all the sciences. Phenomenology makes possible the intersubjective experience. Intersubjective experience is empathic experience, acts of empathy constructs intersubjectivity. Intersubjective experience, empathetic experience occurs by way of conscious attribution of intentional acts to other subjects.

8. Conclusion

The main objection against phenomenology is that it is solipsistic, being reduced into the transcendental ego. As an answer to this objection, the Fifth meditation of *Cartesian Meditations* discusses intersubjectivity as experiencing other egos through empathy. It is claimed that the intentional faculties of the transcendental ego helps to transcend itself and experience the other and the objective world as such. It is the ownness reduction that helps to transcend itself and uncover the other. The intersubjective sphere of ownness contains the objective world. Mediacy of intentionality, appresentation and analogizing apprehension are necessary steps in the uncovering of the other. Pairing involving an intentional overreaching is also important. The phenomenological modification of the transcendental ego through pairing is an intentional modification resulting in the uncovering of the other.

The other is appresentatively apperceived as the ego of the primordial apperceived as the ego that constitutes the other by way of appresentative apperception involving assimilative pairing and assimilation. The transcendental egos appresents the other egos and an identity occurs. The concrete objective world is constituted by the transcendental ego based on a harmonious confirmation of the apperceptive constitution. Intentional consciousness implies an identical intentional object of separate conscious processes. An intentional communion between the ego and the other egos occurs that make the possibility of the world as common. Transcendental intersubjectivity is constituted with systems of intentionality implying the constitution of the objective world which is intersubjective. A transcendental understanding of sociality is emphasized by Husserl so that social communalization becomes possible through the constitution of social communities.

It is the intentional experience that make possible the accessibility of a cultural world to everyone. The transcendental subjectivity is intersubjectively structured which is made accessible through the radical primordial reduction. The intentional explication of the primordial sphere and the world of universal experience are important with respect to phenomenological transcendental idealism which is not metaphysical but objective and intersubjective. Human sociality is founded on intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity and objectivity are related in such a way that objectivity is intersubjectively constituted.

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CHAPTER IV

THE CONCEPT OF LIFE-WORLD.

THE CONCEPT OF LIFE-WORLD.

1. The Crisis of The Sciences- An Introduction
2. The Idea of Universal Philosophy.
3. The Problem of The Life-World and The Life-World
Epoche.
4. The world and The Subjective Manners of Givenness.
5. Transcendental Philosophy as Genuine Philosophy.
6. Conclusion.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONCEPT OF LIFE-WORLD

An exposition of Husserl's work *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* is attempted in order to throw light on the concept of life- world as detailed in the text.

Husserl's ideal of Philosophy as a rigorous science may be described as discovering a region of apodictic evidences. The apodictic is having the characteristic of universality, necessity and immediacy of consciousness to the things themselves realized in intuition. Husserl was of the conviction that the ideal of Philosophy as a rigorous science can be realized. The analysis and description of transcendental experience finally led to the concept of life-world and problems of intersubjectivity and historicity. The theory of the life-world is approached in his *Crisis* with a different outlook of the transcendental Phenomenology. The true status of the scientific world is described by Husserl. The originary status of the intentional constitutive consciousness is disclosed by Husserl.

1. The Crisis of the Sciences- An Introduction

The crisis of the sciences according to Husserl, is a result of the life Crisis of European Humanity. A genuine scientific and Philosophical approach, a transcendental Phenomenological Philosophy, a Phenomenology proper was established through a teleological historical reflection that Husserl worked out in the *Crisis*. Though he started working on the book in 1934, his lecture in Vienna on “ Philosophy in the Crisis of European Humanity” in 1935 and his lecture in prague “The Crisis of European Sciences and Psychology” in November 1935 led to his major work *Crisis*. Part I and part II of *Crisis* deal with historical reflections, part III deal with reflection on the life-world, (part-A) and then on Psychology (part-B). The historical reflections on the origin of the crisis of sciences forms an introductory account of genuine philosophy. The concept of the life-world is a final product of the historical reflections. Both the historical reflections and the life-world forms an interconnected unity establishing Husserl’s phenomenology proper.

Husserl considers phenomenology as a final product of the historical search, a philosophy of history, and the crisis of sciences ultimately leading to the fulfillment of Philosophical task for humanity. Husserl claimed that a new approach to history has been adopted in the *Crisis*, an inquiry into the essence of history, man’s historicity. Intersubjective community and consciousness, a description of social consciousness, a theory of the essence of history forming

an essential aspect of eidetic theory of consciousness constitute the main theme of *Crisis*.

Husserl was against the sceptical implications of historicism. In “The Origin of Geometry” Husserl characterizes historicity as a character of scientific thinking viewing science as a historical process. In the *Crisis* and the Vienna lecture, Philosophy is presented as science and historicity forms an essential characteristic of science, science without assumptions being the ideal of ‘Philosophy as a Rigorous Science’. In the Vienna lecture on “The Origin of Philosophy”, Husserl established a relation between historicity and the life-world. Husserl distinguished between the theoretical and pre-theoretical attitudes and also showed the relation between them which ultimately paved the way for the theory of the life-world discussed in the *Crisis*. The life-world is discussed by both philosophers and scientists as the world pre-given in the theoretical attitude. The life-world is presupposed by theoretical activity and it forms the structure and foundation for conscious life. Any theory presupposes the pre-theoretical attitude and the life-world so that pre-givenness and the pre-theoretical attitudes are the characteristics of life-world as asserted by Husserl in his dealing with European sciences with respect to the *Crisis*. The life-world is described as the ‘world of immediate experience’ the pre-predicative world referred in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. The social or intersubjective nature of life-world described as a world of immediate experience is explained in his earlier work.

The crisis of sciences is with respect to the genuine scientific character. The crisis of culture and the role of science is concerned with the meaning of science for human existence. The world view of the modern man determined by the progress of positive sciences have resulted in the neglect of rational discussions concerning genuine humanity regarding human existence and related issues. The ideal of universal philosophy having a genuine method was the need of all historical philosophical movements. A crisis regarding the foundations of sciences, a crisis regarding foundations of philosophy as such arose, not even concerning science alone or philosophy alone but concerning European mankind as such¹. Modern European humanity was in urgent need of a new philosophy and the crisis of sciences was a crisis of philosophy. The meaning of genuine humanity was the concern of philosophy and this has been the concern of European humanity. The crisis in philosophy and science needs clarifications which was not fulfilled till the time of phenomenology. A new understanding with new reflection on the history by philosophy is the necessity. A concrete historical approach is attempted by Husserl, an entirely new approach, new correlations are envisaged and the sense of philosophy is itself radically transformed.

2. The Idea of Universal Philosophy

The idea of universal has been the guiding idea of philosophical movements since the time of Descartes². The mathematical world of idealities was substituted for the real world of perception. With Galeileo begins the substitution of idealized nature for pre-scientifically intuited nature. Galeileo did not inquire into the immediately intuited world in the geometrical ideal constructions. The geometrical method lacked the new achievement required for genuinely geometric idealization. The idea of nature as a self enclosed theoretical and real world of bodies brought out a radical change in the idea of the world. The idea of universal mathematics and the mathematization of nature is found in the philosophy of Descartes. With Galeileo the world was taken as a rational world. The idea of a rational world and the idea of a universal science of the world are characteristics of the modern period, subsequently, the idea of universal objective science faded away and epistemological philosophy emerged. Scientific objectivism was transformed into transcendental subjectivism. The ontic meanings of the world was arrived at and objective truth was revealed through a radical enquiry into subjectivity. The being of the world was given through subjectivity that objectifies it. The idea of transcendental subjectivity involved problems which was tried to solve in the history of epistemological turn that involved antagonism between objectivism and

transcendentalism and the philosophical movement culminated in a new form of transcendental philosophy called phenomenology³.

Descartes conceived philosophy as universal mathematics involving the idea of universal philosophy meaning mathematical rationalism. To Descartes, philosophical knowledge meant apodictic knowledge and only ego is absolutely indubitable and subjectivity is the ultimate foundation for objectivity. But Descartes did not systematically investigate the pure ego, did not analyse the intentional structure of it⁴. Descartes' new universal philosophy as a theory of knowledge transcends the ego. Locke did not make use of Cartesian cogitatio as a subject of investigation. Locke was sceptical about the rational ideal of science. Locke's empiricism led to further development of empiricism which ultimately led to paradoxical idealism which ended in absurdity. Berkeley reduces things of experience to sense data. No inference is admitted through which conclusions can be drawn. Locke and Berkeley considers matter as existing in itself as a philosophical invention. The culmination of empiricism in Hume arrived at fictions regarding all categories of objectivity. The fictitious nature of objectivity have their origin in psychology. Hume is recognized as having an important place in history as he has brought about a great turn in the development of Kant's philosophy. A new kind of transcendental subjectivism originated in Kant giving rise to new forms in German idealism.

The term transcendental philosophy has been used since Kant as title for universal philosophy, and Husserl used the term as an inquiry into the ultimate source of knowledge reflecting upon the ego and its knowing life⁵. The ego, its conscious life and its relation to the world forms the central issue of the transcendental problems. The transcendental philosophy of Kant does not provide a truly radical grounding of philosophy, According to Husserl. However, Kant's philosophy is the first attempt at a truly universal transcendental philosophy as a rigorous science⁶. The revision of Kantian transcendentalism is based on the conviction that the objective sciences lacks ultimate grounding which can be attained only by a transcendental subjective method. Kant's philosophy had unquestioned pre-suppositions. According to Husserl, a systematic inquiry into the pre-suppositions not only of Kant but all philosophers and scientists is necessary. A systematic uncovering of the intentionality, an intentional analysis of consciousness was needed⁷.

Kant in his method constructs transcendental subjectivity that functions in forming the world of experience. A clarification of the transcendental function in explaining objectively valid knowledge is to be attained in Kant's theory through a proper method that will discover a realm of theoretical self-evidence. The proper method is intended to have access to depth sphere making possible the pure grasp of itself thus clarifying the distinction between the 'life of the plain' and the 'life of the depth'⁸. Husserl maintains that

the path taken offers self-evidence and apodicticity that can be verified. Science as a human spiritual accomplishment presupposes the intuitive surrounding world of life pre-given as existing for all in common. The pre-given world is to be investigated reflectively for achieving clarity, it being referred by the term life-world.

The pre-given world is to be investigated which needs special attention. The special ontic sense of the life-world is to be understood. The correct understanding of the essence of the life-world and the proper method for it is to be considered and realized in pure experience which is not psychophysical and psychological. The immediately given sense data of the life-world, the purely intuitive data of the life-world is to be investigated. The life-world is a realm of original self-evidences, experienced as ‘the thing itself’, in immediate presence⁹. The thing itself is intersubjectively experienceable and verifiable which can claim truth by being related to original self-evidences. From objective-logical self-evidence the path leads to original self-evidence in which the life-world is pre-given. The life-world and the objective-scientific world are different, however related each other in the sense that the objective-scientific world is grounded in the life-world with pre-given self-evidence. The life-world is the ground of the scientifically true-world¹⁰. Husserl is of the opinion that philosophizing so far has been without a ground. The problem is regarding how to become real philosophers .

3. The problem of the life-world and the life-world epoche

Husserl treats the problem of the life-world as a universal problem for philosophy. In comparison with the problem of the life-world, the problem of objectively true world appears as a problem of specialized interest. Life-world is taken into consideration in terms of the concrete universality of the world related to the world of intersubjective experiences. The life-world is supposed to make possible scientific statements having their own objectivity which can be verified by reflecting with proper method as a necessity. The problem of the life-world has proved to be the most genuine and universal problem for philosophy¹¹.

The method of verification involves a number of steps having the character of an epoche. The first epoche is in respect of all objective sciences, an epoche with respect to all objective theoretical interests. The life-world epoche is basically a matter of indifference effecting a complete personal

transformation like a religious conversion having the significance of existential transformation assigned as a task to mankind as such¹². The actual life-world is the world as experienced in pre-scientific life beyond what is ordinarily experienced and a world horizon of possible thing-experience. The objects of the life-world is common to all and on the way to objective science, objectivity is the goal, truth in itself. The first epoche concerning the objective sciences requires further steps to be undertaken scientifically.

The life-world has a general structure accessible to all. The bodies in the life-world are not physical bodies. Everything objectively a priori refer back to the life-world a priori as a founding of validity. A certain type idealization brings about the ontic validity of the objective apriori on the basis of the life-world apriori. A systematic division of the universal structures, universal life-world apriori and universal objective apriori, is required. Further a division among the universal inquires, the way in which objective apriori is grounded in the subjective-relative a priori of the life-world is also required¹³. A separation of the traditional objectivistic metaphysics from the universal apriori belonging purely to the life-world is necessary, which is brought out by the epoche of objective, and-priori sciences. The universal apriori of the objective-logical level is grounded in the universal apriori of the pure life-world. The distinction between the objective-logical apriori and the life-world a priori makes possible the required radical reflection of the pure theory of the essence of the life-

world¹⁴. A life-world ontology amounts to a general doctrine of essence of the world of things. A general reflection of the pre-given world reveals the necessity of a new look into life-world.

There is fundamental difference between being conscious of things or objects and being conscious of the world. Things or objects in the life-world are given as being conscious of them within the world-horizon. The world as horizon cannot be actual without particular objects of consciousness. Every object have different modes of validity, ontic certainty. But the world does not exist as an entity, as an object. Every object pre-supposes the world-horizon. Thus the difference between the being of an object in the world and that of the world makes different types of consciousness for them¹⁵.

There are two possible ways of life-world theme, the natural attitude and the reflective attitude. The reflective attitude is concerned with the subjective manner of givenness of life-world and life-world objects. The reflective attitude involves a transformation of the thematic consciousness so that the objects are becoming conscious through subjective ways of givenness. This is the synthetic totality in which the world exists as constantly pre-given. There is essential distinction between the two types of investigations, the two ways of making the life-world thematic. In the natural attitude the subjective aspect always remains necessarily concealed. The revelation of the subjective aspect requires a method revealing it as the all-encompassing unity of ultimately

functioning subjectivity¹⁶, a science of the universal of the pre-giveness of the world which makes it a universal ground for any mode of objectivity. A clarification of the pre-given world's character of universal ground of all objective science has led to the new universal science of subjectivity as pre-giving the world. The first step is the epoche freeing from all objective sciences and reducing to the life-world valid pre-scientifically. The pre-given world valid as a ground is to be converted into the universe of the purely subjective, a universal framework which is independent, the general ground of the validity of the world. A total change of the natural attitude is necessary so that the pre-given world as the ground of natural life can be explored through a unique and complete universal epoche. Husserl is of the opinion that an entirely new kind of universal epoche involving the total transformation of the natural attitude, a complete transformation of all of life, an entirely new way of life is possible¹⁷. The transcendental epoche effecting a total change of natural attitude of life through which a radical change of all human existence reaching into philosophical depths is possible.

It is the epoche, the new way of philosophizing the genuine transcendental epoche through which the philosopher views truth in a free way, the hidden pre-giveness of the world, the universal absolutely self-enclosed correlation between the world and world consciousness is discovered. The world consciousness means the conscious life of subjectivity effecting the validity of

the world actively shaping it in a new way. There is an absolute correlation between things and absolute subjectivity constituting meaning and ontic validity. A new way of experiencing is affected through the epoche, the world has become a phenomenon in a new sense¹⁸. Husserl is very specifically concerned with the transcendental reduction, the reduction to transcendental subjectivity through whose conscious life the world attains its ontic validity. A new sort of scientific discipline is attained through the epoche with a total transformation of attitude consisting in the infinity of actual and possible transcendental experience in which the world is experienced as 'phenomenon'. The success of transcendental philosophy is very much related to the self-reflective clarity to its most extent. The transcendental reduction in *Ideas* is called the Cartesian way, critically purifying Descartes's prejudices and confusions. But this has a great shortcoming, it leads to the transcendental ego empty of content¹⁹. A reflection on the method is required as a necessary step, to comprehend the whole subjectivity is the task, excluding everything objective, a type of universal epoche for which deeper and intense reflections are required. A disinterested outlook and a specific inquiry into the subjective manners of givenness is the necessity. A universal inquiry into the world's manner of givenness, its implicit intentionalities is meant²⁰.

4. The world and the subjective manners of givenness.

Husserl views the world experienced as involving intersubjective harmony of validity and as the universal horizon with overlapping community consciousness²¹. The correlation between the world and the subjective manners of givenness remained a philosophical problem unanswered²². Husserl is of the opinion that anything that has its meaning entirely depending on a subjective system of correlations. The world is pre-given through the multiplicities of the subjective manners of appearing. The essential way in which the world and the subjective ways in which it is given are related did not enter the philosophical realm. Each thing appeared different to each person. Husserl's transcendental

phenomenology is an attempt to reveal the essential relation involved. The correlation and the alteration of validity for the intentionality occurring in the ego-subjects and their communalization are examined carefully. Everything is related to its manners of givenness and has its modes of validity and its manners of synthesis.

The correlation between appearance and that which appears as such is taken up by Husserl within the framework of the intentionality of ego-subjects involving communalization. The world and subjective manners of givenness involving specific synthesis is the subject matter of discussion for Husserl. Husserl is hopeful of resolving the issue with proper method, a synthesis of individual-subjective and intersubjective harmony and discrepancy through actual concrete experience with a harmonious manner of givenness that fulfills the experiencing intention²³. The total manners of givenness is a horizon of possible realizable processes that belongs to each experience being intentional. Everything that exists has its meaning, its manners of self givenness, its manners of intention in modes of validity, the manners of the subjective variation in synthesis of individual-subjective and intersubjective harmony and discrepancy. Husserl demands the necessity of an essential method that can translate these into essential generalities, into a system of new a priori truths. Every actual experience provides a harmonious manners of givenness which fulfills the intention.

The initiative for the universal apriori of correlation between experienced object and manners of givenness occurred in the work of *Logical Investigations* around 1898. A systematic elaboration of this apriori of correlation have been incorporated in Husserl's subsequent works. A radical transformation of the meaning of these problems led to the phenomenological reduction and the notion of transcendental subjectivity. A systematic introduction to the new philosophy of the transcendental reduction appeared in 1913 in *Ideas Vol.I*. The intersubjective constitution of the world means the total system of manners of givenness and the modes of validity for egos. The systematic uncovering of the world through intersubjective constitution makes the world understandable as a structure of meaning formed from elementary intentionalities. Intentionality is the only genuine way of explaining, making intelligible. The intentional origin and synthesis of the formation of meaning are the real way of understanding²⁴.The intentional function has a horizon of retentions and protentions. The past has its being and its multiplicities of manners of givenness, manners of original self-givenness. Similarly the future as an intentional modification of perception has a meaning formation from which it gets its ontic meaning. It is through the all inclusive universal synthesis the world is constituted, the intentional synthesis, the synthesis of continuity which serves as the ground for clarification of a higher level discrete synthesis.

In the subjective- relative life-world, the sphere of the intuitively given, the sphere of the modes of experience is attended to. Husserl is trying to

analyse the ego-cogito-cogitatum. Here the different aspects of the notion of intentionalities is at work as ego-cogitatio-cogitata, the ego-pole, the subjective as appearance synthetically, and the object-poles. The different aspects of the notion of intentionality such as direction towards something, appearance of something and the objective something towards which the intention of the ego-pole is directed intentionally through the unity of appearances which are inseparable are attempted to. When the new way of thinking is established through the strict epoche, the life-world in pure ontic certainty becomes guideline for inquiring into the intentional structures. A second level reflection will lead to the ego-pole as the enduring ego. In subjectivity, the ego-pole is functioning constitutively in intersubjectivity. There is a synthesis of the ego and the other egos, constituting a pure ego- horizon in which every ego knows itself, constituting a universal sociality of mankind. The intersubjectively identical life-world provides an intentional indication for the multiplicities of appearance in which the ego-subjects are directed towards a common world²⁵.

The life- world is constituted as a unity, the universe of life-world objects. The transcendental attitude, the epoche, transforms the life-world into a transcendental phenomenon, the phenomena as a component of the concrete transcendental subjectivity. The life-world apriori is a stratum within the universal apriori of the transcendental in general. With the epoche the ego is directed towards the life-world with its apriori essential forms. The transcendental attitude focused

upon the life-world phenomena make possible the universal task of the transcendental reduction fulfilled²⁶ with reduction there occurs a reorientation from the natural attitude to a disinterested attitude. The world and mankind in community as the subjectivity which intentionality provides in establishing the world validity has become the theme of the investigation. To become conscious of the constituting activities, a complete re-orientation and radical reflection is necessary. With the radical reflection, of the epoche, objective truth is established²⁷. Philosophy in the ancient times constituted only object- poles but the concrete being and life constituted transcendently is ignored.

In the epoche it is the subjectivity that is traced and the ways in which the subjectivity constructs the world. The Phenomenologist is not concerned with the external world but the world-life is the topic of his investigation with respect to the subjective aspects so that the world is transformed into the meaning of 'system of poles for a transcendental subjectivity' constituted²⁸. The transformation remains within the world itself. This is a way of explicating intentional life. The epoche has an aim that is realized in the harmoniousness of the new ontic validities and realized in intuition as the 'thing itself'. The essential form of the transcendental accomplishment in subjective and intersubjective levels can be attained through the eidetic method. The total essential form of transcendently accomplishing subjectivity in its intersubjective form can be grasped only through its essence and not empirically possible²⁹. The epoche provides a pure attitude with correlations, the

objective world becomes the transcendental phenomenon with subjective manners of givenness. All objectivity is resolved into universal intersubjectivity. The world is constituted by the universal interconnection of intentional subjectivity of the ego subjects. The phenomenological attitude after the epoche is above the subject-object correlation, a transcendental subject-object correlation. Thus phenomenological transcendental philosophy does not presuppose anything but through self-reflection the world is transformed into a universe of phenomena³⁰.

Human beings as world-constituting subjectivity is at the same time in the world as objects. The ego is to be treated as the subject matter of the highest level of reflection. The functioning of the ego is to be understood with depth. The ego constitutes intersubjectivity including itself and other egos so that intersubjectivity constituted is within the ego itself. Self-reflection of the intersubjective context reveals that it is the intentional structure of the human community that constitute the world. The intersubjective community of human beings are themselves 'Phenomena' and are object-poles and subject for inquiry into the intentional structure through which they function and attain ontic meaning of themselves³¹. The transcendental subjects functioning in the constitution of the world are 'Phenomena'. Each human being is considered as pure ego-pole of conscious acts directed towards the world, directed towards the ontic certainty through the manners of givenness. In the epoche, the ego-pole functioning is

focused in its purity along with its concrete intentional structures belonging to the phenomenon as the world constituted.

The transcendental ego is explained as constituting the horizon of transcendental others as co-subjects in the transcendental intersubjectivity constituting the world. The whole mankind has become a phenomenon for the ego, and the world has meaning as a pure world³². The ego constitutes the primordial sphere, and then performs constitution through which an intentional modification of itself and its primordiality derives ontic validity of other egos by way of analogy. In the primordial sphere, transcendental ego constitutes another ego, gets its ontic validity as co- present through empathy. Transcendental intersubjectivity and transcendental communalization can be methodically derived by starting from the ego and the system of its transcendental functions through which the world for all is constituted as the world for each ego subject. Through phenomenological self-reflection of the transcendental ego and through self- objectification, intersubjectivity is constituted³³.

The epoche is modified by a reduction to the absolute ego as the ultimate centre of constitutive function. The method requires that the ego is to be systematically inquired into the concrete transcendental ego in its constitutive, functioning acts. The ego given apodictically is to exposed through intentional analysis and the correlation between the world and transcendental subjectivity is objectified. Phenomenology demands apodicticity with respect to the ego and all

transcendental knowledge. The apodictic ego arrived at provides a realm of self-evidence requiring no further inquiry. Genuine explanation is, according to Husserl, making transcendently understandable³⁴. Anything that is objective needs to be understood transcendently. Scientific explanation is not genuine explanation because it does not give ultimate knowledge of nature and genuine ontic meaning.

5. Transcendental Philosophy as Genuine Philosophy

A philosophy of selfunderstanding is the task, a philosophy with apodictic selfevidence as its ground is the requirement. This could be achieved only through the method of most radical self- reflections. Husserl further states that phenomenological transcendental philosophy has become a truly first beginning. Husserl felt that what is needed is a philosophy that is radically pre- suppositionless and ultimately grounded. For this a universal framework not having the prejudice of modern objectivism was necessary. Objectivistic philosophy and transcendental philosophies continued since Kant. Transcendental philosophy could not undergo transformations in the proper line of development. Though transcendental philosophy appeared first in the *Cartesian Meditations* as an absolutely subjectivistic grounding of philosophy through the apodictic ego, the genuine sense of transcendental philosophy remained unclear. But the required sense of Copernican turn was not available even in Kant's new beginning. By the genuine sense of the required Copernican turn Husserl means "grounding once and for all a systematic transcendental philosophy in the rigorous scientific spirit³⁵. Kant's attempt could not

analyse the absolute subjectivity which constitute everything in its meaning and validity. No method of attaining apodicticity was evolved by Kant. From Kant onwards there was struggle for the clear and genuine sense of transcendental turn and a proper method. Husserl proposed that transcendental philosophy requires the necessary rising from the natural ground to the transcendental region. A complete inversion of the natural standpoint is conceived. Transcendental philosophy required a serious reflection on conscious subjectivity. The difference between empirical and transcendental subjectivity was necessary. The Transcendental consciousness in general cannot be the individual ego but a general transcendental-intersubjective consciousness. The consciousness of intersubjectivity is a transcendental problem and the interrogation of the ego itself in inner experience only can discover the general consciousness. Kant and his successors did not have a genuine psychology with the help of which a concrete transcendental philosophy could be worked out. The psychological understanding they followed lacked original self-evidence. By the end of the 19th century psychology developed a philosophical motive for evolving a genuine transcendental philosophy by a total change of psychical outlook having an entirely new reflection. This ultimately gave birth to a science of transcendental subjectivity and a universal transcendental philosophy.

a) Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology

Husserl discusses the agreement and differences between psychology and transcendental philosophy. Modern psychology is a science of psychophysical realities of the objective world. Transcendental philosophy involves the transcendental ego inquiring into the different manners of givenness and conscious life as an intentionally accomplishing life so that the life-world attains new meaning. In the natural attitude the ego is obstructed by interests towards the object-poles. In the transcendental attitude, all natural data acquires a transcendental meaning. In the transcendental attitude, the ego is reflexively directed towards itself and is self-aware. This has been synthetically combined with other apperceptions of the transcendental ego derived from other subjects with which the ego is in contact. The transcendental ego with its total accomplishment derived from other ego-subjects investigate its intentional structure of meaning and validity. A transition of psychological into transcendental attitude is possible only through the transcendental reduction. Psychology played an important role in the great process of development of transcendental philosophy in the new sense. Husserl analyzed the shift from the psychological attitude to the transcendental attitude. In the natural psychological attitude the horizon of transcendentially functioning intentionalities are not accessible to reflection. All reflections within the psychological attitude hides the functioning intentionality, the universal apperception giving the ontic sense to the particular apperceptions.

In the psychological attitude everything is worldly and belonging to the psychic and empirically explained. The transcendental-phenomenological attitude brings about a very important transformation which is very much essential for psychology itself, a significant transformation needed to the psychological attitude³⁶. The new apperceptions as a result of the phenomenological reduction, concealed in the natural attitude, becomes apperceived in the newly expressible intentional accomplishments. Within the transcendental attitude, the ego is well aware of the whole dimension of transcendental function which is infinite. With the phenomenological attitude everything is made concrete and made available in the world through the living body that is constituted necessarily. The new transcendental attitude by analyzing the natural attitude makes the psychic life of the ego and other egos concrete and enriched.

Husserl proceeds to inquire into the reasons for the failure of psychology. The dualistic and physicalistic pre- suppositions are stated as the reasons for the failure. Psychology had a concept of soul derived from the cartesian dualism. This is characterized as a crisis in psychology³⁷. Body and soul are two real entities in the world and are integrally connected. A return to the contents of pure experience bracketing all presuppositions of natural science and treat the world as life-world is necessary. Husserl is of the opinion that cartesian dualism is the reason for the parallelization of soul and body, inner experience

and outer experience, life-world experience and natural scientific experience. The fundamental insight regarding the renewal of psychology was lacking so that naturalization of the psychic and the sense of dualism remained in force. In the 19th century Brentano and Dilthey made efforts to bring about a rigorously scientific psychology³⁸. The scheme of a descriptive science of psychology is emphasized by Brentano and Dilthey in the 19th century with the aim of establishing a rigorously scientific psychology. The aim is a critique of the naturalistic physicalistic modern psychology. Everything is to be derived from clarity, self-giving intuition, self-evidence. For this a method rejecting the descriptive realm, realizable through intuitive experience is necessary. This characterizes the possibility of a genuine psychology. The arguments against dualism is philosophically oriented.

All theoretical objective sciences have their ground in the pre-given world, the life- world as the ultimate foundation of all objective knowledge, existing pre-scientifically³⁹. The universe is pre-given as ultimately existing having ultimate properties, the ultimate substrate. Dualism has been freed from all metaphysical abstractions. The Cartesian theory of two substances is defeated through the new method of abstraction. Husserl proceeds to a critical analysis of data empiricism. The historical influence of empiricist approach is also analysed. The reality of dualism, the differentiation of man and the sciences is examined through the new approach of abstraction. The psychophysical dualistic

empiricism has been critically examined. A new approach is essential for a proper understanding of genuine psychology. The new abstraction is a new gaze based on the concrete experience of man. The body and the soul of man can be viewed with the new gaze separately. The distinction between outer and inner experience can be distinguished through abstraction. The psychic aspect of man is given in pure inner perceptions. The psychic experiences in the attitude of abstraction reveals the psyche. The psychic experiences of man is experienced with apodictic self-evidence. The psychic experiences of other men are given through mediate experience called empathy, not an inference in the usual sense⁴⁰. The dualism in man is questioned finding justification in pure intuitive experience.

Husserl is specific in asserting the influence of Brentano in renewing psychology with the concept of intentionality. Brentano was having the prejudices of naturalistic tradition. Brentano descriptively analyzed psychic phenomena in the old traditional way. Brentano's task was only to postulate a psychology of intentionality, but did not analyze it in the proper way. Husserl's *Logical Investigations* demanded for a new approach of intentional phenomena which Brentano and his school did not accept. The problem of self-evidence as original self- giving is introduced for the first time in contrast to scientific evidence. The genuine intentional synthesis introduced in this work forms the first beginnings of phenomenology. Husserl was critical of Brentano's

psychology. The separation of outer experience corresponding to natural science and inner experience corresponding to psychology involves dualism. The inner psychic experience is pure psychic life having intentional experience as an essential part of it. A pure descriptive psychology is the necessity for which a complete consciously practiced method is required which Husserl calls the phenomenological psychological method as a method of psychology⁴¹.

b) Phenomenological psychological epoche and Life-World

Pure descriptive psychology is having psychic subjects with a life of purely intentional nature, intentionally related to other individual souls, intersubjective community. The world is intentionally valid for the psychic subjects having pure internal relations and the psychic subjects are related to the real world and real objects. A pure descriptive psychology with a pure field of framework with pure souls with essential intentionalities is the requirement which can be arrived at through a universal psychological epoche, an abstractive attitude having a disinterested attitude⁴². The epoche is a radical one and universal in nature effecting a universal and entire unity of intentional life in which the original life of the person and lives of others are intentionally interrelated.

Husserl is of the opinion that the universality of phenomenological-psychological epoche is to be understood in the proper way. Only a genuine understanding of the reduction can bring about a clear picture about the

transcendental phenomenological reduction. Self-apperception and world consciousness are intimately related. Original self-experience and original world consciousness involving self-apperception of a disinterested observer makes the possibility of experiencing phenomena in which nothing is lost but everything is gained. The reduction makes the world a phenomenon. The epoche is to be performed as self-experience and experience of others. All human beings as pure souls becomes conscious of self-experience and world-apperceptions. Intentionality of the self reaches those of others so that a reciprocal correction occurs in attaining a common world with agreeing consciousness⁴³. An intentional awareness is created with a common world-apperception in which each individual is having his own world-apperception in his self-apperception. Each individual is thus having his life-world as the world for all. The world thus attained is a phenomenon. The psychic framework of all souls are intentionally united through communalization of their lives. Each psyche has world-consciousness through empathy, experiences involving consciousness of others also having a world of the same nature.

Every ego-subject is having a horizon of empathy constituting others as co-subjects. The life of the ego-subject is involving other ego subjects intentionally constituted by empathy. In this horizon there is no externality but only the essential nature of the souls prevail. The externality of the natural attitude of world-life is reduced into pure intentional internality⁴⁴. The world is

transformed into a community of phenomenon world in which all subjects are included by way of intentional implication. There occurs a complete transformation of the phenomenological-psychological epoche into the transcendental universal transcendental philosophy. In the radical reduction, the ego, the ego's world-consciousness, other human beings, the world-itself are mere intentional phenomena. The absolute ego of the pure psychologist becomes the pure subject of intentionality with intentional implications. The apodictic ego with apodictic intentionalities manifests by itself. An important consequence of the radical reduction is that all egos form a single unity of intentionality with mutual implication of the lives of individual ego subjects, only phenomenology can reveal the unity in a systematic way which involves an intentional mutual internality⁴⁵.

Husserl is attempting to establish and relation between transcendental psychology and transcendental phenomenology in order to explain the accessibility of pure self-knowledge. Pure psychology is identified with transcendental philosophy as the science of transcendental subjectivity⁴⁶. The transcendental or pure phenomenologist has within its transcendental self-consciousness only phenomena in which the other egos exist for the transcendental ego having the ontic meaning implied by the ego's intentional life. Egological self-reflection reveal the essential structures of original life involving intentional syntheses and implications made possible through epoche

within the epoche. The universal community is evolved through empathy creating the world of intentional validity, a cultural world⁴⁷. The transcendental subjectivity explicating itself through the most rigorous method reflecting apodictically is claimed to be transcendental philosophy. The radical transcendental epoche regains the totality of the subjective sphere in which everything is intentionally and internally connected together as intentional objects.

6. Conclusion

The concept of life-world can be treated as a result of Husserl's teleological historical reflections establishing a genuine scientific philosophy. The crisis of sciences and the crisis of philosophy was subjected to a concrete historical approach with new understanding and new reflection by phenomenology. The idea of a universal philosophy emerged in the modern

period and scientific objectivism was replaced by transcendental subjectivism which finally led to phenomenology with a new form of transcendentalism. History of philosophy starting with Descartes, leading through Locke, Berkeley and Hume culminating in Kant's transcendentalism as universal philosophy finally led to Husserl's phenomenology as an intentional analysis of consciousness, a systematic uncovering of intentionality. The problem of life-world is taken as a universal problem for philosophy by Husserl.

The life-world epoche as a universal epoche with intense and deep reflection is required for discovering the life-world through a complete personal transformation just like a religious conversion. Intentional explanation is the genuine way of explaining and the real way of understanding. The different aspects of intentionality are paid attention to. The radical reduction brings in the life-world with its different a-priori forms. Philosophy so far has taken into consideration the object pole, not the subject pole. The being constituted transcendently is ignored. Phenomenology is a way of explaining intentional life. The intentional subjectivity of the ego is the source of life-world constitution involving transcendental intersubjectivity constituting the world.

Ultimately grounded and radically pre-suppositionless philosophy was the requirement. The transcendental philosophy of Descartes and Kant could not achieve this. It was Husserl who proposed a complete inversion of the natural standpoint to the transcendental standpoint reflecting on transcendental

conscious subjectivity, a general transcendental intersubjective consciousness. A total change of psychical outlook with a new reflection gave birth to a genuine transcendental philosophy. Conscious life is conceived as an intentionally accomplishing life in which life-world attains a new meaning. Psychological attitude is dualistic giving importance to both mind and body.

The new transcendental phenomenological attitude is a return to pure conscious experience of the world as life-world. Brentano tried to renew psychology by postulating the concept of intentionality not analyzing it in the proper way. Husserl being critical of Brentano, advocated phenomenological psychological epoche for arriving at pure psyche with essential intentionalities having self-experience of life-world common to all. Phenomenology as transcendental philosophy, the science of transcendental subjectivity only can explain the unity of intentionality with mutual implications.

The need for a new reflection and a concrete historical approach is emphasized by Husserl in order to face the crisis of philosophy and science which ultimately led to the concept of life-world as the realm of social consciousness. The idea of a universal transcendental philosophy finds its culmination in the concept of life-world as the intuitively pre-given and intersubjectively experienciable realm of original self-evidence. The problem of life-world can be explained as arriving at a transcendental reflective attitude through a radical and universal transcendental epoche revealing the absolute

transcendental subjectivity with which the world is related as a phenomenon in a new sense. The world experienced in the subjective manners of givenness, involving a synthesis within the framework of intentionality involving intersubjective harmony of validity within the universal horizon with overlapping community consciousness is emphasized. The intersubjectively identical life-world is a common world constituted by the intentional consciousness subjectively forming a universal sociality of common world. The radical transcendental reduction establishes objective truth as life-world. The investigation is characterized as a way of explicating intentional life in which the subjective manners of givenness provides the objective world as a transcendental phenomenon constituted by intentional subjectivities involving intersubjectivity within each ego forming universal intersubjectivity. Only transcendental understanding can provide a realm of apodictic self-evidence, the ego constituting the primordial sphere and constituting intersubjectivity by way of analogy and empathy. A transcendental philosophy with apodictic self-evidence having rigorous scientific spirit with a general transcendental-intersubjective consciousness being the aim, though the first initiative was taken by Descartes onwards along Kant, only by the end of the 19th century psychology took a real initiative for a genuine transcendental philosophy.

Husserl's transcendental philosophy is concerned with the intentional life of consciousness having different manners of givenness

providing life-world with a new sense. The change from the psychological attitude to the transcendental attitude is analyzed by Husserl. The crisis in psychological attitude is stated to be due to the dualistic approach derived from Descartes. A rigorous scientific approach in psychology was initiated by Brentano and Dilthey. Dualism of body and mind, inner and outer experiences, man and science was rejected in favour of pure inner perception. Brentano tried to renew psychology with the concept of intentionality but did not analyze in the proper way. Criticizing Brentano's psychology, Husserl advocated phenomenological psychological epoche by which a pure descriptive psychology with a pure field of framework having pure psyche with essential intentionalities can be arrived at. A common world apperception is made possible having self-experience of life-world as the world for all. Each ego-subject constitute other egos by empathy and a unity of intentionality is formed with mutual implications of the lives of ego-subjects which can be explained only by phenomenology as transcendental philosophy, the science of transcendental subjectivity.

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CHAPTER V

**SOCIAL CONTEXT IN EDMUND
HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLGY**

SOCIAL CONTEXT IN EDMUND HUSSERL'S
PHENOMENOLGY

1. Phenomenology and Sociality.
2. Social Phenomenology of Alfred Schutz.
3. Schutz on Intersubjectivity and Life-world.
4. Social Relations, Intersubjectivity and Objectivity.
5. Phenomenology, Ethnomethodology and Symbolic Interactionism.
6. Conclusion.

CHAPTER V

SOCIAL CONTEXT IN EDMUND HUSSERL'S

PHENOMENOLOGY

1. Phenomenology and Social Phenomenology

Phenomenology has great significance in relation to the social sciences. Research in sociology is helped very much by phenomenological insights of Husserl. It is recognized that phenomenology plays a great role in the fact that understanding of human behaviour is very much helped by understanding the meaning evolved in personal activities within social context. The use of qualitative methods in social research has been helped by the advent of phenomenological sociology. The social constructionism of Berger and Luckmann have contributed much in this area of social research¹. Blumer's social interactionism is very much associated with phenomenology².

Sociality is a central theme in phenomenology and phenomenology is very much interested in an understanding of the world that is experienced in everyday life including social reality. This can be stated as life-world as the central theme of phenomenology. Phenomenology considers social reality as a product of human activity. The social world is constituted through a process of 'typification'. Social reality is based on intersubjectivity, a theme very much

emphasized by phenomenology. Phenomenology is very well prepared to answer any criticisms regarding its relevance to the sociology of everyday life.

Phenomenology conceived the world as constituted by consciousness, transcendental subjectivity. Transcendental subjectivity is conceived as embedded in a community of subjects, evolving a context of intersubjectivity and life-world. Influenced by Husserl's analysis of intentionality, Heidegger claimed that human being can be understood only in the context of the world of society. Man is an agent in the world involved in functional relations with his surroundings. Merleau-Ponty, influenced by Husserl also contended that man is a part of the structure that Heidegger called 'Being in the world'.

The importance of the concept of life-world has been paid attention to by phenomenology in connection with the relation between science and experience. Life-world is the historical sense-foundation for science, the pre-scientific world. It is the source of meaning and evidence for Husserl³. The life-world is the meaningful foundation and ultimate source of evidence. Science has its foundation on the life-world. The relation between science and life-world is dynamic. The phenomenologist is against the natural science's advocacy of scientism and objectivism. Scientism advocates that natural science alone is real. It is the exact sciences that can claim reality, the life-world being a construction claiming reality. Phenomenology is against natural science in its judgement of reality, and claims that the concepts of the exact sciences are

capable of revealing reality. The exact sciences make use of new methods in order to have precise knowledge about the world. Phenomenology tries to explain human nature by making sense of scientific rationality through different forms of intentional experiences of the ego subject. The phenomenological examination of the life-world is worked out by Husserl and other phenomenologists such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. A phenomenology of the life-world with special reference to the social structure is worked out by Alfred Schutz and his followers under the title phenomenological sociology. Husserl's analysis of intentionalities and the life-world have helped Schutz in his attempt. Schutz reveals the structure of the social world with the help of Husserl's notion of intentionality involving different intentional experiences and the notion of the life-world. For an understanding of the social world it is necessary to examine the social agents for whom the social world exists. Schutz is of the opinion that the social scientist is to take into consideration consciousness, motives and understanding in the construction of social reality; the meaning and significance of the structures and relations of these is to be made explicit⁴. The investigation of intersubjectivity especially of how one subject has experiential access to another subject, how a community is constituted, plays an important role in Schutz's sociological theory. The social reality is constituted by the structures of meaning of the multitude of experiences. The meaning constituting life in the social world involves everyday experiences of other subjects. Schutz in his phenomenological

sociology is emphasizing the importance of human beings in their social relations and their meaning-constituting subjective lives. Schutz, very much influenced by Husserl, is interpreting sociality as intersubjectivity, that is ultimately based on individual subjects.

The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl influenced the sociology of Alfred Schutz to a great extent. Husserl's interest in a rigorous and scientific study of the structures of consciousness made him to recognize the importance of lived experience, and interaction in the life-world and intersubjectivity. Schutz's interest in life-world and intersubjectivity of Husserl contributed much to his sociology. Recognizing Husserl's emphasis on rigorous and scientific nature of phenomenology, Schutz very well acknowledged the intersubjective nature of life-world. Schutz interpreted the reality of everyday life-world through constructs or ideal types of social action having certain criteria such as relevance, logical consistency, compatibility and subjective interpretation.

A phenomenological understanding of the relationship between individual consciousness and social life is significantly undertaken by sociologists. Phenomenology is seeking the relationship between human awareness and social action⁵. Attracted by phenomenology's sociological approach, Schutz attempts a descriptive study of the relation between subjective meanings and objective social world. The human beings of social life is well explained by the methodological investigations of phenomenology providing an

analytic attitude on the role of consciousness in developing a systematic everyday life.

Phenomenology views society as a human construction. Phenomenologists emphasize the necessity of human construction and human requirements for meaning, subjective relation and order. Humanization of theoretical procedures in contemporary sociology is as a result of phenomenological influence⁶. From a phenomenological perspective, humans are creative agents in the constitution of social worlds⁷. Sociologists analyse social phenomena from the natural attitude, thus limiting the process of analysis. Social phenomenologists analyse social phenomena as humanity meaningful acts⁸.

For Husserl, the world means the world experienced by acts of consciousness, everyday experience of the life-world, the world as given in immediate experience. Transcendental phenomenology as a universal theory of consciousness provides an ontology of the life-world that enables to yield socio cultural insights. Alfred Schutz developed Husserlian insights on life-world in his own way making use of Max Weber's sociological explanations critically analysed. To Husserl the world has meaning because of the intentional nature of consciousness. Intersubjectivity plays an important role in sharing meaning and thus creating a social context.

Social phenomenology as a phenomenology of society is an attempt to reveal the role of human awareness in social action and social situations aiming to explain social interactions within human actions reality constructions. Social phenomenology is a study of concrete social existence describing intentional conscious acts and analysing meaningful lived world of everyday life. Phenomenological sociology is interested in the analysis of life-world and description of the formal structures of social existence subjectively constituted for consciousness. Social phenomenology views social order as created by everyday interaction of pupil maintaining proper social relations between them⁹. Sociality is a central theme in phenomenology. Phenomenology emphasizes the importance of examining the world, social reality, the life-world. Social reality is the product of human actions. Social world is constituted through a process of typification. Intersubjectivity emphasized by phenomenology is the basis of social reality.

The impact of phenomenology on social sciences is evident from the phenomenological approach of Alfred Schutz mainly based on Husserl's concepts of intersubjectivity and life-world. Jurgen Habermas criticized Husserl's phenomenology and its social aspect on the ground that it is solipsistic. It can be stated that this criticism is because of a misunderstanding of the phenomenological understanding of sociality. Phenomenology takes subjectivity and sociality as necessarily related. Subjectively experiencing the

world also involves other subjects world-experiencing so that intersubjectivity is sociality. Sociality is phenomenologically treated as a form of intersubjectivity¹⁰. Intersubjectivity presupposes a number of subjects and subjectivity arising out of phenomenological reflection involves intersubjectivity. Transcendental phenomenology is characterized by Husserl as sociological transcendental phenomenology and it is a move from egological to transcendental sociological phenomenology¹¹.

2. Social Phenomenology of Alfred Schutz

Alfred Schutz(1899-1959) is the founder of social phenomenology, phenomenological sociology. Alfred Schutz made original contribution to a phenomenologically oriented social science. Alfred Schutz was born in Vienna, Austria in 1899, and he died in New York in 1959. He studied law and social science at the University of Vienna. In 1927, he was the executive officer of Reilter and company, a leading Viennese banking firm. He become “a banker by day and a philosopher by night” as described by Husserl. Schutz attained his Ph.D from Vienna in 1921. He became professor at a university named New School for Social Research in New York.

Schutz migrated to the United States on July 14,1939, as a result of the Nazi movement. He helped Marvin Farber in founding the International Phenomenological Society and in editing Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. He began teaching sociology and philosophy courses on The Graduate Faculty of The New School for Social Research, where he presented papers in seminars, supervised dissertations and served as chair of the philosophy Department 1952-1956. He also had philosophical correspondence with Marvin Farber, Aron Gurwitsch and Eric Voegelin. The correspondence with Aron Gurwitschis published as *philosophers in Exile: The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch, 1939-1959*. In the United States, Schutz published Articles explaining and criticizing Husserl’s thought, and developing his philosophical positions on social sciences.

Schutz was very much interested in dealing with the problem of order in society and the behaviour of members of society making sense of social life. He found meaning in his life by working on phenomenological sociology. Schutz migrated to the United States and began teaching courses on phenomenological sociology at the New School for Social Research in New York City. He gave up his career in banking by 1956 and concentrated on teaching and writing phenomenological sociology. His students Peter Berger, Thomas Luckmann and Harold Garfinkel were influenced by Schutz. He was interested in creating a phenomenological basis for the social sciences. He was also interested in the work of Max Weber¹², from whom he derived a sociology of understanding. The influence of both Husserl and Max Weber resulted in the publications of his first book *The Phenomenology of the Social World*¹³.

The main phenomenological sociologists are, Alfred Schutz, Peter L. Berger, Thomas Luckmann and Harold Garfinkel. Initially influenced by Max Weber's interpretive sociology, Schutz combines Weber's sociology with Husserl's phenomenological methodology. Alfred Schutz, the chief proponent of phenomenological sociology, provided a critical philosophical foundation for Max Weber's interpretive sociology by making use of the transcendental phenomenological method of Edmund Husserl. In the initial chapter of *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, Schutz explained Weber's methodology, and the distinction between social sciences and natural sciences. Schutz

developed his own theory of meaning and action influenced by Husserl's study of the consciousness of internal time which helped him to criticize Weber. Weber's concept of 'ideal types' and Husserl's concept of 'typification' are made use by Schutz. The sociological phenomenology of Schutz recognized the importance and necessity of the study of construction of social reality by way of an empirical investigation phenomena in the society.

Husserl's influence on social sciences have been indirect. In the French tradition, relationship between Husserl and sociologists such as Durkheim and Max Weber have been interesting. According to Husserl descriptive phenomenology or intentional psychology analyses social structures, even though social sciences did not give much importance to phenomenology. It was Alfred Schutz who applied phenomenology of Husserl to the study of social world. Social actions, social situations and social realities within society are investigated by the phenomenologists. It was only after the 1960's that the phenomenological insights were applied into the field of sociology by Alfred Schutz.

Max Weber also contributed in the development of phenomenological sociology. Schutz is of the view that Weber's ideas on analysis of social reality and social action is very limited. It is stated that Weber attempts to connect positivism with phenomenological method in sociology¹⁴. Weber defines social action as a subjectively meaningful behaviour oriented

towards the behaviour of others. Weber emphasized understanding the subjective meanings of social actions in sociology. For Weber, understanding social reality at the level of meaning forms the core of sociology. Schutz criticized Weber for not explaining the intersubjective nature of the social world. The problem of intersubjectivity, according to Schutz, is very important and essential for creating common view of the world so that intersubjectivity is central to Schutz's scheme. Schutz agreed with Weber's notion of sympathetic introspection into people's consciousness. Schutz uses the idea of types and the value of the idea of types for information science in his essay "The well-informed citizen"¹⁵. The process of typification is borrowed from Weber's concept of 'ideal types' which is made use by Husserl as an important process in sense making about the world. The process of typification, scientific typification of social types helps to identify, classify and compare modes of social actions and interactions.

Alfred Schutz was very much influenced by Max Weber's interpretive sociology. Schutz is of the opinion that the world with which he is concerned is the Weberian rationalized modern world. It was Alfred Schutz who provided a philosophical foundation for Max Weber's interpretive sociology. Schutz was attracted by the lectures of Max Weber in Vienna in the summer of 1918, but Schutz found that Weber's methodological writings contained unexamined pre-suppositions. Schutz combined the ideas of Weber and

Husserl's theory of social action by distinguishing between strata of social actions.

Schutz analyzes the ground of intersubjective understanding in human experience, influenced by Weber's and Husserl's interpretations. To Husserl intersubjectivity is a transcendental problem, to Schutz intersubjectivity is a practical problem that in everyday life the existence of others is assumed by everyone. The concept of social action by Weber is accepted by Schutz in proposing an understanding of the social world. Analyzing social relationships is emphasized by Schutz. The different types of social relationships is based on the distinction between direct and indirect experience of social reality. Weber's concept of 'ideal types' gets a new interpretation in Schutz's analysis. To Schutz, ideal types is necessary to any interpretation based on indirect experience, so that ideal types does not make any distinction between scientific and non-scientific interpretation. Schutz is of the opinion that social science interprets social action and social world is indirectly known. Schutz's influences and contributions on the practice of phenomenology¹⁶and the social sciences, and the relation between phenomenology and social sciences as claimed by Schutz¹⁷ are to be specifically emphasized.

3.Schutz on Intersubjectivity and Life-world

Husserl's transcendental intersubjectivity forms an important aspect of his phenomenology. The main objective of Husserl's phenomenology was to have ultimate foundation for knowledge, not the social aspect. But later he made use of his analysis of transcendental consciousness for sociological purpose through his concept of intersubjectivity.

Husserl is very much concerned about the essential eidetic structure of the experience of phenomena¹⁸. Phenomenology as a philosophical method analyses things intentionally constituted as meaningful objects by consciousness. Phenomenology claims itself as a rigorous science which founds knowledge on absolute foundations. For this, the transcendental sphere of pure consciousness is aimed at by the method of reduction, the reduction of transcendence to immanence, the realm of pure consciousness. After reduction, the world as an object of consciousness is the intended object of pure constituting consciousness. Husserl's transcendental idealism is a pure form of egology in the sense the world is constituted as an object of consciousness related to the constituting activities of the pure ego. The objectivity of the world is a necessary condition which presupposes that the world is the same for everyone. This is satisfied by his theory of transcendental intersubjectivity as the basis for the constitution of the objective world. Husserl claims that his theory of transcendental intersubjectivity has enabled him to overcome the

criticism of solipsism. Husserl's phenomenology progresses from transcendental egoology to transcendental sociology, a sociological transcendental philosophy.

To Husserl, the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity is the transcendental ego having access to the constituting activities of another transcendental ego, having access to other minds through empathy, gaining access to the mind of the other. The special way of constituting the other Husserl calls empathy, having indirect access to other minds through apperception. The objection of solipsism is transformed into argument in favour of intersubjectivity through his analysis of transcendental intersubjectivity. Husserl proposed a reduction to the 'sphere of ownness' or 'primordially' or what is called the 'intersubjective sphere' where the living body of the other is apperceived or appresented through empathy. There occurs a passage from transcendental intersubjectivity to the objectivity of the world, a plurality of constituting transcendental egos. The world is experienced directly and through others, a common world. Through empathy intersubjectivity is established and a common life-world is shared by everybody being aware of mental interconnections. Actual communication becomes possible so that a higher unity of consciousness constituting the essence of social life is established. Interpersonal communication is basic to social life and there is a progression in the interconnections within humanity as such involving

communities and societies. Thus Husserl conceives empathy as the foundation of social life.

Phenomenology attempts to explain human nature through a detailed analysis of the cognizing subject's intentional experience. The life-world analysis forms an important part of the project. The phenomenology of the life-world, and its social structure is available in Schutz and his followers. Alfred Schutz attempted a possible relation between Edmund Husserl's phenomenology and sociology. A systematic examination of everyday life based on a new type of sociological theory is the necessity. For this, Schutz aims to describe and analyze the essential structures of the life-world. The role of subjectivity in the construction of social meaning and social actions is also offered. Husserl's analyses of intentionality and life-world have contributed very much in Schutz's analyses of social world through intentional experiences. Though Schutz was aware of Henry Bergson's philosophy of consciousness, he discovered the relevance of the phenomenology of consciousness of Edmund Husserl.

Schutz has developed a phenomenological psychology of inner experience focusing on the structures of life-world. Gergen Hebarmas criticized Schutz's account of the life-world for not addressing personality structures and for being constructed in a culturalistic fashion¹⁹. Schutz discussed the relationship between philosophy and the social sciences in his essay "concept

and theory formation in the social sciences”, criticized the Weberian method of understanding. Schutz made an attempt to clarify social reality by his phenomenology of the social world. According to Schutz mutual understanding is possible without entering into other’s private inner sanctum. Schutz interpreted Max Schellers idea of intersubjectivity which he treated within the natural attitude. Schutz examined and criticized Jean Paul Sartre’s notion of intersubjectivity. Schutz agreed with Sartre’s rejection of Husserl’s transcendental approach to intersubjectivity. It is felt that Sartre’s notion of the other is treated as a part of Husserlian influence. Husserl’s distinction between pre-predicative and predicative have played an important role in Schutz’s gradual development from the pre-predicative sphere to the predicative sphere, the empirical types constituted to the presumptive universals formed automatically. In the predicative level, non-essential types are transformed into essential types with the help of eidetic universals.

Schutz’s account of the social world and his criticism of Husserl’s account of transcendental constitution are interrelated. Schutz criticized Husserl’s notion of the other person’s appearance in consciousness as explained in Husserl’s Fifth *Cartesian Meditations*. For Schutz, experiences of others, supposed to be within the sphere of ownness, were within the intersubjective world of everyday life. Husserl had argued in the Fifth Meditation that it was

through a “pairing” as explained in it that the other was transferred to another. The other’s living body was like one’s own living body. Schutz was against this transfer sense and argued that the other’s body was experienced from the outside, not like one’s own given innately. Schutz was of the opinion that intersubjectivity is not constituted within the transcendental sphere, but everyday life as described in the usual way. To Schutz, the social world was of utmost importance. Schutz had a phenomenology of the natural attitude. Schutz’s posthumously published work *Reflections on The Problem of Relevance* by Richard Zaner, gives a general account of the life-world and its relation to sciences and social structure.

Schutz disagreed with Husserl’s phenomenological method in studying the social world, and studied human being in the world within the natural attitude. According to Schutz, the ordinary social life was the concern of the social sciences. Schutz is of the view that the meaning structure and meaning constitution about which the phenomenologist speak, are to be studied empirically, and clarification of the notion of the meaning is very much related to understanding.

Schutz was interested in investigating the formal structures of the life world, while Husserl was interested in investigating the formal structures of intentional consciousness. Schutz tried to establish a mundane phenomenology of the life-world, while Husserl tried to establish a transcendental

phenomenology of consciousness. However their tasks seem to be complementary, the social phenomenology of Schutz depending upon the phenomenological analysis of Husserl. A phenomenological description of the formal structures of life-world is depending upon and consistent with the phenomenological description of the formal structures of intentional consciousness. Schutz's description of the formal structures of the life-world combined with Husserl's description of the formal structures of consciousness, is made use of for an understanding of social world with its own culture and history. An understanding of the social world depending on an understanding of the structures of consciousness constitute the possible world.

Schutz agrees with Husserl's phenomenological analysis involving a reduction to the sphere of the transcendental constituting ego. But Schutz questions Husserl's notion of intersubjectivity. It is argued that phenomenology did not provide a successful theory of intersubjectivity involving an account of the transcendental ego. Schutz argued that the notion of intersubjectivity cannot be linked with the notion of transcendental ego. Schutz in his analysis of intersubjectivity tries to avoid transcendental notions, conceives the human object as an embodied being sharing social relation with other embodied human subjects. The concept of types introduced by Schutz goes against the concept of radical intersubjectivity. He is of the view that habits and typifications are necessary for any organisation.

Schutz locates three layers or spheres in the experience of social environment as contemporaries, predecessors and successors, each individual being at the center²⁰. Schutz characterizes the experience of the life-world as a process of typification. Typification has an important role to play in social life. Typification is possible with respect to contemporaries, predecessors and successors not only experienced objects and living creatures but actions, situations etc... are also typified.

4. Social Relations, Intersubjectivity and Objectivity

Schutz divides the realm of social relations into three regions, the world of contemporaries composed of individuals who exist at the same time but who are not encountered on a face to face level. In the world contemporaries, the self and the other are active and interaction possible. The world of predecessors is in continuity with the world of contemporaries, but predecessors effects one another indirectly since their existence does not coincide, and no genuine social relation occurs with mutual affecting. Understanding predecessors is difficult since cultural changes have occurred during action and interpretation. The world of successors being the final intersubjective world actually does not exist, are to exist, and cannot know what they will be like since they belong to the future which is indeterminate. Schutz's concept of intersubjectivity is that of community. Community does not have a general form and the opacity of the community is preventing the outsider's accessibility.

Schutz's discussion of the world of contemporaries, predecessors, and successors and of community provides intersubjectivity as a phenomenon different from that of Merleau-Ponty. According to Schutz, community is more than a mere collection of people and it is constituted through interrelated systems activated through interactive actions. Schutz's view is different from Merleau-Ponty's concrete intersubjectivity. Schutz's intersubjectivity is a type of abstraction without considering actual concrete empirical communities.

Further Schutz's intersubjectivity is presenting a very small world. It is stated that Schutz's idea of concrete intersubjectivity does not account for a large social system.

Four distinct realms of social reality are identified by Schutz²¹. Each realm is an abstraction of social world distinguished by degree of immediacy and determinancy. They are, the realm of directly experienced social reality (Umwelt), the realm of indirectly experienced social reality (Mitwelt), the realm of successors (Flogwelt), and the realm of peripheral interest (Vorwelt). According to Schutz it is possible to understand contemporaries (Mitwelt) and those who are in immediate face- to- face contact (Umwelt), but it is difficult to understand predecessors and successors. Mitwelt, According to Schutz, is that realm of social world in which people deal with actual others. In the world of contemporaries, people are not directly experienced, spatial distances make it impossible for direct action. The Umwelt people co-exist in the same time and space. In Mitwelt relationships, people do not have face to face interaction with each other and cannot know what is going on in other minds, the knowledge is directed to 'general types of subjective experience'.

Intersubjectivity being simultaneous understanding of one's own consciousness and another's subjectivity, Schutz took in the sense of anything social having social origin and social distribution. According to Schutz, four realms of social reality are, Flogwelt (future) where no social analysis is

possible, Vorwelt (past) where social analysis is possible though misinterpretations are also possible, Umwelt where interactions are possible by constructing rational models and ideal types, and Mitwelt where sociological analysis is possible in which types of people and social structures are available. Umwelt is a social realm characterized by 'we' relations, where as Mitwelt is characterized by 'they relations'.

The abstractively reduced world is called primordial world and the methodological operation that shapes the 'sphere of ownness' is described as primordial reduction. The world is a shared world that is objective for everyone. Husserl's position inspired social philosophers. The work of Schutz analyse Husserl so that life-world is interpreted as a 'social life-world'. Habermas was interested in the social-philosophical aspect of the concept of life-world. Gergen Habermas works out intersubjectivity and life-world as the starting point of his social theory and social life. According to Habermas, the life-world forms the primary social constituent. Habermas views modern society from the perspective of the life-world. Habermas constructs a theory of communicative action in the theory of intersubjectivity and the idea of the life-world. Latter Husserl and Schutz have been the main sources of understanding the life-world for Habermas. Habermas seems to have taken the concept of the life-world from the work of Husserl and Schutz. For Habermas, phenomenology is the

philosophy of consciousness. Habermas goes beyond the phenomenological concept of the life-world, understanding the life-world as a cultural system.

In Schutz's sociological theory, the notion of intersubjectivity, one subject having experiential access to another subject, and the constitution of community plays an important role. Human beings acting and experiencing each other, having their own meaning-constituting subjective lives, is the main object of Schutz's sociology from a phenomenological perspective. Schutz understands sociality as intersubjectivity based on individual subjects.

The phenomenological social scientists are in a position to provide a phenomenology of the social world through phenomenological reduction bracketing the thesis of the natural attitude. The existential belief in the existence of the objective world is bracketed, so that objects in the world as phenomenon or intentional consciousness is made possible, so that objects in nature is transformed into objects for subjectivity, objects for consciousness, objects as intended. In this context it is asserted that the meaning of an object as objective is taken in the sense of property of the object itself independent of any observer. The subject as creating the object or creating the meaning of the object is a misconception. The interpretation of the object's meaning is intersubjective realm. Husserl's phenomenology is concerned with understanding construction of meaning in the intersubjective context, experiencing the world intersubjectively.

5. Phenomenology, Ethnomethodology and Symbolic

Interactionism.

Schutz's phenomenology having a social orientation influenced Harold Garfinkel in developing ethno methodology as a methodology for social science. Ethnomethodology is an empirical analysis of social life and interested in intersubjectivity of the day-to-day world. Ethnomethodology is related to social phenomenology in the sense that daily life as presupposed is employed by it. Reflective approach to knowledge and the ontology of man are the central features of phenomenology. Empirical phenomenology is mainly based on the insights of social sciences. Understanding the social world phenomenologically is to be based on subjective experiences of people regarding the happenings of events in the world.

Social phenomenology is concerned with the process of human action and reality construction. Human experience the world through typifications. A life-world as an area of human awareness and action is constituted by consciousness through typification. Social interaction is viewed as a process of reciprocal interpretive constructions. Typified action and

interactions give an order to the social reality. Peter.L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann in *The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of knowledge* makes an attempt to combine Schutz's phenomenology with the symbolic interactionism of George Herbert Mead. Berger and Luckmann applies the theoretical perspective of phenomenology to socialization and social roles. According to them, social theory is to provide an account of human beings creating social structures through social interactions having the character of intersubjectivity. According to Berger and Luckmann, human society is to be understood in terms of externalization, objectivation and internalization. Berger and Luckmann has made Schutz's ideas accessible to the public. Another work under the influence of Schutz's and Husserl was by Harold Garfinkel on Ethnomethodology²². Ethnomethodology examines the structuring of social environment in a meaningful way. The ethnomethodologists, understand life forms as a result of interaction with each other forming interpretations and openions. Ethnomethodology also like Schutz's phenomenological sociology regards social structures a result of social interaction, social reality as a construction by the participants. Garfinkel also like Schutz emphasized typification of social reality. Phenomenology and Ethnomethodology have emphasized the point that sociology must have access to the 'things themselves', 'Phenomena' in constructing social reality. Symbolic interactionists and phenomenologists are interested in studying interpersonal

social interaction. They consider social interaction as a meaningful communicative action between individuals.

The psychologist and philosopher George Herbert Mead is an advocate of symbolic interactionism. Herbert Blumer, a student of Mead, characterized symbolic interactionism as meanings developing out of social interaction and group action resting on meaning held by others. He contributed much to the development of symbolic interactionism. Erving Goffman, a student of Mead provided a close relation between symbolic interactionism and phenomenological sociology. Schutz's phenomenological sociology had an affinity with early symbolic interactionism at the same time had also deviated from it later. Schutz influenced his students Peter Berger, Thomas Luckmann and Harold Garfinkel to a great extent. Schutz applied phenomenology to sociology and developed new insights into social world. Schutz tried to answer questions regarding the nature of social reality by looking into human consciousness. According to Schutz, meaning of the outside world was not as a result of pure individual action but interpreting meanings to social life as the social world experienced, socially constructed and organized. Schutz's phenomenology is based on the notion of intersubjectivity. Knowing other minds, mutual understanding and communication, reciprocity of perspectives is possible only through intersubjectivity. Intersubjective world is a common world in which the subjectivity of other egos is grasped in the living stream of

consciousness. Schutz was very much interested in grasping each other's consciousness, relating to one another intersubjectively. The intersubjective social world was the primary concern of Schutz's social phenomenology.

The concepts attached to classes of things that are experienced in the social world, Schutz called 'typification' that are human developed. Typification focuses on generic and homogeneous characteristics and does not give importance to individual unique characteristics. The life-world is derived from Husserl, and Schutz uses the term for the world in which intersubjectivity and typification occurs. The life-world for Schutz is the world of working, a sphere of activity directed towards objects animals and persons within our reach, a world of routine activities. The life-world is the common intersubjective world experiencing and interpreting. Schutz wanted to dominate and change the life-world in order to realize the purposes, the pragmatic motives to change or modify it by our actions. Schutz was very much concerned with sharing social knowledge leading to habitual actions.

Husserl's phenomenology though influenced Schutz in a profound way, Schutz differed from Husserl's treatment of the individual in abstraction in search of pure mind. People in interaction, not in radical abstraction, a common subjective world independently can be constructed. Schutz maintained that intersubjectivity, a common subjective world of interacting individuals can be created which will be helpful in the empirical study of social reality. Schutz

have contributed in freeing Husserl's constitutional properties from radical abstraction, so that the life-world involved a process of interaction intersubjectively. Schutz, by making use of the interactionists's concern for socialization, and his own version of typification, argued that social order is a result of the concept of common world not by external rules.

There are certain criticisms against phenomenological sociology. Nick Crossely criticizes Schutz in adopting an individualist perspective as against the community functionalism as a system. Berger and Luckmann have given a detailed account of society as a trans-individual system. The criticism is ungrounded. Society, a social system without individual subjects is meaningless. Society is individual subjects standing in various relations to each other. The interpersonal is a must in a community and there is no interpersonal without the personal²³. Ajiboye, Olanrewaja Emmanuel gives a critical account of social phenomenology of Alfred Schutz indicating the limitations and contributions²⁴. Haralambos criticized Schutz's social phenomenology stating that the illusion of stability and order in society created by Schutz is not convincing²⁵. Cuff and Payne criticized Schutz on the ground that Schutz did not apply his ideas regarding phenomenology of social life to the empirical study of the social world²⁶. Turner in his critical approach towards social phenomenology distinguished it from symbolic interactionism and also claimed that it is against then prevailed nature of studying human conscious processes.

The criticism against Schutz's social phenomenology is based on a misrepresentation of social reality. It is claimed that Schutz's notion of Umwelt is helpful in understanding the relative social order in rural communities and his notion of Mitwelt helps to explain impersonal relationship existing in urban cities. It is also claimed that Schutz's social phenomenology is a strong base for sociological theorizing of human society.

6. Conclusion

Phenomenology has played an important role in understanding social reality especially with respect to the concepts of life- world and intersubjectivity. Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty have emphasized the social aspect of phenomenology. Alfred Schutz also investigated the social aspect of phenomenology by considering the intentional and life-worldly approach taken by phenomenology. Schutz in his phenomenological sociology interprets sociality as intersubjectivity. The intersubjective nature of life-world is recognized by Schutz.

In the development of Phenomenological sociology, Schutz was influenced by both Husserl and Max Weber. Husserl's phenomenological methodology and Max Weber's interpretive sociology are combined in Schutz's phenomenological sociology. Husserl's transcendental intersubjectivity enabled him to workout a sociological transcendental philosophy in his later thought. Inter subjectivity, empathy and life-world are interrelated in Husserl's

philosophy. Alfred Schutz attempted an analysis of the essential structures of life-world in order to establish an intimate relation between Husserl's phenomenology and sociology. Schutz analyzed the social world with the help of Husserl's concepts of intentionality and life-world. Though Husserl and Schutz differ on many points of detail regarding phenomenological method and the notion of intersubjectivity, Schutz's enquiry into the formal structures of life-world derives its sense from Husserl's notion of the formal structures of intentionality. Social relations is discussed by Schutz through the notions of predecessors, contemporaries and successors. To Schutz, the notion community involves the concept of intersubjectivity. Habermas also was greatly influenced by Husserl's concepts of intersubjectivity and life-world in creating his own version of social theory, a theory of communicative action. Both Husserl and Schutz were admired by Habermas in providing with a sociological notion of life- world as a cultural system.

Intentional consciousness is treated as an intersubjective realm creating objectivity for objects of consciousness. Ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism are developments of social phenomenology having their root in Husserl's phenomenology. Harold Garfinkel, Peter L Berger, Thomas Luckmann, Herbert Mead are thinkers who contributed much in the new developments of social phenomenology . Nick Grossely, Boye, Olanrewaja Emmanuel, Haralambos, Coff and Payne, Turner were critical of Schutz's social

phenomenology, through most of the criticism are ungrounded and based on misrepresentations of social reality.

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CHAPTER VI

**INTERSUBJECTIVITY, LIFE-WORLD AND
SOCIAL CONTEXT IN HUSSERL'S
PHENOMENOLOGY: A CRITICAL
APPROACH.**

INTERSUBJECTIVITY, LIFE-WORLD AND SOCIAL
CONTEXT IN HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY: A
CRITICAL APPROACH.

1. Reduction and Intersubjectivity.
2. Intersubjectivity and Life-world.
3. Intersubjectivity and Social Context:A Linguistic
Approach.
4. Intentionality and Social Context.
5. Conclusion.

CHAPTER VI

INTERSUBJECTIVITY, LIFE-WORLD AND SOCIAL CONTEXT IN EDMUND HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY: A CRITICAL APPROACH

1. Reduction and Intersubjectivity

The phenomenological method paved the way to the possibility of interpersonal relationships in phenomenology, the possibility of men to reach one another and communicate meaningfully being the core of intersubjectivity. According to Husserl, intersubjectivity is one of the most important aspects of human experience. Intersubjectivity is a key concept in Husserl's phenomenology. The theory of intersubjectivity as propounded by Husserl is so complex that it could be discussed only in the light of a discussion of his phenomenological method. Husserl made use of his method of phenomenology to investigate the interpersonal relationships possible. Husserl was able to work out the absolute rigour of the phenomenological method, phenomenology claiming to be rigorous science. Husserl developed a theory of the intentionality of consciousness, the essence of consciousness was viewed as a special medium in which essences were constituted as invariant meanings. The intellegibility of experience was recognized by Husserl. His theory of the constitution of essential types of meaning within the realm of consciousness involves an important problem of his philosophy, the problem of the intersubjective constitution of the other, the problem of intersubjectivity. Thus Husserl's problem of intersubjectivity is connected

with his concept of intentionality, method of reduction and the theory of constitution.

Phenomenology is viewed as a dialogue, sharing of experiences, a betweenness, the experience of others being accessible, having an intimate dialogue of interconnectedness. The phenomenological approach is humanistic and involving attending to our experiences so that we can describe other's experiences completely. Any act of experience implies the possibility of communication and intersubjectivity attributing social reality to experience. Phenomenology is a way of correct understanding the other's experience. The relation between intentionality and consciousness is addressed in a new way by Edmund Husserl and his followers. Phenomenological method, intentionality and intersubjectivity are discussed by these thinkers as a part of their programme. Husserl's analysis of consciousness being the source of the discussion, different proposals regarding consciousness have emerged that have led to many research programmes¹. Though Habermas is critical of Husserl's phenomenology of social thought being solipsistic, Husserl understands sociality as intersubjectivity combining both individual and society in his transcendental sociological phenomenology². The relevance of the concept of intersubjectivity in Husserl's phenomenology lies in his making it a cardinal principle of his phenomenological method. The concept of intersubjectivity is

inseparable from the concept of experience in that it determines the relation between self and others, and self's experience of others.

Husserl begins *Cartesian Meditations* with Descartes who starts with doubting as a method. Husserl takes a different path suggesting that consciousness is intentional. Husserl's phenomenology investigates the world as intended and constituted in consciousness with the help of his theory of phenomenological reduction. Husserl, instead of doubting and denying, suspends the belief in the existence of the world in order to examine the world as intended in consciousness. Descartes' failure to examine the transcendental ego or pure ego is rectified in Husserl's phenomenology taking the transcendental ego as the meaning giver of objects intended in consciousness. Husserl's phenomenological analysis of intentionality is necessarily connected with an analysis of constitution, the active constitution of the objects of experience. The existence of other conscious egos and the relationship of the ego to other conscious egos is answered in the *Cartesian Meditations* as the concept of intersubjectivity.

The main criticism about phenomenology is that it is solipsistic. Critics are of the opinion that other persons and communities are mere phenomena and the transcendental ego is the only reality. Instead, phenomenology describes human community providing an elaborate explanation of other egos. Two types of descriptions are possible³, direct experience of other persons and indirect experience of the world and things

experienced by other egos. The second approach involves viewing at the relation all the egos have to the world and things. In this approach the experience is by other egos and not by any individual ego only so that the object is given intersubjectively. Reduction to the sphere of ownness is not imagining a factual solitude, not imagining the ego alone. The reduction to the sphere of ownness is aimed at reaching a level of experiencing in which no distinction between the ego and the other egos is existing. Critics claim that the sphere of ownness is unjustified on the ground that such experience is not public, but the sphere of ownness could not be private and it needs exploration regarding presences and absences possible within it⁴.

The criticism against Husserl was that transcendental idealism following phenomenological reduction reduced the other to the consciousness of the ego, leading to solipsism. In the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl tried to avoid solipsism on social-ontological grounds relying on the concept of intersubjectivity. Husserl's phenomenological notion of intersubjectivity transcends solipsism by establishing the concrete existence of the other. Husserl's analysis of the intersubjective mode of intentionality suggests that the others are presented to the ego as worldly psycho-physical objects, experience the world as an intersubjective world, a world as experienced by others. Intersubjectivity is the relation between 'ego' and 'other' the other immanent in the ego. The phenomenological theory of intersubjectivity regarding the immanence of 'other' in the ego tries to solve the problem of

the transcendence of objectivity, the presence of other in the lived-world. Husserl's sociological transcendental philosophy⁵ or transcendental sociology⁶, discusses this problem. The ego is treated by Husserl as a transcendental intersubjective unit.

The use of the phenomenological method is very important. The phenomenological method helps to attend to the presence of the other in the lived experience of the ego, reflecting on the way in which the other is presented to the ego. The phenomenological method helps to have access to the other's 'otherness' from inside. The aim of Husserl is to establish collective human phenomena, culture and community. Only the belief in the independent existence of the other is suspended, and this is done for knowing how they are intended and constituted. Others are experienced as subjects who experience the world and know others as part of the world experienced. The ego experience itself as experienced by every ego as an intersubjective world, a world experienced by others. The genuine sense of the other is experienced by transcending the particularity of the ego and actually experience the other's experience.

A particular consciousness experiencing the consciousness of the other, is the problem of intersubjectivity. The consciousness of others is different from ordinary objects of experience. The others cannot be treated as objects. They are intentional experiences and as such are accessible from within. After bracketing out the external reality, Husserl performs a further

methodological reduction reducing to the ‘sphere of ownness’, a new phenomenological level. This methodological reduction involves bracketing the otherness of mundane consciousness. The others are perceived not as subjects but as objects of the ego’s perception. The methodological reduction reducing to the ‘sphere of ownness’ helps to reveal a primordial level of experience in a monadic sense. It also helps to reveal the ego in itself. Thus in the reduced ‘sphere of ownness’, self knowledge is possible from which knowledge of others is constructed. Apperception becomes possible, relevant to perception of others, going beyond perception. Husserl states that we do not have direct experience of other consciousness, but analogical apperception based on empathy in which the other is identical with the ego is posited. An empathic intentionality is involved. Closely associated with this process is the process of pairing in which the embodied ego is paired with the other. Analogical apperception and pairing forms an important aspect of Husserl’s *Cartesian Meditations*.

Brentano⁷, Stein⁸, and Fink⁹ have influenced Husserl in his formulation of the theory of intersubjectivity. Stein’s notion of empathy helped Husserl to clarify the way of perceiving others and ‘otherness’. Husserl views intentional acts as objectifying acts presenting the objects to the ego within consciousness¹⁰. Intersubjective intentionality make present other ego to the ego in its lived experience, the other is perceived in the form of empathy, forming the idea of otherness. The term empathy used by Stein

in his doctoral thesis on Empathy helps to account the sense of other's experience as the ego's own. The ego's intersubjective engagement with the subjectivity of the others is called empathy in phenomenology. One's subjective experience of own body is applied to the experience of other's body, and through apperception constituted as other's subjectivity the other's intentions are recognized. What is objective is intersubjectively available to all other subjects. Thus intersubjectivity constitutes objectivity. In intersubjective experience, one, experiences oneself as the noema of other's noeses. Intersubjectivity plays an important role in the constitution of life-world. Life-world is the world we live in, being the horizon of all experiences. The life-world is personal and intersubjective, called a home world.

According to Husserl, the other ego appears to the primordial ego as similar to itself. Analogical apprehension enables to present the other as similar as mirrored in the experience of the ego. Harmonious synthesis also helps in this process, according to Husserl. Husserl has written, "The other man is constitutionally the intrinsically first man".¹¹The other ego is genetically constituted within the ego's own. The term pairing is used by Husserl to mention the peculiar relation of companionship. The experience is called by Husserl 'communitarization', meaning the originary mode of living in community, also called monadological intersubjectivity. The other ego that is constituted is the ego in its ownness¹². The other ego, alter ego that appears

in pairing is similar to the primordial ego. Living in analogical apprehension helps to recognize and share with others the common nature of humanity. In analogical apprehension, the other lives within the ego's lived experience as a mirroring of the ego's own self, an analogue of the ego's self¹³. Analogical apprehension thus pre-supposes the ego and the other ego given in a primal pairing.

Intersubjectivity is interpreted as the ego's opening to the world of others. The word that describes the intersubjective constitution of otherness, the intersubjective community, is harmonious synthesis. The otherness is perceived when the ego appresents the other to the ego itself by its intentional act. Appresentation and unity of the ego results in the identity of the primordial nature of the ego and the presented other primordial nature of the other ego. The ego and the other ego are having the same world of experience within the sphere of ownness of the ego¹⁴.

In the Fifth *Cartesian Meditations*, reduction is explained as a primordial act of referring to the primordial sphere of the ego in its immanence, intentional sphere in which the ego is constituted in its peculiar ownness. The reduction reveals the original sense of the ego, the primordial ego. The ego after reduction is the intersubjective ego discovering itself as an intersubjective unit. It is immanent and transcendental, constituting the world as an intersubjective constitution, a life-world shared by an intersubjective community¹⁵. The life-world is an objective world shared within the

intersubjective life of a living community. The life-world is the 'grounding soil' within which the objective intersubjective world of community is constituted¹⁶, within which the intersubjective life is discovered. Primordial reduction helps to uncover the immanence of the transcendental ego upon which the sphere of intersubjectivity is grounded and the meaning of objectivity is constituted. Primary transcendence concerned with the ego and secondary transcendence concerned with the other ego are discovered as two necessary meanings of transcendence that makes the constitution of objectivity possible, through primordial reduction. Primary transcendence make possible the 'primordial world', secondary transcendence make possible the 'objective world'. The constitution of the being of the other is intentionally analyzed and the experience of the other is clarified through intentional analysis by way of 'empathy'. The objective actuality, 'thereness' for everyone is established and the problem of the other is solved in this way.

The three types of Reduction, Phenomenological, Eidetic and transcendental reductions, are related to the concept of intersubjectivity. The main issue within phenomenology is regarding the way in which they are related. The two studies given by Wataru Kuroda and Noe explain the semantic and its consequent hermeneutic reduction which throw light on this issue. The main problem within Husserl's Phenomenology is regarding the exact way in which these concepts are related. The Japanese Phenomenologist Keiichi Noe¹⁷ suggests that there is a kind of 'semantic' and

'hermeneutic' reduction may be before or simultaneous to the phenomenological reduction in a broad sense. According to Noe, Husserl's phenomenology of language can be understood as making a passage between the early 'solitary model' to the 'intersubjective model' which is made possible by what he calls the 'semantic reduction' following Wataru Kuroda. According to Kuroda¹⁸, Husserl's semantic reduction consists of three stages. The first stage restricts the extension of 'expression' to the sphere of linguistic sign. The second stage consists of 'removing the indicating function of speech from expressing function. The third stage consists of excluding the physical existence of the linguistic sign. Noe speaks of five stages of reduction following Kuroda. At the first stage Husserl distinguishes between 'indications' and 'expressions'. This distinction is parallel to the distinction between verbal and non-verbal signs or between meaningfulness and meaninglessness of expressions. This stage corresponds to the epoche suspending the natural attitude regarding signs. In the second stage facial expressions and gestures are excluded. In the third stage communicative functions are excluded. This is reduction of dialogue to monologue. In the fourth stage distinction is made between 'meaning- conferring acts' and 'meaning-fulfilling acts', in the fifth stage meaning fulfilling acts are differentiated from expressions. In the whole reduction process, language is transformed into a transparent medium. This is what Derrida calls 'voice' metaphorically¹⁹. According to Noe, there is a transition from semantic reduction to hermeneutic reduction by which Husserl discovers the 'other'

and 'history'. This is made clear in his essay on "The Origin of Geometry". Ideal objectivity is discussed in "The Origin of Geometry". Derrida have formulated three levels of idealities in his famous introduction²⁰. The first level is called 'semiotic ideality', the second level is called 'semantic ideality' and the third level is the highest stage of ideality, according to Derrida. Husserl transcends the solipsistic model in order to reach the intersubjective level where ideality and historicity come together. The solipsistic model excluded the communicative function of language, the intersubjective level is arrived at through constitution of language. Noe remarks that the constitutive function of language marks a transition from the *Logical Investigation To The Origin of Geometry*. The solipsistic model is transformed into an intersubjective linguistic community. Merleau-Ponty have remarked that the last stage of transcendental phenomenology grounds ideal objectivity and also explains the 'genesis of ideality'. Noe concludes that this is the hermeneutical turn in Husserl's later thought that opened up great a new horizon for phenomenological research.

2. Intersubjectivity and Life-World

Life-World is the world in which we live and intersubjectivity is the kind of intentionalities that functions in the experience of the ego about other egos, other persons. Phenomenology claims that the exact sciences are within the life-world. Phenomenology provides a clarification of the exact sciences regarding their origin. Phenomenology being a science about sciences is also a science of the life-world showing the life-world as a foundation for all sciences.

Husserl's concept of Life-World may be thought of in terms of socially established sense or meaning. Considering a community of subjects, the life- world, the common life- world can be viewed as the system of senses or meanings constituting the form of life. Considering subjects belonging to different communities the common life-world can be viewed as the general framework or apriori structure senses or meanings. The term life-world can be understood as the way the members of one or more social groups use to structure the world into objects.

The concept of life-world had already been introduced in the posthumously published, second volume of *Ideas* as surrounding world or environment, characterized as a world of entities presented under ego-centric aspects. According to Husserl, the subjective-relative life- world or environment provides the base for the objective world of science in two senses. The first sense is that the scientific conceptions are provided with

reference to reality and the second sense is that in the crisis of science the pre-scientific life-world provides base for new scientific approaches.

The objective spatio-temporal world, the everyday life-world, is constituted intersubjectively. The intersubjective experience or empathy is providing the epistemic justification which is explained. The spatio-temporal objects exist independently of subjective experiences and are part of an objective reality. The intersubjective experience is possible on the condition that the structuring of the world by different subjects is the same. Husserl thus upholds both realism and idealism.

The life-world is intersubjective. Habermas focuses on the life-world consisting of socially and culturally sedimental linguistic meanings, and his social theory is grounded in communication. An intersubjective world is common to all. An intersubjective social world is discussed by Schutz. The world in which intersubjectivity takes place Schutz calls the life-world. The life-world, according to Schutz, is a specific form of sociality involving the common intersubjective world of communication and social action. It is generally agreed that Husserlian concept of life-world provided the background for the phenomenological sociology of Alfred Schutz. Habermas developed Husserl's concept of life-world in his social theory grounded in communication focusing on life-world consisting of socially and culturally sedimented linguistic meaning.

Husserl's treatment of the life- world can be considered as a radical critique of the spirit of the sciences and his return to the life-world helps in protecting today's sciences and civilization. There are many attempts to make concrete relation between analytic philosophy and Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl's later analysis of the life- world within the transcendental phenomenological context can be viewed as a reaction against forgetfulness of history. The emphasis on the historical aspect has led to an inner connection to existential hermeneutic philosophy. The concept of life-world plays a significant role in the social philosophy of Habermas. To Husserl intersubjectivity is the source of objectivity. It constitutes both the subject and the objective world. It is the common ground of human sociality. Husserl's ideas offer a new view of human sociality that is often ignored. Husserl's notion of intersubjectivity involves the self and the other. Intersubjectivity constitutes the theoretical framework for social life. Alfred Schutz, one of the creative interpreters of Husserl within the social sciences has remarked that there is plenty to learn from Husserl's discussion of intersubjectivity.

Husserl's notion of intersubjectivity presents the world to the self as it is presented to other by way of empathy, sees the world from the point of view of the other. Intersubjectivity leads to a shared understanding of the world, an interaction in which an understanding about things and people occurs. For Husserl, the common world for all is made possible by empathy,

being the primordial experience and participating in the feelings of another without becoming the other.

Intersubjectivity is the condition for the possibility of communication. Intersubjectivity is not something that is achieved through the use of language as a medium of communication. But it is fundamentally social in nature. To Husserl, intersubjectivity is mainly a theoretical issue. For Sartre, Husserl never overcome the problem of intersubjectivity for others. Husserl was concerned with the problem until the end of his life indicating a path towards a possible solution. Intersubjectivity for Husserl meant making an objective-shared world possible, human interaction and human understanding made possible. Shared or mutual understanding is the very condition for intersubjectivity, as claimed by Schutz.

Husserl's phenomenologically- based notion of intersubjectivity provide a view of human sociality relevant to anthropology and social sciences in general. Intersubjectivity as an important aspect of human experience and human sociality has become a fundamental aspect of social research. There is much to learn from Husserl's discussion of intersubjectivity following the interpretations of thinkers within social sciences.

The phenomenological intersubjective analysis starts with reduction of the natural attitude to the phenomenological attitude by means of which the essence of lived experience is reflected upon. Primordial act of reduction

brings in the constitutive transcendental subjectivity, the primordial sphere of ownness of the transcendental ego, the primordial ego. The intersubjective ego is the result of intersubjective ego is the result of intersubjective reduction. The transcendental ego is the intersubjective ego, constituting the world intersubjectively, intersubjective constitution, constituting the life-world shared by an intersubjective community.

3. Intersubjectivity and Social Context A Linguistic Approach

It is stated that there is an interface between Husserlian phenomenology and the analytical tradition. J.N.Mohanty, the celebrated Indian philosopher claimed that analytical philosophy and phenomenology are complementary to each other. Mohanty's work *Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning* synthesises²¹ platonic (essentialist) and anti-platonic approaches to language. The early platonistic phase of Husserl's investigations into language adopts an essentialism according to which meanings are hypostatized entities, the later anti-platonist, view adopts 'clarification of meaning' following the later Wittgenstein having an anti-essentialistic turn. It is a sort of 'phenomenological ascent' described in the Quinean way. Here Husserl's investigation into meaning is described as being the foundation of meaning of all sciences²². Mohanty credits Husserl's later investigations with hermeneutic intent, especially in his later writings. Mohanty distinguishes the two phases of Husserl's phenomenological investigation into language

following Merleau-Ponty as eidetic and transcendental phases. The first phase as found in *Logical Investigations* represents the eidetic phase dealing with structure of ideal language and the second phase concentrate on the protological structure of language as given by the life-world. From this, Merleau-Ponty claims that Husserl's account of speech is a concretization of intersubjective ideal stage. According to Mohanty, the eidetic phase correspond to the objective phenomenological attitude and the second phase is a return to the speaking subject or simply speech in which intersubjectivity plays an important role. The former phase clarifies the conception of the ideality of language, the latter talks about the constitution of meanings in terms of the life-world in order to explain speech at the inter-personal communicative level.

The idea of the 'foundation of meaning', according to Mohanty's interpretation, has its historicity which is made clear in his article on "consciousness and Life-World"²³. Mohanty's interpretation makes clear the two extremes one that of Merleau-Ponty²⁴ which locates intersubjectivity within transcendental subjectivity and the other that of Apel²⁵ which constructs the transcendental domain as the communicative situation. This position is well explained in Mohanty's, *Transcendental Phenomenology*²⁶ where interface between analytic philosophy and phenomenology is well articulated. The discussion of the inter-face extends in the hermeneutic direction.

Cunningham²⁷, criticizes Husserl's inter-face of reduction and language following Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations*. According to Cunningham, phenomenological reductions pre-supposes that transcendental consciousness is language-using. Language after reduction cannot be private because it necessarily arise out of intersubjective context. Cunningham in her account of transcendental reduction discusses how language is constituted with the help of the theory of constitution, the genetic theory of constitution involving passive reception and active constitution, Passive reception implies a social context because the words must be constituted by other people²⁸. Cunningham argued that language use bridges existence and essence so that the distinction between the transcendental and transcendent, the ideal and the real are bridged by language use. Cunningham's account of the theory of constitution follows Sokolowski's account²⁹.

Following Sokolowski, Cunningham divides Husserl's theory of constitution into three stages. In the first is called hylomorphic, constitution is explained in terms of matter and form as given in his *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas*. In the second stage as found in the *Phenomenology of Internal Time-consciousness* the temporal dimension is added into the constitutive process. The third stage is the final full-blooded phase as found in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, and *Cartesian Meditations* is a full-blooded theory of genetic constitution. It is state that Husserl follows a parallelism between constitution of language and the constitution of objects.

Cunningham remarks that Husserl uses constitution of language as the pattern for the constitution of objects³⁰. Cunningham is of the opinion that Husserl makes the issue complicated by operating without the mediation of language. Husserl actually desired to show that noema can be constituted directly without the mediation of language so that meanings are intuited.

In the second stage temporality or temporal meanings as expressed in judgements was introduced. As Cunningham remarks, here Husserl begins with the constitution of objects and then treats language represented by judgements very briefly. The temporality of constitution does not help in understanding the constitution of language until it is expanded into the genetic theory. Husserl does not make use of his theory of temporal constitution directly to his earlier discussion of meaning intending and meaning-fulfilling. Husserl only analyzes its relation to judgement suggesting that judgement is a second level constitution. Husserl developed his theory of genetic constitution as a third stage in order to correct the short-comings of the earlier stages. The genetic theory introduces levels of accumulated meanings from the earlier constitutive processes. Cunningham remarks that there is a shortcoming that Husserl does not say much about the genetic constitution of language. According to Cunningham the genetic theory is important in that it provides an explanation of the constitution of language as an aid in understanding the relation of language to the constitution of objects

and also it helps in discovering the context of intersubjectivity within which the transcendental ego constitutes meanings.

Cunningham's account shows how language is placed in the three reductions namely the phenomenological the transcendental and the eidetic reductions. At each level language functions in such a way that to eliminate language is logically impossible to be understood by others. At the level of phenomenological reduction, it is not possible to construct a language whose meaning is logically inaccessible to others. Cunningham's critique attacks the Husserlian sort of private language. Cunningham suggests to introduce a distinction between noematic language and meta-language corresponding to the distinction between noematic object and noetic act. The consistency problem for a private language can be solved by positing a public language at the meta-language level. At the level of transcendental reduction, the distinction between the self and others is overcome by the theory of genetic constitution. The transcendental ego is treated to be a meaning-giver and the relation between self and others brings in intersubjectivity. Cunningham works out a theory of genetic constitution following Sokolowski. Cunningham claims that there is a parallelism between linguistic and non-linguistic constitution, a parallelism between constitution of language and constitution of objects. According to Cunningham, the problem of being is more important for Husserl than the problem of language. To Cunningham private language cannot operate with the phenomenological reduction. There

is the need for intersubjective context within reduction. The arguments for the existence of others occur in *Cartesian Meditations*. But on Cunningham's account, Husserl's argument cannot meet the solipsist because the others remain only as meanings constituted for the transcendental ego. To Cunningham, reductions are possible only at the expense of intersubjectivity, reduction presupposes an intersubjective use of language. According to Cunningham, Husserl fails to uncover the other.

Hutcheson³¹ argues that the post-reduction language is not private and shows Cunningham's interpretation is an erroneous understanding of reduction. Hutcheson argues that if phenomenological reduction reduces transcendent objects to private objects then intentional objects and transcendent objects would be mutually exclusive³². So, the post-reduction language is understood by one speaker only is false. Husserl is philosophically neutral regarding the existence of others³³. From the phenomenological standpoint, language is understood by others is false but does not mean that language is not public³⁴.

Cunningham in response to Hutcheson's criticisms states that Husserl's doctrine of language is against ideal of absolutely certain foundation for knowledge³⁵. Cunningham disagrees with Hutcheson's claim that 'language is not an object but only a means of reference'. Cunningham distinguishes between object- language and meta-language³⁶. To Hutcheson's objection regarding Cunningham that she wrongly assume intentional objects

and transcendent objects as mutually exclusive, Cunningham answers that this objection confuses ‘intentional objects’ with ‘immanent objects’ or ‘post-reduction objects’³⁷. Reduction of transcendent objects to immanent objects does not mean reduction to intentional objects. In the natural attitude intentional objects might be transcendent. Cunningham also remarks that neutrality is not enough. The consistent use of language is not being checked³⁸. The existence of others if assumed makes Husserl’s reduction problematic. Hutcheson views that reduction does not effect language. The post-reduction language is ordinary language in phenomenological usage not involving any existential aspect. Cunningham is critical of Hutcheson’s view of identifying each other because they differ regarding existential aspect³⁹. The neutrality of language regarding existential aspect is possible, but neutrality about the existence of others in the use of language is impossible⁴⁰. Hutcheson in another article⁴¹ justifies his position regarding Husserl’s reduction and language. Others are to be treated as phenomena not as factually existing. Husserl is neutral to the issue⁴². Speakers of the language of phenomenology, according to Husserl, can understand the language. It follows that it must be possible for there to be other speakers⁴³. Hutcheson, quotes the argument of Chris Swoyer⁴⁴ in order to show Husserl’s neutrality regarding other speakers. Cunningham’s distinction between language and meta-language makes the pre- reduction language meta-language and the post-reduction language private.

The concept of life- world plays an important role in the above discussions. In the experience of the individual ego, the pre-predicative experience which is purely subjective and non-sharable experience passess to the predicative experience involving language where the role of language in the active phase of meaning constitution is discussed in Husserl's discussion of geometry in his essay on the "Origin of Geometry". It is language that make possible the generalization, the active constitution of experience as meaningful.

Cunningham claims that reduction becomes impossible of intersubjectivity is bracketed out. The consistent use of language presupposes a concrete criterion which is found only in an intersubjective context which is not a product of meaning-constituting act but a condition for the possibility of the very constitution. If reduction excludes sociality and culture then reduction itself becomes impossible. So, Cunningham concludes that if phenomenological reduction is to achieve its goal, then language and intersubjectivity cannot be bracketed out⁴⁵.

According Fuchs⁴⁶, language is related to phenomenology in a double sense. Since phenomenology is a descriptive science and description is a linguistic act, science is objectified through the medium of expression, that is, language. Further, the major logical issues within phenomenology such as the concept intentionality, the relation of meaning meant etc... are related to language. Husserl's affinity to the doctrine of metaphysics of

presence is related to his views on language. Metaphysics of presence, according to Fuchs, helps in understanding language itself. It is in relation to the doctrine of metaphysics of presence and phenomenology the consideration of language is revealed⁴⁷. According to Fuchs, metaphysics of presence in relation to language is primordial within Husserl's phenomenological reasoning.

Fuchs makes the concept of language as a condition for the very acceptance of the metaphysics of presence. Fuchs states that a series of meanings constituted by consciousness does not recognize the reality of language⁴⁸. Husserl's doctrine of language is inadequate because of its adherence to the doctrine of metaphysics of presence⁴⁹. According to Fuchs, Husserl fails to solve the problem of the other, either the 'other' is intentionally constituted by the transcendental ego and present or the 'other' is outside the ego and absent. The problem of intersubjectivity is not solved in Husserl because it is a continuation of the traditional movement called metaphysics of presence⁵⁰. The meaning of the other is constituted by the transcendental ego. Jacques Derrida⁵¹ criticizes Husserl's account of phenomenology of language. Derrida states that Husserl reaffirms logocentrism, a doctrine which accepts the centrality of the metaphysics of presence. According to Derrida, Husserl bases his theory of meaning on mental presence, on the presence of meaning to the mind. Further, meanings being present to the mind, it moves on to specify, the relevant sense of

presence. Escaping from the metaphysics of presence needs an account of meaning without appealing to special mental activity....

The interface between analytic philosophy and phenomenology as explained by Mohanty discovers a hermeneutic direction in Husserl's later writings. Mohanty following Merleau-Ponty claims that intersubjectivity plays an important role in the constitution of meanings in terms of the life-world locating intersubjectivity within transcendental subjectivity. Cunningham is critical of Husserl's interface of reduction and language and claims that the problem of language is not seriously taken by Husserl. As some other thinkers are critical of Husserl an solipsistic account, Cunningham too criticizes Husserl stating that the others are mere meanings constituted by the transcendental ego so that Husserl fails to discover the other. But Hutcheson's arguments seems to be more reasonable in that Husserl is philosophically neutral regarding the existence of others. Hutcheson's argument that reduction does not have any existential aspect. Hutcheson is justifying Husserl's position regarding reduction and language arguing that Husserl is neutral regarding other speakers. Cunningham's argument that language and intersubjectivity cannot be bracketed out does not find justification so that with bracketing language and intersubjectivity still exists as phenomena. Fuchs argues that the problem of the other is a failure in Husserl's philosophy because of its adherence to the doctrine of metaphysics of presence. Intersubjectivity as the meaning of the other

constituted by the transcendental ego is criticized by Fuchs. Jacques Derrida is also critical of Husserl's doctrine of language arguing that Husserl's theory of meaning is based on the presence of meaning to the mind so that he cannot escape from the doctrine of metaphysics of presence as in the case of Fuchs. But the fact is that in Husserl there is no place for the doctrine of metaphysics of presence because Husserl's philosophy is not metaphysics but phenomenology having no adherence to any metaphysical notions. Husserl's doctrine of intersubjectivity and social context is evident in the concept of life-world from a phenomenological approach to language as envisaged by Hutcheson and other thinkers.

The problem of intersubjectivity was approached linguistically by Jacques Lacan⁵² influenced by Husserl, but he was more interested in structuralism than in phenomenology. He found language as a vehicle for establishing intersubjectivity. He made use of intersubjectivity in a psychoanalytic treatment. The root of intersubjectivity was Husserl's use of the same especially related to his method of phenomenology.

For Lacan intersubjectivity is determined by linguistic structures not available to conscious experience. For Lacan intersubjectivity forms the interrelationship between experiencing subjects. The concept of intersubjectivity refers to the problem of the relationship between self of other and the influence of others on self's experiences of both self and other.

Husserl's phenomenological concept of intersubjectivity is concerned with the relation between self and other.

Edie⁵³ characterizes phenomenology as a science of experience where being and consciousness meet, a study of consciousness as intentional, an intentionally constituted world with intersubjective experience. Both objective scientific approach and subjective approaches are negated by phenomenology, but it gives importance to the ground of experience determined by the interhuman bond shared with others. The intersubjective experience and the justification for the same was the main problem of Husserl mainly relying on the concept of empathy as advocated by Lipps and explained by Stein. According to Heidegger, we are empathic by our very nature being with others in our primordially so that we cannot be without empathy. Heidegger gives priority to being over experience. But Lacan gives more importance to language situating intersubjectivity within it.

Apel and Habermas proposed a theory of intersubjectivity within linguistic philosophy, treating language as a vehicle of intersubjectivity, not experience. According to them communication with others is the medium through which intersubjectivity works. Laing's⁵⁴ treatment of intersubjectivity is a specific phenomenological sense which is based on Heidegger's notion of relation with others in which Stein gives emphasis to the others over self-experience. Laing and Lacan were concerned with the impact of others on self's experiences of both self and other. Laing and Lacan

considered intersubjectivity as a mode of experience in which individuals relate to one another. Lacan considered intersubjectivity as mainly linguistic.

4. Intentionality and Social Context

The logical development of the concept of intentionality in Edmund Husserl's phenomenology starts by introducing consciousness and its structure with the help of the concept of reduction and leads to the concept of intersubjectivity culminating in the concept of life-world giving a provision for social context. The world is treated by Husserl as the intentional correlate of consciousness and his investigations have finally led to the concept of life-world. The concept of intentionality has played an important role in solving the problem of intersubjectivity. Husserl has worked out the relation between the concept of intentionality and the concept of intersubjectivity which ultimately helped in dealing with the concept life-world in his later writings.

The method of reduction provided Husserl with the phenomenological concept of consciousness excluding all relation to empirical existence. The phenomenological concept of consciousness is entirely different from the psychological concept of consciousness. The phenomenological sense of consciousness explains phenomenological experience having an intentional character with a specific structure. The phenomenological concept of consciousness as intentional means the conscious subject being conscious of the object in a specific way. The relation between consciousness and the world is a constitutive relation giving an epistemological dimension to the limitations of the natural attitude of consciousness. In the *Ideas*, the relation between subjective conscious act and

objects is explained as the intentional relation between noetic and noematic experiences. Husserl views transcendental subjectivity as the constitutive sphere constituting the objective world in an objective way. The relation between intentional consciousness and the objective world is public and open. The subject object duality in the traditional philosophy is interpreted in phenomenology as the correlation between the conscious act and the object of conscious act which is a necessary correlation.

Husserl's phenomenology can be characterized as a transcendental inquiry into the issue of the actual representation of a world by a subject. Phenomenology describes consciousness and objects as presented to consciousness. The investigation of the structure of transcendental consciousness that is the phenomenological residuum after bracketing is the task of phenomenology. The investigation is characterized as phenomenological or transcendental reflection. Transcendental reflection is devoid of any existential commitment. Transcendental reflection enables to describe consciousness of its objects in the most proper way.

Phenomenology is claimed to be an externalist theory of conscious intentionality by which world representation is made possible. Phenomenology is an externalist theory of intentionality, making sense to the constitution of the world. Self explication of the subjectivity and its necessary correlate the real world as it is represented to the subject is made

possible. Explication of what is implicit in consciousness is the real task of phenomenology⁵⁵.

According to Husserl every experience have two different and inseparable aspects, intentional experience as experience of a specific type such as remembering, hoping, desiring, affirming etc... called intentional quality of experience, and intentional experience directed at something called the intentional matter of experience. The first-personal quality of experience has led to the self and self-consciousness which is non-inferential and immediate. Any conscious experience is intentional and manifest to itself. Every object experience involves self-experience.

The constitution of the world is viewed in phenomenology as an intersubjective constitution constituted intentionally shared by an intersubjective community. Husserl have developed the aspect of intentionality in a way solving the problem of consciousness gaining an objectivity sharing with others. The transcendental ego transcends its own being and experiences the other within itself so that the ego is a transcendental intersubjective unit. The transcendental constitution of the other is made possible through a specific reduction, the ownness-reduction by which the reduction to the transcendental sphere of ownness is made possible. The other is constituted by way of the synthetic effect of intentionality. The transcendental ego contains the objective world and the transcendental intersubjectivity is having an intersubjective sphere of

ownness. The transcendental clarification of experiencing the other is provided by mediacy of intentionality which make present the other to consciousness by reaching out from the primordial world. The other is appresented involving analogical apperception and pairing. It is also stated that the other is constituted phenomenologically by a modification of the transcendental ego forming an intentional modification. The intentionality of the primordial sphere and the intentionality of the sphere of the other are identified by what Husserl calls associative intentionality where an intentional reaching of the other into the primordial sphere take place. Thus the transcendental ego constitutes the objective world of an intersubjective community, the intersubjective world.

Phenomenology as a study of pure consciousness becomes significant with its concept of the life-world. The life-world in phenomenology is a study of pure consciousness in an intersubjective context. To Husserl consciousness of the world of objects and egos living together is recognized by Husserl⁵⁶. The objectivity of the world of experience is provided by the intersubjective experience which is called the life-world experience⁵⁷.

It is to be noticed that the implications of the concept of intentionality is revealed in the concept of intersubjectivity. The intersubjective context explicated as a consequence of the concept of intentionality finally leads to the life-world. The conscious life of the

transcendental ego with its intentional experiences is termed as monad. The nature concept of life-world available in the *Crisis* is explained in the background of a history providing a concrete concept. The life-world is explained as the universal framework for human experiences, the general structure of objectivity derived from the concept intentionality, thus providing space for social context in Husserl's phenomenology.

The main theme of transcendental phenomenology is intersubjectivity, which is discussed in his Fifth *Cartesian Meditations* and in the manuscripts published in Vol. XIII of *Husserliana*. Intersubjective experience constitutes objectively existing subjects, other experiencing subjects and the objective spatio-temporal world. The spatio-temporal objects of the world exists indendently of the ego's subjective experiences being part of an objective world. Phenomenology as propounded by Husserl is a study of human phenomena as experienced in consciousness. Experience of the world is intersubjective since experience with others is implicit in human experience of the world. Understanding the phenomenon as it is lived as the context of the person living through the situation is important⁵⁸. Phenomenology is a significant philosophical movement of the 20th century with respect to social sciences, especially with the rise of social phenomenology involved in social researches.

To the phenomenologist, the issue of intersubjectivity is not the issue of the other minds one's own subjectivity is not revealed to one self as

an internal phenomenon, and the others body is not revealed as an external phenomenon. The phenomenological treatment of intersubjectivity considers the problem of the other as not as a body alone or a hidden psyche alone but a unity of both aspects, as a unified whole. The expressive relation between mental states and bodily behaviour constitutes the unified whole. The manifestation of the subjective life mind is an important aspect. The bodily presence of the lived body as a mode of consciousness called empathy is another aspect. Empathy is an intentional act in which one is directed towards or presented with the other's lived experiences. Empathy is an intentional act in which one is directed towards or presented with the other's lived experiences. Empathy is an intentional act in which one is presented with the other's subjectivity from a second-person. Empathy is experiencing the other person directly as an intentional being whose bodily movements are expressions of his or her states of mind⁵⁹.

Intersubjectivity and objectivity are necessarily related. The experience of objects become objective only when the ego and other egos experience objects in the same way. Only the intersubjective constitution of the world guarantees objectivity. The co-operation of phenomenology and analytic philosophy has enriched the scientific study of consciousness to a great extent. The phenomenological and analytic approach to consciousness is evident in many journals published recently suggesting new directions of research.

5. Conclusion

Phenomenological reduction in Edmund Husserl's phenomenology establishes the world as intended and constituted in consciousness. The

reduction to the sphere of ownness helps to arrive at an experience where no distinction between ego and other egos exists, experiencing the world as an intersubjective world. The ego is a transcendental intersubjective unit. The lived experience of the ego with the presence of the other reflectively attended is made possible with the phenomenological method. The world is presented and experienced by the transcendental ego as an intersubjective world, experienced by other egos also. The others become intentional experiences accessible to the ego from within. In the sphere of ownness, self-knowledge and knowledge of others becomes possible. Empathic intentionality involving analogical apperception and pairing plays an important role in the experience of others which protects from criticisms on the ground of solipsism.

According to Wataru Kuroda, with reduction language is transformed into a transparent medium along with the 'other' and 'history'. The constitution of language, ideal language, brings in the intersubjective level. Noe along with Kuroda speaks about the hermeneutic turn discovering the other in Husserl's later thought. It is the intersubjective experience that acts as the background of life-world experience. To Husserl intersubjectivity is objective and forms the theoretical framework for social life in a new way. Alfred Schutz is a thinker who worked on Husserl's notion of intersubjectivity developing his version of phenomenological sociality. Interpretations of thinkers within social sciences have recognized the

importance of intersubjectivity with respect to human experience and human sociality. It is the intersubjective transcendental ego that constitutes the life-world shared by the intersubjective community.

Mohanty's account of Husserl's later thought finds hermeneutic content by explaining the constitution of life-world by way of language at the inter-personal communicative level. Merleau-Ponty and Apel also make reference to the intersubjective and communicative domains respectively. Cunningham's criticism of Husserl regarding the others as meanings constituted by the transcendental ego establishing the failure to uncover the other is because of a mistaken understanding of reduction as argued by Hutcheson. According to Hutcheson, both language and others are phenomena phenomenologically understood, and the reality of both cannot be questioned. Fuchs claim that Husserl's notion of language and the existence of others fails because of the adherence to the doctrine of metaphysics of presence also cannot be accepted on the ground that Fuchs have misunderstood Husserl's richness of the concept of intentionality that goes beyond both the traditional metaphysics of presence and the traditional notions of consciousness. Jacques Lacan is another thinker who tried to locate intersubjectivity linguistically influenced by Husserl. Edie credits phenomenology with intersubjective experience intentionally constituted.

The concept of consciousness introduced by phenomenology is unique in that the limitations of natural attitude is gotrid of by the method of

reduction and the constitutive aspect is revealed in a full-blooded way with a rich concept of life-world having intersubjective and social aspect. The concept of life-world having social significance is a result of the implications of the concept of intentionality revealed through the concept of intersubjectivity. The linguistic dimensions of intentionality following the tradition of co-operation between phenomenology and analytic and philosophy is to be fully utilize

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