

**THE TREATMENT OF THE CONCEPT
OF SENTENCE: A STUDY BASED ON
VĀKYAPADĪYA**

**Thesis submitted to the University of Calicut
for the Award of the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN SANSKRIT**

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that this thesis, "The Treatment of the Concept of Sentence: A Study based on *Vākyapadīya*", submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sanskrit in the faculty of Language and Literature in the University of Calicut, is a record of bonafide research carried out by **Sarath P Nath** under my guidance. It is also certified that this thesis has not previously formed the basis for the award of any Degree, Diploma or Fellowship or other similar title or recognition in this University.

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DECLARATION

I, Sarath P Nath, hereby declare that this thesis titled, "The Treatment of the Concept of Sentence: A Study based on *Vākyapadīya*, submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sanskrit in the faculty of Language and Literature in the University of Calicut, has not previously formed the basis for the award of any Degree, Diploma or Fellowship or other similar title or recognition in any University.

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29.01.2018

Sarath P Nath

Preface

Language is generally perceived as the method of communication. It is essentially a social phenomenon, through which, we share our thoughts, experiences, emotions, commands, wishes, statements of facts etc. Thus, the basic function of language is 'communication'. Ancient scholars in India inquired into this concept and went beyond its mere communicative perspective. They portrayed it as the lamp that brought to light all the material objects. Had there been no language, everything would have remained in the darkness of ignorance. No knowledge or science would have originated. Nobody can fulfill his/her life in this material world, without the medium of language. Language which thus spreads over all walks of life is not just a medium of communication, based on syllable-word-sentence. Language can be perceived as the carrier of thoughts and ideas. Thus, beyond its communicative level, language is something, which carries within itself the entire culture of a community. Therefore an insight into the working of language can be the beginning of the philosophical inquiry.

One of the fundamental problems in the philosophy of language, that has attracted the serious attention of all thinkers, is the relation

between *śabda* (the linguistic element) and its meaning (*artha*). The term *śabda* is normally used to refer to a linguistic element, which is the meaningful unit of speech. Indian thinkers uphold different views on the linguistic element that is referred to by the term *śabda*. According to various thinkers, it is the articulated phoneme (*varṇa*) or the word (*pada*) or the sentence (*vākya*). But all of them emphasise the role of sentence in communicating the ideas conceived by the speaker. Therefore the study of sentence and sentence-meaning became one of the major concerns of linguists, grammarians and philosophers.

The present study titled "The Treatment of the Concept of Sentence: A Study Based on *Vākyapadiya*", puts stress upon the different prospects regarding the basic element of the language-sentence and its meaning. The studies on sentence and sentence-meaning in ancient India are disseminated among the different systems of knowledge. The scholars in the Schools of *Mīmāṃsā*, *Nyāya* and *Vyākaraṇa* have devoted their effort to unravel the basic problems regarding these concepts. While analysing the concept of sentence, ancient thinkers tried to deal with two vexed questions: What is a sentence? and What constitutes the sentence-meaning? They have endeavored to answer these questions according to their preconceived notions.

In the science of Grammar, it was Bhartṛhari (hereafter Bh), the great grammarian and philosopher, who discovered the depth and breadth of Sanskrit grammar. His *magnum opus Vākyapadīyam* (hereafter VP) created a philosophical dimension in the science of Grammar hitherto unseen. He explains the concept of language in different levels to have a comprehensive idea of its function. If language is perceived in the communicative level, sentence is the basic unit of language. The entire second *kāṇḍa* of VP is dedicated for the syntactico-semantic analysis of the sentence. Here, Bh sets forth new visions and dimensions in the concept of sentence and sentence-meaning. His whole theory of language is to be understood from the context of his general theory of *Akhaṇḍavākya*. According to this theory, a sentence is the indivisible *sphoṭa* or a unitary whole and the sentence-meaning is the kind of a flash of understanding called *Pratibhā*. The present study tries to analyse the concepts and discussions on sentence and sentence-meaning, with special stress to VP.

Today, language study possesses a multi-dimensional perspective, which has moved up even into the realm of the studies on history, culture, psychology and philosophy. In this scenario, an inquiry into the linguistic perspectives of ancient Indian thinkers is useful and appropriate. The present study tries to understand the sentence theory of Bh in a deeper level and find out whether his unnoticed ideas could be useful in

interpreting the language phenomena. Bh's concepts are studied by many scholars of the East and West. Though many of his concepts are treated as mystic entities, the linguistic value of his views on sentence and sentence meaning is unraveled by modern scholars. But the ideas of *Akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*, *Pratibhā* etc. are either taken for granted or are not given much importance in the linguistic point of view. Therefore it is significant to analyse these concepts wherever is available rather than keeping them away because of their philosophical or metaphysical label on them.

The present study comprises four chapters. The first chapter entitled "The Philosophy of Language; a Bhartr̥harian Perspective" discusses the syntactic and semantic thoughts in India and the importance of Bh in Indian linguistic tradition. A brief survey of Bh's works and the commentaries of VP are also included in this chapter.

The second chapter titled "Various Perspectives on the Concept of Sentence in Indian System of knowledge" elaborately discusses various definitions of sentence propounded by different schools of thought. The different views of ancient Sanskrit scholars on the relation among the words in a sentence and their meanings, through which they are semantically connected to give a unified sense, are also explained in detail.

The third chapter named "The Concept of Sentence and Sentence Meaning: Gleanings from *Vākyapadīya*" is the discussion of the concepts of Bh on sentence and sentence meaning. It begins with presenting the definitions of sentence which are enumerated in the first verses of the second *kāṇḍa* of VP. In the second part, different ideas on the concept of sentence-meaning discussed by Bh are analysed and Bh's concept of *Pratibhā* as the meaning of sentence is also pointed out.

In the fourth chapter "The Treatment of the Concept of *Pratibhā* and its Implications", the origin and development of the concept of *Pratibhā* in various systems of knowledge is discussed. The characteristics of Bh's *Pratibhā* and the implications of this very concept are also explained in this chapter. The thesis ends with a conclusion which is the conspectus of the important points noted during the study. The scope for the further study in the topic is also pointed out in this chapter.

At this juncture, I thankfully remember all who supported and inspired me throughout the period of research. First of all, I express my deepest gratitude to my supervising teacher Prof. P Narayanan Namboodiri, whose proper guidance and wholehearted support helped me to materialise this thesis. I am grateful to Prof. C Rajendran, whose valuable suggestions helped me in choosing the topic of the study. I would like to thank Prof. N K Sundareswaran, Head of the Department of

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Abbreviations

Bh	:	Bhartṛhari
Kty	:	Kātyāyana
MB	:	<i>Mahābhāṣya</i>
P	:	Pāṇini
Ptj	:	Patañjali
RV	:	<i>Ṛgveda</i>
VP	:	<i>Vākyapadiyam</i>

Chapter 1

The Philosophy of Language: A Bhartr̥harian Perspective

1.1. The Concept of Language: Indian Perspectives

Language can be defined as the method of human communication, either spoken or written, consisting of the use of words in a structural and conventional way (<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/language>). The word language has its origin from the Old French word 'langage' and from the Latin word 'lingua'. The word lingua in Latin signifies 'tongue'. Thus the word 'language' simply denotes the human interaction, which involves gestures and spoken or written words. A human being thinks, and as a necessary corollary of his thinking, he wishes to communicate the ideas conceived. Language, as a tool of communication, achieves its goal, when the listener understands what the speaker intends to convey. Thus, thought and language are the two characteristics that differentiate man from animals. Aldous Huxley states that "for in spite of language, in spite of intelligence and intuition and sympathy, one can never really communicate anything to anybody" (2007, p.3). Harold G Coward rightly observes that language is a fascinating aspect of human behaviour and it

not only makes distinction between man and animals, but mediates human knowledge also (1980, p.1). Thus, language can rather be perceived as the very essence of thought, than a mere tool of communication.

Language has been one of the fundamental concerns of Indian schools of thought and has attracted the serious attention of all thinkers from the outset. They perceived language as one of the most precious gift given by god to human beings ("*samskr̥tam nāma daivī vāganvākhyātā mahar̥ṣibhiḥ*", Kāvyaḍarśa, 1.33). All knowledge from the time immemorial had been handed over to us in the form of language. Bh also mentions that there is no cognition without the operation of the word and all knowledge is illuminated by language.

na so' sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamāḍṛte

anuviddhamiva jñānam sarvam śabdena bhāsate (VP, 1.123)

Thus, it can be stated that the ancient preceptors were aware of the importance of language in our social life. In the study of language, they tried to deal with various vexed questions like What is language? What is its structure? How can it be analysed? etc. They have been endeavoured to solve these problems according to the basic norms of their philosophies.

1.2. The Philosophy of Language

In India, the study of language has never been the monopoly of the grammarians or the rhetoricians. Almost all schools of thoughts have given emphasis to the fundamental problems of verbal communication. The earlier references of linguistic thoughts in India are glimpsed in the Vedas and Upaniṣads. The Vedic seers praised language as a powerful deity, known as *Vāk*, who bestows all the favours to its devotees. In RV, a complete *sūkta* in the glorification of *Vāk* can be found. Even more examples can be cited from RV which shows the prominence of *Vāk*. It states that those who do not understand the real nature of *Vāk*, cannot see language, even when they are seeing and cannot hear it, even when they are hearing. The *Vāk* unfolds herself only to those, who understand the essence of speech.

uta tvaḥ paśyanna dadarśa vācam

uta tvaḥ śṛṇvanna śṛṇotyenām

uto tvasmai tanvaṃ visasre

jāyeva patya uśatī suvāsāḥ.(10.71.4)

The seers of RV praise the speech as the great deity (*Mahādeva*), who possesses himself in humans.

*catvāri śṛṅgā trayo asya pādā dve śīrṣe saptahastāso asya
tridhā baddho vṛṣabho roravīti maho devo martyāṃ āviveśa. (4.58.3).*

Apart from the Vedic passages, three among the six *Vedāṅgas* are directly concerned with language viz. *Vyākaraṇa* (Grammar), *Nirukta* (Etymology) and *Śikṣā* (Phonetics). This indicates the prominence of linguistic study in the Vedic ages.

The study of linguistic aspects has been emphasised in all systems of Indian philosophy. The Schools of *Mīmāṃsā* and *Vyākaraṇa* have contributed much in this regard. *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* is also known as *Vākyaśāstra*, which is devoted in interpreting sentences, either Vedic or ordinary. The *Nyāya* system, known as *Pramāṇaśāstra*, also discusses the basic linguistic problems. Though the School of *Vyākaraṇa* do not possess the status of *darśana* or philosophy, the ancient grammarians were interested in the linguistic and philosophical analysis of speech and they claim the status of an independent *darśana*.

1.3. The Basic Problems of the Philosophy of Language

The Indian approach to the study of language has been characterised by both analysis and synthesis. The study of language essentially requires a process of analysis in which the speech utterance is analysed in terms of

sentences and words, stems and suffixes, morphemes and phonemes¹. The earlier reference regarding the language analysis can be seen in *Taittirīyasamhitā*. It says that once Gods (*devas*) requested Lord *Indra* to analyse speech and on behalf of their request, he performed the duty. Since then, the speech is called *vaikṛta* or analysed (6.4.7). Śākalya's *Padapāṭha* of RV is also one of the earlier attempts of language analysis. The RV, originally in the *samhitā* form has been broken down into words in this *Padapāṭha*. In *Bṛhaddevatā*, Śaunaka defines a sentence as the group of words and words as the group of phonemes (2.117). We can find similar analytical methodology in *Prāśākhya*s also. But the systematic analysis of speech begins from the time of Yāska, who analysed the speech on the basis of etymology. He was the first to divide language into four parts viz. *nāma* (noun), *ākhyāta* (verb), *upasarga* (prefixes) and *nipāta* (prepositions) ("*tat yānyetāni catvāri padajātāni nāmākhyāte copasarganipātāśca*", 2002, p.3). This fourfold analysis is accepted by almost all the later Indian systems of knowledge.

The whole system of *Vyākaraṇa* has been dedicated in the linguistic analysis of speech. P, who propounded the descriptive grammar of Sanskrit language in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, has been praised by many modern

¹This analytical method is very popular in Sanskrit. Generally this method is considered as older, but some scholars like Punitha Sharma holds that it is a later development in the history of language (1998, p.12).

linguists. *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is primarily concerned with building up of words from verbal roots, preverbs, primary and secondary suffixes and nominal and verbal terminations. This treatise also points out some syntactic problems involved in the formation of compound words and the relationship of the nouns in a sentence with the verb. The followers of the *Pāṇinian* School developed this analytical method of language study in their works.

The School of *Mīmāṃsā* is mainly concerned with the methodology of textual interpretation of the Vedic texts. *Mīmāṃsakas* use both analysis and synthesis in their approach to the problems of textual interpretation. They give the semantic definition of the sentence and introduce the concepts of *ākāṅkṣā* (mutual expectancy), *yogyatā* (consistency) and *āsatti* (congruity), which are necessary for the unity of the sentence. *Naiyāyikas* hold that *śabda*, uttered by a trustworthy person, is one of the means of valid knowledge. Therefore the method of language analysis has been occupied a prime position in their philosophy. Thus it is clear that the various schools in India have carried out significant studies, which have produced insights into the working of language (Harold G Coward and K Kunjuni Raja, 2008, p.5).

1.4. Syntactic and Semantic thoughts in India

One of the fundamental aspects of the philosophy of language, that has attracted the serious attention of all thinkers, is the relation between *śabda* (the linguistic element) and its meaning (*artha*). The term *śabda* is normally used to refer to a linguistic element, which is the meaningful unit of speech. Philosophers held different views on the linguistic element that is referred to by the term *śabda*. According to various systems, it is the articulated sound or the phoneme (*varṇa*) or the word (*pada*) or the sentence (*vākya*). *Mīmāṃsakas* consider the letters or phonemes as *śabda*, which are eternal. Words and sentences are only the manifestations of these phonemes. For the *Naiyāyikas*, the term *śabda* refers to the word which is produced by the speaker and heard by the listener. Therefore, *śabda* is impermanent for them. According to the *Sphoṭa* theory of grammarians, *śabda* is eternal, but not in the form of letters. To Bh, *śabda* is the complete utterance of the sentence and is the unit of language called *vākyasphoṭa* (Coward and Raja, 2008, p.5). Grammarians analyse the sentence also into morphemes for grammatical purpose, which are termed as *padasphoṭa* and *varṇasphoṭa*.

1.5. The Concept of Sentence

As discussed, language is perceived as the method of

communicating one's thoughts. An idea or a thought can never be in bits and pieces, but is a unitary whole. Thus, it is communicated also as a unitary whole, but not in terms of its parts. Since words cannot communicate the speaker's thought fully, sentence is to be considered as the unit of language, which can communicate the whole idea. Different thinkers accept either a letter or a word or a sentence as the unit of language. But all of them emphasise the role of sentence in communicating the ideas conceived by the speaker. Therefore the study of sentence and sentence-meaning became the most important concept for linguists, grammarians and philosophers. Though we cannot find any explicit discussions on this topic in the ancient literature, some glimpses can be seen in Vedic texts. As stated, a simple definition of sentence is cited in *Bṛhaddevatā*. Later, *Naiyāyikas* and *Mīmāṃsakas* have expounded the syntactico-semantic analysis of sentence. They have produced several independent treatises on the systematic analysis of sentence. In Sanskrit grammar, the emphasis has been given to *prakriyā* or the formative aspect of words, while the treatises on the syntactico-semantic analysis of sentence are a few and far between. VP of Bh, *Bhūṣaṇasāra* of Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa, *Laghumañjūṣā* of Nāgeśa etc. have completely devoted their attention into this topic. Among them, VP possesses a prime position in the realm of the philosophy of language.

1.6. Bh: The Philosopher Linguist

Bh is considered as an outstanding figure in the history of Indian linguistic thought. He led Grammar into philosophy proper, by making a case for *Vyākaraṇa* as a *darśana*, a view about ultimate things, eventually about liberation. Gaurinath Sastri therefore aptly refers to his work as an "astoundingly original system of thought which to the best of my knowledge has no parallel" (Introduction, 1959, p.xxiv). VP became the most extensive work in the medieval period which represented the most fruitful epoch of Indian thought. Bh was also the major architect of *Sphoṭa* theory, which is regularly identified as the contribution of grammarians to the philosophical problem of meaning. His linguistic philosophy is to be considered as unique and singular among the linguistic thoughts in India.

1.6.1. Date of Bh

Although Bh is a renowned grammarian, philosopher and author in Sanskrit literature, we have very little information about his personal life and date. There are references of many Bhs and one may find different traditions about him in different places. Bhaṭṭi, the author of the grammatical poem *Bhaṭṭikāvya*, was also known as Bh. There are references to another Bh, who was the ruler of Malwa, in Tārānātha's *History of Buddhism*. He also mentions a Bh who was intimately

connected to the King and one of the nine great *siddhas* of the *Nāthapanthīya* religious order. But neither the King nor the *siddha* is known to have been a poet (K V Sharma, Introduction, 1969, p.8). One of the traditions says that, Bh was the youngest son of a Brahmin who had four wives from four different casts and that Bh was the son of *śūdra* wife. Another tradition says that Bh was a king, perhaps a brother of either Vikramāditya or Śūdraka, who gave up his worldly life and became a *sannyāsin*. Bh's life has been dramatized by Harihara in his *Bhartṛharinirveda*. In this story, Bh is portrayed as a student of Gorakṣānātha, from whom he learns Yoga and renounces the world (Coward, 1980, p.11). However, these traditions cannot be taken as evidence to fix the date of Bh. Since he had commented upon the MB of Ptj (150 BCE), the date of MB can be taken as the upper limit. His major work VP is referred to by Vāmana and Jayāditya in *Kāśikāvṛtti* (650 CE).

adhikṛtya kṛte granthe, (P, 4.3.87). śisukrandayamasabhadvandvendra-jananādibhiśchaḥ, (P, 4.3.88). taditi vartate. adhikṛtya kṛte granthe iti ca. dvandvāt (dvitīyāsamarthāt) chaḥ pratyayo bhavati adhikṛtya kṛte granthe. śabdārtasambandhīyam prakaraṇam. Vākyapadiyam." (Under P, 4.3.87-88)

Hence Bh can be placed within the limits 150 BCE-650 CE. Much of the evidence regarding his date supports him being placed nearer to the

latter date. I-tsing, the Chinese traveller and a Buddhist, who studied at the Nalanda monastery in 670 CE, reported Bh died forty years earlier. If this report is accepted as authentic, Bh probably died in 630 CE. But I-tsing also reported that Bh was a contemporary of Dharmapāla, who lived from 530 to 561 CE. Here it can be noted that I-tsing's opinions are self contradictory and unacceptable. More reliable evidence can be seen in the Tibetan translation of *Traikālyā Parīkṣā* of the famous Buddhist author Diñnāga. He quotes two verses from the *Svopajñāvṛtti* (hereafter *Vṛtti*) of VP. This evidently says that Bh must have preceded Diñnāga, who flourished between 480-540 CE. Some autobiographical references can be seen at the end of the second *kāṇḍa* of VP, where he mentions his teacher with great respect (2. 478-487). Puṇyarāja, in his commentary, makes it clear that it is Vasurāta, the teacher of Bh (VP, 2.481). The Tibetan translations of Diñnāga and some works of a Jaina writer Simhasūrigaṇi suggest that Vasurāta was a Brahmin and a brother-in-law of Bālāditya, a pupil of the great Buddhist scholar Vasubandhu, whose date is fixed as 400 CE (Coward, 1980, p.11).

We can collect as many references supporting the latter date limit of Bh. In *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa*, while commenting on the portion '*vāgvā anuṣṭub, vāco vā idam sarvam prabhavati*' (1-3-2-16), Hariswāmi quotes two verses from VP as follows.

*vāco vā ityādi. vācaḥ śabdasya sakāśāt 'idam' sarvamarthajātaṃ
prabhavati. ata eva jagataḥ śabdavivartamāhuḥ. tadyathā-
anādinidhanam brahma śabdatattvam yadaḥsaram
vivartate' rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ. iti.
tathānyatrāpi śabdavedhāt tatkāryatvam arthasyoktam-
na so' sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śābdānugamādrte
anuviddhamiva jñānam sarvaṃ śabdena bhāsate. iti." (1-3-2-16)*

Hariswāmi was evidently lived in the sixth century CE. Another important reference that historians point out is that of Kumārilabhaṭṭa who flourished in the fifth century CE. He quotes several verses of VP in his famous work *Tantravārtika*. In the light of all these discussions, it may be deduced that the date of Bh can be fixed between 450 -500 CE.

1.6.2. Works of Bh

There are several philosophical, grammatical and literary works attributed to Bh. Harold G Coward mentions five works which are attributed to Bh (1976, p.12). They are:-

1. *Mahābhāṣyaṭīkā*: a commentary named *Dīpikā* on the MB of Ptj of which, only a fragment still exists.
2. *Vākyapadiyam*, Chapters I, II, III: Bh's great work on the Sanskrit philosophy of language.

3. *Vṛtti* on VP I and II: a commentary explaining the above work.²
4. *Śabdadhātusamīkṣā*: a work that is currently lost.
5. *Śatakas* on *Nīti*, *Śṛṅgāra* and *Vairāgya*: well-known Sanskrit poems on politics, passionate love and renunciation.

We can undoubtedly fix that Bh, the grammarian-philosopher is the author of *Mahābhāṣyaṭīkā* namely *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, VP and *Vṛtti* in the light of many evidences. Vardhamāna Sūri, a Jain grammarian says about two works of Bh in his *Gaṇaratnamahodadhi* as "*Bhartṛhariḥ Vākyapadiyaparakīṇakayoḥ kartā Mahābhāṣyatripādyāḥ vyākhyātā ca*" (1963, p.2). Another grammatical work of Bh, *Śabdadhātusamīkṣā* have unfortunately not come to light so far. But, there is little evidence to prove that the author of the literary work *Śataktraya* and the grammarian Bh are the same. K V Sharma, while introducing the text *Puruṣārthopadeśa*, which is also attributed to Bh, clearly states that the grammarian Bh

² Recent studies of scholars like Ashok Aklujkar claim that the *Vṛtti* of the first two cantos of VP cannot be attributed to Bh. The first two cantos, according to one manuscript tradition, consist of *kārikas* as well as *vṛtti*. The other manuscript traditions have only the *kārikas*, accompanied by a *ṭīkā*, evidently authored by someone other than the *kārikā* author (1972, p.181-198).

In the *Vṛtti* of the first canto, the author states that his name is Harivṛṣabha (2007, p.236). Many scholars in Sanskrit treats Bh and Harivṛṣabha as one, but Aklujkar argues that Harivṛṣabha is different from Bh. According to him, Harivṛṣabha is the author of the commentary *Paddhati*. (2007, p.179)

mentioned by the Chinese traveller I-tsing is different from the author of VP and *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* (1969, p.8).

1.6.2.1. *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*

It is evidently known that Bh has written a commentary on MB of Ptj. Unfortunately only one manuscript of this work is available till now, which has the commentary up to P 1-1-55. In the colophon of this manuscript, the name of the commentary is given as *Bharṭṛhariṭīkā*, *Mahābhāṣyaṭīkā* and *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* (MB, Preface, 1984, p.3). Ashok Aklujkar points out that, early commentators in the grammatical tradition refer to this work as *Tripādī*, which signifies that the commentary is only up to the third *pāda* of *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (2007, p.122). Kaiyaṭa, in the beginning of his commentary *Pradīpa* on MB refers to *Dīpikā* as:

bhāṣyābdhiḥ kvātigambhīraḥ kvāhaṃ mandamatistathā

chātrāṇāmupahāsyatvaṃ yāsyāmi piśunātmanā.

tathāpi haribaddhena sāreṇa granthasetunā

kramamāṇaiḥ śanaiḥ pāraṃ tasya prāptāsmi paṅguvat. (Introductory verses, 6-7)

These lines throw light to two facts that Kaiyaṭa must have had before him a complete text of Bh's *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* and the authenticity of the commentary was also unquestionable.

1.6.2.2. VP

VP can be treated as the *Magnum opus* of Bh. This is probably the first book which laid down a new path way to the philosophy of grammar in India. Later, philosopher-grammarians like Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa and Nāgeśa accept VP as the authentic text to explain their views. K A Subramania Iyer opines that not only grammarians but other Indian philosophers also admitted the authenticity of this work (Introduction, 2006, p.2). The word '*Vākyapadiya*' is derived from two words viz. '*vākya*' (sentence) and '*pada*' (word). As stated, the derivation of this word is explained by Vāmana and Jayāditya in *Kāśikā* (Under P, 4.3.87-88). Hence the title *Vākyapadiyam* signifies 'a work which is related to *vākya* and *pada*'. According to this derivation, the text VP elaborately discusses the concepts of word and sentence, which are the main topics in it.

1.6.2.3. Structural Analysis of VP

VP consists of three chapters or *Kāṇḍas* and because of this reason; it is termed as *Trikāṇḍī* by some scholars³. The first chapter is called *Āgamakāṇḍa* or *Brahmakāṇḍa*. But in the colophon of first chapter, the

³ Aklujkar holds a different opinion that only the first two *kāṇḍas* constitute the text VP. He argues that the title *Vākyapadiya* could have referred to the second of the three cantos. The third canto named *Padakāṇḍa* or *Prakīrṇakāṇḍa* (which means 'miscellaneous') seems to be no older than sixteenth century CE (2007, p.547-555).

name of the chapter is given as *Āgamasamuccaya* or *Brahmakāṇḍa*. ("iti śrīmad padavākyapramāṇajñamahopādhyāya Bhartṛharikṛte vākyapadiye āgamasamuccayo nāma prathamam brahmakāṇḍam, 2006, p.282). This chapter elucidates the real nature of the speech element *śabdatattva* or *śabdabrahma* which is eternal and beyond birth or death. The first four verses of the first canto VP give a vivid picture of *śabdabrahma*, which is the sum total of Bh's theory of language. He describes *śabdatattva* as the all pervaded essence of the universe, from which the whole world is derived. His arguments in the whole VP can be traced to this concept of *śabdatattva*. Probably, Bh is the first to proclaim word or *śabda* as eternal *Brahma* in the history of Indian philosophy⁴. Bh says that the one and indivisible *śabdatattva* apparently seems to be many, due to its different inherent factors⁵ (VP, 1.2). Bh says that the real nature of *śabda* or *śabdatattva* is not external; but it is the inner consciousness. Bh explains this *śabdatattva* in two dimensions. He perceives *śabdatattva* as the essence of language, which is described as *Brahma* and is not external. He also views *śabdatattva* as the cause of verbal cognition or *sphoṭa*. Hence

⁴ Later, a similar reference can be seen in *Kāvyaḍarśa* of Daṇḍin. He states that unless the light called language shines in the world, it would sink in deep darkness.

*idamandham tamaḥ kṛtsnam jāyeta bhuvanatrayam
yadi śabāhvayam jyotirāsamsāram na dīpyate. (1.4)*

⁵ This concept of *śabdabrahman* seems to be similar with that of '*Brahman*' in *Vedānta*. But when it is analysed thoroughly, it cannot be analogous with the concept of *Brahman*.

we can find that Bh manifests language in its metaphysical background and as a tool of communication. According to Bh, every expression contains three elements i.e. *dhvani* (uttered sound), *sphoṭa* (the intermediary or the sound image from which bears meaning) and *artha* (meaning). Bh discusses the first two in the first kāṇḍa of VP. The third element, which is a multi-dimensional entity, is elaborately discussed in the second canto.

Along with *śabdatattva*, Bh discusses other relevant topics also in this chapter. The importance and advantages of studying grammar, authenticity of *āgamas* or *Vedas*, the real nature of *śabda*, discussions about *sphoṭa* and *dhvani*, *apabhramśa* etc are the major topics dealt with in this chapter. After describing the characteristics of *śabdabrahma*, Bh suggests that the *Vedas* are the way to manifest this *śabdatattva*. Here we may find a detailed discussion on the authenticity of the *Vedas* and other *pramāṇas*. He accepts the *Vedas* as one, compiled by many sages and therefore it became many (VP, 1.5). Various *darśanas* and *śāstras* are also derived from the same *Veda* by various philosophers (VP, 1.7). Grammar should be considered as the main *Vedāṅga* according to Bh, for it is the only way to know the real nature of *śabda* and through which, we can attain the final goal *apavarga* (*taddvāramapavargasya vāṇimalānām cikitsitam*, VP 1.14).

As indicated, Bh defines *śabda* in two dimensions; one is the cause and the other is the external word that we utter. Former is termed as *sphoṭa* and the latter is termed as *dhvani* or *vaikharī*. Ptj also explains *śabda* in this manner in the first chapter of MB (*yenocāritena sāsānālāṅgūlakakudakhuraviṣāṇināṃ sampratyayo bhavati sa śabdaḥ*, Vol.I, 11). Bh explicates the nature of *sphoṭa* and *dhvani* in this canto. He analyses this concept from the point of view of the speaker as well as the hearer. While we analyse *śabda* in the speaker's dimension, *sphoṭa* is the cause of *vaikharī* or the uttered sound. The order is reversed when *śabda* is analysed from the hearer's point of view. What is worthy of note here is in both cases *sphoṭa* is the meaning bearing unit.

Bh sets forth *sphoṭa* as the real *śabda* in the first chapter and a detailed study on the concept of sentence is included in the second chapter *Vākyakāṇḍa*. While we enter into this chapter, various views about the definition of sentence can be found. Bh elucidates two main views regarding the concept of sentence. According to some philosophers, sentence is indivisible or *akhaṇḍa* while in some others view, sentence is an aggregation of its parts and thus, it can be divided into parts or it is *sakhaṇḍa*. Bh is in favour of the *akhaṇḍapakṣa* or the indivisibility of sentence, for he clearly states in the first chapter that words in a sentence and syllables in a word are not true, but only imaginary

pade na varṇā vidyante varṇeṣvavayavā na ca

vākyāt padānām atyantam praviveko na kaścana (VP, 1.73).

Along with these eight views on sentence, Bh discusses the definitions given by Kātyāyana, the author of Vārtikas and Jaimini, the founder of *Mīmāṃsā* philosophy. After explaining these views, Bh affirms the indivisibility theory of sentence through the *vākyavādin-padavādin* controversy and refutes the *padavādins*, who do not accept the authenticity of sentence.

Various views on sentence-meaning by different thinkers are also discussed in this chapter. Bh elucidates the theories of *Anvitābhidhāna* and *Abhihitānvaya*, the two prominent theses propounded by *padavādins*. He then discusses the *Pratibhā* theory of sentence-meaning, in which the meaning of a sentence is accepted as a flash of understanding. The particulars of the concept of *Pratibhā* are also expounded here in detail.

The third chapter, named as *Padakāṇḍa* or *Prakīrṇakāṇḍa* is again divided into fourteen chapters called *samuddeśas*. As the name indicates, the discussions in this chapter are focussed on the linguistic as well as philosophical analysis of words. The fourteen *samuddeśas* are *Jāṭisamuddeśa*, *Dravyasamuddeśa*, *Sambandhasamuddeśa*, *Dravyalakṣaṇa samuddeśa*, *Guṇasamuddeśa*, *Diksamuddeśa*, *Sādhanasamuddeśa*,

Kriyāsamuddeśa, Kālasamuddeśa, Puruṣasamuddeśa, Saṅkhyāsamuddeśa, Upagrahasamuddeśa, Liṅgasamuddeśa and Vṛttisamuddeśa.

1.6.2.4. Commentaries of VP

The text of VP has been commented upon by several scholars, but most of these commentaries are not available for the complete text. Ancient commentaries of VP are available for several cantos of the text, while some later commentaries are up to the end of the text. Ancient commentaries include *Vṛtti* by Harivṛṣabha, *Tīkā* of Puṇyarāja, *Paddhati* of Vṛṣabhadeva and *Commentary of Helārāja*. There are some modern commentaries also, which emphasise on imparting a clear idea of the verses of VP for the students. A brief analysis of the commentaries of VP is given here.

1.6.2.4.1. *Vṛtti*

There is an old tradition, which says that Bh himself had written a commentary on VP, named *Vṛtti*. This is probably the oldest commentary available on VP. I-tsing, the Chinese traveller, who visited India in 670 CE, records that Bh had written a work containing 700 *kārikas* and Bh himself had written a commentary on it consisting 7000 *kārikas*. If so, the original commentary is in the form of *kārikas*, but it is available in the form of prose commentary. In the commentary of *Brahmakāṇḍa*, the name

of the author is found as Harivṛṣabha (*iti śrī Harivṛṣabhamahāvaiyākaraṇaviracite Vākyapadiye āgamasamuccayo nāma brahmakāṇḍaṃ samāptam*, 2006, p.236). Many scholars in Sanskrit explains the word 'Vṛṣabha' in praise of Hari (Bh), just as *Indra* in *Rājendra*. This commentary is available for the first two *kāṇḍas*. The commentary of first canto is available in full, but there are many gaps in that of the second canto.

The authorship of this commentary has been recently questioned by scholars like Ashok Aklujkar. He discusses the problem elaborately in his article titled "The Authorship of Vākyapadiya-Vṛtti", published in 1972. He sets forth many evidences to prove that the author of the *kārikas* and that of the prose commentary are not the same (181-198). Anyway, there is a scope for more authentic research to draw any conclusion in this regard.

1.6.2.4.2. Puṇyarāja

Puṇyarāja is believed to be born in Kashmir in the last decades of 800 CE. The details about the life of Puṇyarāja have not come to light fully. He himself says that he was known as *Rājānakaśūravarma* and studied the entire second canto of VP from Śaśāṅkaśiṣya (V P Limaye and K V Abhyankar, Appendix II, 1965, p.213). Vāmanācārya, who authored

Kāvyaḷaṅkārasūtra, was known to be the disciple of Śāśāṅka. If Śāśāṅka, who is referred to by Puṅyarāja and the teacher of Vāmanācārya are the same, then Puṅyarāja should be flourished after Vāmana, whose date is known to be in 800 CE (M Srimannarayana Murthy, 1997, p.13). These are the available details about the life of Puṅyarāja. But M S Murthy holds that this information is subject to controversy.

Puṅyarāja wrote commentaries on the first and second canto of VP. The first two cantos along with the *Tīkā* of Puṅyarāja have been published by Benares Sanskrit Series, Benares in 1884. But the available commentary on the first canto has many gaps in it and hence cannot be taken as complete. Fortunately the *Tīkā* on the second canto including the *Vṛtti* of Harivṛṣabha is available in full. Peri Sarveswara Sharma is of the opinion that the commentary on the first canto is an abridged version of Bh's own *Vṛtti* and it is wrongly attributed to Puṅyarāja (1972, p.3).

Puṅyarāja has also composed a synopsis of the contents of the second canto of VP at the end of his commentary. He comprises almost all the essential points of the second canto in 59 verses. The verses are written in a lucid style, that the students and scholars can easily enter into the concepts of VP.

1.6.2.4.3. Helārāja

Helārāja has composed commentary on all the three cantos of VP, but his *Prakīrṇaparakāśa*, the commentary on the third canto alone is extant now. In one of the introductory verses of his commentary on third *kāṇḍa*, Helārāja says

*kāṇḍadvaye yathāvṛtti siddhāntārthasatattvataḥ
prabandho vihito' smabhirāgamārthānusāribhiḥ (7-8).*

Thus it is observed that he has written commentaries on the first two cantos. The commentary on the first *kāṇḍa* was named as *Śabdaprabhā*. Helārāja himself says that "*vistareṇāgamaprāmāṇyam vākyapadiye' smābhiḥ prathamakāṇḍe śabdaprabhāyām nirṇītam*" (1994, p.54). Aklujkar holds that Helārāja's commentary on *Brahmakāṇḍa* was named as *Śabdaprabhā* and that on the second *kāṇḍa* as *Vākyakāṇḍaṭīka* or *Vākyapradīpa* (1972, p.193). References can be found that Helārāja has composed another three works viz. *Advayasiddhi* (VP, 1994, p.117), *Kriyāviveka* (VP, 1994, p.60) and *Vārtikonmeṣa* (VP, 1994, p.149). But none of which is available now. Among these works, *Vārtikonmeṣa*, as the name indicates, was an explanation of Kātyāyana's *Vārtikas*. *Kriyāviveka* was intended to establish action (*kriyā*) as the main idea expressed by a sentence. The third, named *Advayasidhi*, seems to have been a work on *śabdādvaita* or linguistic monism (Coward and Raja, 2007, p.193).

A few references of the personal details of Helārāja can be found in his commentary *Prakīrṇaparakāśa*. Helārāja gives the following information about himself in the last portion of his commentary on *Padakāṇḍa*. He says that Helārāja, the son of Bhūtīrāja, born in the family of Lakṣaṇa, who was a generous minister at the court of wealthy and famous Kashmiri King, popular with the name of Mukṭāpīḍa, composed this commentary called *Prakāśa*.

muktāpīḍa iti prasiddhimagamat kāśmīradeśe nṛpaḥ

śrīmān khyātayaśā babhūva nṛpatestasya prabhāvānugaḥ

mantri lakṣaṇa ityudāracaritastasyānvaye bhavo

Helārāja imam prakāśamakarocchri bhūtīrājātmajaḥ. (VP, 3.14,

Helārāja, 1-2)

Abhinavagupta, who have studied with Bhūtīrāja, refers to the son of Bhūtīrāja, whom he calls 'Indurāja'. Raja argues that Abhinavagupta refers to Helārāja in some passages as; he is credited with having written a grammatical work named *Prakīrṇakavivarāṇa*. This is probably the commentary of VP by Helārāja known as *Prakīrṇakaparakāśa* (Coward and Raja, 2007, p.193). It is evident that Kalhaṇa, in his famous work *Rājatarāṅgiṇī*, refers to a King called Lalitāditya Mukṭāpīḍa, who lived in Kashmir at about 650-736 CE (2009, p.130). Kalhaṇa also says that the King has many ministers in his court (2009, p.144). Lakṣaṇa may have

been one of these ministers. From these references, scholars conclude that Helārāja lived in the second half of 10th century CE.

Helārāja's commentary on the third canto appears in the manuscripts sometimes as *Prakīrṇaparakāśa* and sometimes as *Prakīrṇakaparakāśa*. Both may be deemed correct because the real name of the commentary is *Prakāśa* and *Prakīrṇa* or *Prakīrṇaka* is the name of the third canto of VP. While we go through the commentary, it can be found that Helārāja composed it according to the *Vṛtti* of Bh. In the opening verse itself he says "*yathāvṛtti*", which means, this commentary is in accordance with the *Vṛtti* (Helārāja, p.1). This makes the commentary more authentic. Several chapters in the *Padakāṇḍa* seem to be very difficult to understand as they deal with certain complicated philosophical as well as linguistic problems. Helārāja's commentary helps to have a vivid understanding of those complicated ideas. While going through the verses of Bh, sometimes we may get confused to determine Bh's own view, since he also quotes the views of others. In such situations, Helārāja distinguishes Bh's views from others. While explaining the concept of time (*kāla*) in *Kālasamuddeśa*, Bh states that some call it as *śakti*, while others call it as *devatā* (VP, 3.7.62). Helārāja, commenting on this verse, opines that Bh is of the view that time as power (*śakti*). To satisfy this, he refers to the third verse of the *Brahmakāṇḍa* which reads together with the

Vṛtti (VP, 5). There are some gaps in this commentary; so says K A S Iyer . He says that all the manuscripts contain the indication of some scribe that the gaps have been filled up with the commentary of one Phullarāja (Introduction, 1994, p.13-14)

1.6.2.4.4. Vṛṣabhadeva

A commentary of VP called *Paddhati* is attributed to Vṛṣabhadeva. He commented upon Bh's *kārikas* and the *Vṛtti* together. The *Paddhati* commentary also is available for the first canto only. From the introductory verses of the commentary, we may get some information about the author.

vimalacaritasya rājñō viduṣaḥ śri viṣṇuguptadevasya bhṛtyena
tadanubhāvācchridevayaśastanujena bandhena vinodārthaṃ
śrīvṛṣabhena sphuṭākṣaram nāma kriyate Paddhatireṣa
vākyapadīyodadheḥ sugamā. (1)

It can be deduced from this verse that Vṛṣabhadeva was the son of Śridevayaśa, who was in the court of King Sri Viṣṇuguptadeva. Vṛṣabhadeva mentions that there were many scholars who commented upon VP before him. Unfortunately, none of which are available now. According to S Murthy, Vṛṣabhadeva is supposed to have lived before the first half of 8th century CE (1997, p.28). Again he opines that

Vṛṣabhadeva have commented upon the first two cantos along with the *Vṛtti*, but the commentary on the second canto is not available. The style of commentary is lucid that even those who do not enter into the realm of grammar can understand the verses and *Vṛtti* of VP by this commentary. This is probably the only ancient commentary available for the first canto, which follows the traditional style of commenting *śāstra* works. The word *Paddhati* in Sanskrit signifies path, way, manner etc. Hence as the name indicates, this commentary pays a path to enter into the philosophical treatise VP.

1.6.2.4.5. Dravyesa Jha

Sanskrit grammarians consider VP as authentic as MB of Ptj. Hence this text has been included in the curriculum from old days. The verses of VP are so complicated that even the students of grammar are not able to understand the meaning easily. Hence some scholars have written commentaries to enter the students easily into the text. Dravyesa Jha, a famous scholar in Sanskrit grammar composed a commentary *Pratyekārthaprakāśikā* on the first canto of VP, in this dimension. This was published from Vrindavan in 1926. The commentary is only for the verses of VP, but not for the *Vṛtti*. While we go through the commentary, it can be noted that the author puts his mind on a brief meaning of each

verse. He had no intentions to compose an elaborated commentary to untie the complicated issues which are conceived in the *kārikas* of Bh.

1.6.2.4.6. Suryanarayana Sukla

Bhāvapradīpa, a commentary on the *Brahmakāṇḍa* of VP is written by Suryanarayana Sukla, which was published initially in 1937. Later it was published from Chaukhamba Sanskrit Sansthan, Varanasi, which has many editions also.

The author acknowledge his intension to write this commentary in the text as follows:

*tasya paramopādeyatāmālocya tattatparikṣādhyakṣaiḥ vyākaraṇācārya
parikṣāyām niveśītasya tasya yathārtham arthāvabodhāya
saralavyākhyām anviṣyadbhiḥ chātraiḥ tadalābhena prārthitena mayā
Vākyapadiyabhāvapradīpanāmnī vyākhyā viracayya
viśveśvaracaraṇakamalayoh samarpya bhavatām karakamalayoh
upahārikriyate.* (S Sukla, 1937, acknowledgement)

We can understand from this passage that this commentary is also actually intended for the students to have a clear idea of the verses of VP. In a thorough evaluation, we can say that this is equally helpful for the scholars also. The commentator says about the nature of the commentary in the opening verse as

pradīpasāhāyyam avāpya bhāśyam
vigāhya tantrāntaram āgamāmśca
vitanyate Vākyapadīyabhāva-
pradīpa eṣo' titarāmudāraḥ. (S Sukla, 1)

This verse shows that he wrote *Bhāvapradīpa* commentary, absorbing the views from MB of Ptj along with the commentary *Pradīpa* by Kaiyaṭa as well as other *tantras* or schools of thought. He quotes from other texts also to give a clear idea of Bh's verses, wherever necessary. While commenting upon the 31st *kārikā* of VP, Sukla quotes from *Ślokaṅkārtika*. In the same manner he refers to many other texts, which makes the commentary lucid as well as authentic.

1.6.2.4.7. Raghunatha Sarma

Raghunatha Sarma, a famous Sanskrit scholar not only in Grammar but in other Schools of thought, wrote a commentary on VP, which is equally praised by scholars and students. Probably this commentary, named *Ambākartrī* is the only commentary available for the whole text of VP along with the *Vṛtti*. In addition to this, he has included all the available authentic commentaries in his work. In the introduction to this commentary on the first book of VP, K A S Iyer describes that the present commentary is helpful for students as well as scholars (Introduction, 2006,

p.11). All the three cantos of VP along with the commentary *Ambākartrī* have been published from Sampurnananda Sanskrit Visvavidyalaya, Varanasi. The *Ambākartrī* commentary of the first canto of VP is published along with the *Svopajñāvṛtti*, while the second canto is with the *Svopajñāvṛtti* and *Tīkā* of Puṅyarāja and the third canto is with the *Prakīrṇaparakāśa* of Helārāja. Hence this edition can be taken as a complete reference about the text VP.

Sarma took 16 years to complete his commentary *Ambākartrī* on the whole VP. He admits that he wrote commentary on the first book of VP by studying the verses and *Vṛtti* of Bh and *Paddhati* commentary of Vṛṣabhadeva (acknowledgement). Though Raghunatha Sarma admits that he follows the commentary of Vṛṣabhadeva, this commentary can be considered an independent work.

1.6.2.4.8. Vamadeva Acarya

Vamadeva Acarya wrote a commentary on the first canto of VP, which is named *Pratibhā*. This is a bilingual commentary both in Sanskrit and Hindi. This is a later commentary published in 1987 from Chaukhamba Sanskrit Sansthan, Varanasi. Apart from following the traditional way of commenting a *śāstra* text, Vamadeva Acarya had a new approach to VP. The text has an elaborated preface, which expounds the ideas of Bh in a new dimension.

1.6.2.4.9. Dr. K A Subramania Iyer

Dr. K A Subramania Iyer, a versatile scholar in more than one school of thought has set forth original concepts on Bh and VP. He has critically edited all the three cantos VP along with the authentic commentaries. The first canto of VP is edited with the *Vṛtti* and the ancient commentary *Paddhati* of Vṛṣabhadeva from Deccan College, Pune. The second canto is edited with the *Vṛtti* and *Tīkā* of Puṇyārāja, which has been published from Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi. He compiled and edited the third canto along with the *Prakāśa* commentary of Helārāja in two parts, which is published in Deccan College Series. He also translated all the three *kāṇḍas* into English along with exegetical notes. A brief summary of the topics in each canto is also done by K A S Iyer. He has produced several original and authentic studies in the studies of Bh and VP.

1.6.2.4.10. Dr. K Raghavan Pillai

There are several scholars from Kerala, who have endeavoured in the studies oh VP and Bh. Dr. K Raghavan Pillai, who had been the Director and Professor of Sanskrit in the Oriental Research Institute and Manuscripts Library, Kerala University for a long time, have produced notable contributions in this regard. He has edited and translated the first

two cantos of VP into English. Though several translations of VP are available, this translation is unique in its rendition. In the present translation, each verse is preceded by an introduction and followed by summary, commentary and notes. Dr. Pillai himself states that this style of translation will be helpful for the readers to comprehend the main points of each verse. He acknowledges that the style of the translation is similar to the one rendered to a *śiṣya* by a *Guru* in the traditional way. The Translation consists of a brief but scholarly introduction, which is useful to both students and researchers.

1.6.2.4.11. Prof. M H Sastri

Some scholars from Kerala also have commented upon and translated VP into Malayalam. Prof. M H Sastri, who was a great scholar in more than one school of thought, wrote a commentary named *Hariharaputrīyam*. As the author says, he had an intention to write this commentary in Malayalam, but with the inspiration of some students, he decided to compose it in Sanskrit, English and Malayalam. The author's name was actually Hariharaputra and hence the work was named *Hariharaputrīyam*.

Chapter 2

Perspectives on the Concept of Sentence in Indian Systems of Knowledge

2.1. *Śabda*: A Valid Source of Knowledge

As we know the prime use of language or *śabda* is communication. Daṇḍin, the famous rhetorician affirms that all the three worlds would be in blinding darkness unless the light called *śabda* had shone all around us (1.4). Usually *śabda* conveys information to the listeners hitherto unknown. Information, goods and whatever we wish to have, we gain them with the help of *śabda*. Thus, *śabda* makes human life possible. These are the probable implications of this verse. Here the face of language, which is used for communication, is unveiled. In communication, language is a signifier or *śaṅketa*, which is popular in a society. In a particular society, certain meanings are assigned to a word and hence we should be familiar to those assignments (*śaṅketa*) to communicate with that society. In this communicative level of language, words, which are the group of syllables, are only symbols of the meaning. This primary level of language is well said by Ptj in the passage "*athavā*

pratītapadārthako loke dhvaniḥ śabda ityucyate. tasmād dhvaniḥ śabdaḥ" (MB, 1984, p.12). But before the utterance, the speaker conceives an idea, which is to be expressed and this is also considered as *śabda* by Sanskrit grammarians. We can trace this level of language also in MB, where Ptj defines *śabda* as:- "*yenocāritena sāsñālāṅgūlakakudakhuraviṣāṇināṃ sampratyayo bhavati sa śabdaḥ*" (1984, p.11). In this passage, the term '*sampratyaya*' signifies the idea, which is manifested in the hearer's mind and is defined as *śabda*. Without these conceptions, an utterance could not be happened. At this point, language possesses a philosophical perspective. Hence we can analyse *śabda* or language in two distinct perspectives viz. from the point of view of communication and that of philosophy. Both the perspectives have attracted linguists as well.

Apart from mere communication, *śabda* unveils information that is not known to us, till it is uttered. Thus, *śabda* can be accepted as a source of valid knowledge. In Indian Philosophy, *Vaiśeṣikas* and *Cārvākas* do not accept the validity of *śabdapramāṇa*, arguing that it can be included in inference. While the preceptors of *Nyāya* and *Mīmāṃsā* accept *śabda* as a distinct *pramāṇa*, which is a source of valid knowledge. *Naiyāyikas* like Jayantabhaṭṭa, Jagadīśa and Gadādhara refute the arguments of *Vaiśeṣikas* and *Cārvākas* and put forth much logic to establish *śabda* as a different means of knowledge.

Grammarians give prime position to *śabda*, for their whole science is relied on it. This is evidently accepted by Ptj as: "*śabdapramāṇakā vāyam, yacchabda āha tadasmākam pramāṇam*" (MB, 1984, p.56). Bh, in accordance with Ptj, accepts the superiority of *śabda* among the sources of valid knowledge. After establishing *śabda* as the essence of the whole world saying that it is word that form the basis of meaning, purposes, activities and truth (VP, 1-13). Bh remarks that Vedas are the soul means of attaining this principle of language. Bh presents a keen discussion about the authenticity of Vedas. Vedas are also in the form of *śabda* and hence the authenticity of *śabda* as a valid source of knowledge can be established.

2.2. *Śabdapramāṇa* and Sentence

Śabda is accepted as a distinct *pramāṇa* by most of the schools of thought born and developed in India. Therefore, the followers of each school have to define *śabda* in accordance with their preconceptions. In general, philosophers use the term *śabda* to denote word as well as sentence. Gautama defines *śabda* in the aphorism "*āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ*" (1.1.7), which says that *śabda* is that which is uttered by a trustworthy person. The commentators explain the characteristics of a trustworthy person. A trustworthy person is he, who has the knowledge of objects conducive to the attainment of what is

beneficial and the avoidance of what is harmful. It is to be noted that the sentence uttered by the trustworthy person should consist of words having mutual expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*), congruity (*yogyatā*) and proximity (*sannidhi*). Then only it can be accepted as valid verbal testimony or *śabdapramāṇa*. Thus the commentators interpret this aphorism, by elaborating the word *upadeśa* into the context of verbal testimony. The word *upadeśa* signifies the medium, through which something is communicated. It is generally accepted by almost all philosophers that sentence is the basic unit of communication, through which a complete idea hitherto unknown is communicated. Thus the definitions of *śabda* by various philosophers can be applied only to sentence, neither to words nor to syllables. Mutual expectancy, congruity and proximity are the qualities of a sentence, but not of a word. Vācaspatimiśra in his commentary on *Nyāyavārtika*, clearly states that the word *upadeśa* denotes the cognition of sentence-meaning ("*upadiśyate' nena iti upadeśo vākyajñānam*", 1967, p.173). Jagadīśa airs his idea about *śabdapramāṇa* in the opening verse of *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, a treatise on verbal testimony of the Nyāya School.

anubhavahetuḥ sakale sadyaḥ samupāsītā manuje

sākāṅkṣāsannā ca svārthe yogyā sarasvatī devī. (1)

Goddess *Sarasvatī* is worshipped in this verse. Equivocally he refers to *śabdapramāṇa*, which should be *sākāṅkṣam* (having mutual expectancy),

āsannam (proximate) and *yogyam* (congruent). These characteristics of *śabda* obviously denote a sentence.

Gaṅgeśa defines *śabdapramāṇa* in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* as: "*atha śabdo nirūpyate. prayogahetubhūtārthatattvajñānajanayaḥ śabdaḥ pramāṇam*"(1). According to him, the word, which is caused by the speaker's knowledge of facts and which causes an utterance of that word, only can be taken as *śabdapramāṇa*.

In *Tarkasaṅgraha*, Annambhaṭṭa defines *śabda* as; "*āptavākyaṃ śabdaḥ*" (1971, p.65). He is also of the view that *śabda* is the sentence, uttered by a trustworthy person. Govardhana, while commenting on this statement, says that a trustworthy person is the person who has the knowledge of an object which is the cause of verbal expression (*Nyāyabodhini*, 1971, p.65). In all these definitions, the word *śabda* is used in the technical sense of a sentence.

Mīmāṃsā philosophy contributed much in the scenario of *śābdabodha* or verbal cognition. This school admits the unquestioned authenticity of Vedas, which are in the form of *śabda*. Thus *śabdapramāṇa* is one of the most important valid sources of knowledge in this philosophy. They also accept *śabdapramāṇa* in the form of sentence. Śabara, the author of the *Bhāṣya* of *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras*, opines that "*śāstram*

śabdavijñānād asannikṛṣṭe' rthe vijñānam" (Under Jaimini, 1.1.5). He clarifies this statement saying that "*yaḥ śabdaḥ svaviśayakajñānena mānāntaraprāptābādhitārthajñānaṃ janayati sa pramāṇam*". That word, which is already known and gives rise to the cognition and that is not known by any other valid means of knowledge or *pramāṇa* and also not contradicted subsequently, is known as *śabdapramāṇa*. Here, the word which gives rise to the cognition is also in the form of a sentence.

Vedānta also accepts *śabdapramāṇa* as a distinct valid source of knowledge. Vedāntadeśika defines *śabdapramāṇa* as "*anāptānuktavākyaṃ śabdaḥ*" (Quoted by Ramanuja Tatacharya, Introduction, 2005, p.9). According to this definition, the sentence, which is not uttered by an untrustworthy person, is the valid source of knowledge. In this statement, he uses two negatives '*na*', to affirm that the sentence uttered by a trustworthy person only should be considered as authentic. Thus, it can be applied to both Vedas, which are not uttered by anyone as well as secular statements, uttered by a trustworthy person. While in his *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Dharmarāja Adhvarin puts forth a different opinion that "*yasya vākyaṣya tātparyaviśayībhūtaḥ saṃsargaḥ mānāntareṇa na bādhyate tad vākyaṃ pramāṇam iti*" (1985, p.208). Here, the sentence which gives rise to a valid cognition of the relation between the words and is not cancelled by any other *pramāṇa* subsequently, is accepted as the

valid source of knowledge. In both the definitions, the term *vākya* is used and hence they also admit the authenticity of *śabda*. Hence it can be concluded that almost all Indian schools of thought, who accept *śabdapramāṇa*, accept it in the form of sentence.

2.3. Defining Sentence: Various Views

It is observed here that Indian philosophies have given *śabda* a prime position in their metaphysics and epistemology. Technically speaking, philosophies like *Mīmāṃsā* and *Nyāya* as well as the School of *Vyākaraṇa* have contributed much to the analysis of the concept of *śabda*. They have analysed words, sentences and their meaning in a scientific way. In addition to this, they have also discussed various philosophical as well as linguistic problems regarding words, sentences and their meaning.

Since these schools of thought accept *śabda* in the form of sentence as one among the *pramāṇas*, they have tried to define sentence in their own perspectives. Ancient texts of Indian philosophy have discussed about the concepts of *Vāk*, *śabda* etc, but none of them specifically define a sentence. A reference can be seen in *Bṛhaddevatā* that a sentence is the *saṅghāta* or collection of words ("*padasaṅghātajam vākyaṃ*", 2.117). Amarasimha gives two definitions of sentence; as a group of verbs and nouns and as a verb, which is connected with *kāraṅgas* ("*suptiṅgantacayo*

vākyam kriyā vā kārakānvitā", 1.6.2). Later, many scholars in different branches of knowledge have tried to define sentence in manifold ways according to their perspectives. This chapter tries to converge various views on the concept of sentence and sentence-meaning in Indian systems of knowledge.

2.3.1. Sentence According to the *Mīmāṃsā* School

Mīmāṃsā is the oldest system among the Indian Schools of thought, that tries to define a sentence. As stated, an early simple definition is seen in *Bṛhaddevatā*, one of the ancient works in *Mīmāṃsā* (2.117). It is in the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* of Jaimini that we first come across the real definition of a sentence. He states that "*arthaikatvād ekaṃ vākyam sākāṅkṣaṃ cedvibhāge syāt*" (2.1.46), which can be explained as, a group of words serving a single purpose forms a sentence, if on analysis, the separate words are found to have *ākāṅkṣā* or mutual expectancy. Kunjunni Raja opines that *Mīmāṃsakas* enunciate this principle so as to deal with the passages of *Yajurveda* (1963, p.152). Śabara also explains this aphorism as referring to the Vedic mantras only, and the term '*arthaikatva*' is interpreted in the sense of 'serving a single purpose' ("*yāvanti padāni ekaṃ prayojanam abhinirvartayanti tāvanti padāni ekaṃ vākyam*", under Jaimini, 2.2.26).

Though Jaimini coined this definition for explaining the Vedic sentences, it is capable of much more extended application. Bh reiterates this as one of the well-known definitions of sentence.

sākāṅkṣāvayavam bhede parāṅkāṅkṣāśabdakam

karmapradhānam guṇavadekārtham vākyamiṣyate. (VP, 2.4)

Kumārila also sets forth the same view that sentence is a group of words. He says: "it must be concluded that those words on hearing which we are clearly cognizant of a single idea, must be regarded as one sentence, either ordinary or of the *mantra* and *brāhmaṇa*" (Tantravārtika, 1984, p.586). He explains the word '*arthaikatva*' in the aphorism in the sense of 'single idea'. Among his followers, Pārthasārathimīśra favours the view of Śabara and explains the word '*artha*' in the sense of 'purpose' (Ganganatha Jha, 1942, p.190). Someśwarabhaṭṭa in his *Nyāyasudhā* commentary, takes the term in the sense of 'meaning' to admit a wider scope of the definition (1984, p.681). Śālikanātha refers to Prabhākara's view in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā*. Here, it states that a sentence is a group of words ("*padānyeva vākyam. padārthā eva vākyārtha iti gurumatasthitih*", 1961, p.377). Ganganatha Jha argues that according to Prabhākara, the word '*artha*' in the definition of Jaimini stands for 'meaning' as well as 'purpose', for both are interrelated. He says that the words of a sentence must be related to the purpose, which is the most important factor in a sentence (1942, p.190). If we analyse

these definitions, it may be noted that, like the *Naiyāyikas*, *Mīmāṃsakas* also accept the group of words as a sentence. But they lay stress on the necessity of *ākāṅkṣā* or syntactic expectancy among the words, in order to bring about the unity of idea or of purpose. Kunjunni Raja refers to some of the definitions of sentence found in *Śrautasūtras*, and he states that those definitions are based on the *Mīmāṃsā* views (1963, p.154).

Mīmāṃsakas do not admit a sentence as distinct from words and words as distinct from letters. Śabara refers to Upavarṣa, who says that the word 'gau' is constituted by the letters *g*, *au* and *visarjñīya*. Thus, syllables are comprehended by the sense of hearing and not anything different from it (Quoted by Tatacharya Introduction, 2005, p.15). Śabara then explains how the letters attain the status of a word. The last syllable associated with the latent impressions born out of the cognitions of each preceding syllable which gives rise to the cognition of the word meaning. In the same way the last word associated with the latent impressions of each word gives rise to sentence meaning.

Mīmāṃsākas refute the *sphoṭa* theory and the concept of indivisibility of the sentence, formulated by the grammarians. But they maintain that the articulate phonemes are eternal. Tatacharya summarises the view of *Mīmāṃsākas* as, *śabda* is none other than the articulated

syllables and they are eternal. They are associated together to form words and sentences.

*śrotragrāhyā varṇā eva śabdaḥ. teṣāmeva vācakatvam-
arthapratyāyakatvam. te kaṇṭhataīlvādyabhighātavyaṅgyāḥ nityā
vibhavaśca. ta eva varṇāḥ samuditāḥ
padavākyavyapadeśabhājo'rthapratyāyakā ityāhuḥ.* (Tatacharya, 2005,
p.115).

Thus, the *Mīmāṃsākas* admit the articulate phonemes are eternal, while the grammarians accept the eternity of sound in the form of sentence.

2.3.2. Sentence according to the *Nyāya* School

Gautama, in his *Nyāyasūtra*, refers to the word 'Vākya' in the aphorism "*vākyavibhāgasya cārthagrahaṇāt*" (2.1.161). But no precise definition of sentence is formulated by him. Vātsyāyana, in his commentary on the aphorism 2.1.54, states that a sentence consists of several units in the form of two or more words. Thus he considers sentence as that which is consisting of a group of words. Jayantabhaṭṭa makes his opinion that the absence of any reference to the sentence in *Nyāyasūtras* shows that the early *Naiyāyikas* treated the sentence to be merely a combination of words ("*kiṃ punaridaṃ padaṃ nāma, kiṃ ca vākyam iti uktam atra varṇasamūhaḥ padaṃ padasamūho vākyamiti*"),

1970, p.143). Vācaspatimiśra states that *varṇas* or syllables constitute a word and the collection of words denotes a sentence. He also opines that the semantic relation among word-meanings has been comprehended to give rise to the recollection of their meaning and then to the sentence-meaning which is unknown hitherto ("*tasmāt padāni kṛtasaṅketāni svārthaṃ smārayitvā ākāṅkṣā-yogyatā-āsatti-sādhricīnāni adṛṣṭapūrvam vākyaṛthaṃ bodhayanti*, 1967, p.178). Later scholars in *Nyāya* consider sentence as not mere combination of words, but group of words possessing *ākāṅkṣa*, *yogyatā* and *sannidhi*.

Among the later scholars, Keśavamiśra gives a vivid description about the nature of sentence in his *Tarkabhāṣā*. He defines sentence as the group of words possessing three qualities viz. *ākāṅkṣā* (verbal expectancy), *yogyatā* (congruity) and *sannidhi* (proximity) ("*vākyaṃ tu ākāṅkṣāyogyatāsannidhimatām padānām samūhaḥ*, 1995, p.121). Thus he says that a mere combination of words like '*gauḥ, aśvaḥ, puruṣaḥ, hastī*' etc. cannot be called a sentence, for it lacks verbal expectancy. Similarly the sentences like '*vahninā siñcati*' (spray with fire) is also not an authentic sentence as it lacks congruity. Fire cannot be taken as an instrument for the act of spraying. Similarly if one says the word '*gām*' and after a long interval, he says '*ānaya*', it will not form a sentence because of the absence

of proximity. Thus, he mentions that sentence is a group of words, which have these peculiarities;

- (i) Words produce the verbal expectancy in the listener's mind through the denotation of their meanings.
- (ii) They convey meanings that are capable of being connected without contradiction.
- (iii) They are close enough to produce the intended meaning without undue delay. (*arthapratipādanadvārā śrotuḥ padāntaraviṣayāṃ vākāṅkṣāṃ janayatāṃ, pratiyamāna-parasparānvaya-yogyatārtha-pratipādakānāṃ, sannihitānāṃ padānāṃ samūho vākyaṃ*, 1995, p.125).

When compared to the Old School of *Nyāya*, the Neo Logicians (*Navya Naiyāyikas*) have special interest in the concept of language and language analysis. Dr. L C Mullatti, argues in his thesis *The Navya Nyāya Theory of Inference* that the Neo Logicians gave much importance to sentences because of their special interest in the extra-linguistic entities, namely, cognitions.

There was, in fact, an important reason, for the *Navya Naiyāyikas*' interest in sentences. Though they did not realise it, they were inevitably faced with the problem of individuation of the extra-linguistic entities

they allowed, namely, cognitions. Lacking any other principle of individuation, they were forced to rely on linguistic considerations (1972, p.40).

This special emphasis on the concept of sentence and its analysis can be evidently seen in the works of Neo Logicians.

Udayana in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, one of the major works in the *Navya Nyāya* School, affirms that sentence is only a group of words. He also states that the group of words is not different from the words, which are its constituents. It is also known to him that words, which do not have the syntactic expectancy (*ākāñkṣā*), congruity (*yogyatā*) and proximity (*sannidhi*), do not constitute a sentence or verbal testimony (5.6). Another major work in this School, *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa too explains the nature of sentence as the group of words and it constitutes the cause of verbal cognition. He states that the words are the instrumental cause (*karaṇam*), the recollection of word-meaning is the intermediate cause (*vyāpāra*), the syntactic expectancy etc. are the auxiliary cause (*sahakārikāraṇam*) and the experience (*anubhava*) of the relation among the recollected word-meanings on the strength of the auxiliary cause is the fruit ("tasmāt padam karaṇam, padārthasmarāṇam vyāpārah, ākāñkṣādisahakāriṣāt smāritārthānvayānubhavaḥ phalam", 1990, p.548). A statement from *Tattvacintāmaṇi* is referred to in the work

Nyāyakośa as follows: "*vākyam padasamūhaḥ. vākyatvam ca viśiṣṭārthaparaśabdatvam*"(1978, p.730). It says that a sentence is a group of words; and the state of a sentence lies in giving rise to the cognition of the relation among the word-meanings.

Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā of Jagadīśa is one of the major works in *Navya Nyāya*, which specially focuses on the language theory of *Naiyāyikas*. He elaborately discusses on the nature of sentence. According to him, sentence is a group of words having mutual syntactic expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) etc. and which is conducive to give rise to a unified awareness of the connected meanings of the words ("*athavā yādṛśaśabdānām yādṛśārthaviṣayakabodham pratyānukūlā parasparākāṅkṣā, tādṛśaśabdastoma eva tathāvidhārthe vākyam*", 2002, p.12). Annambhaṭṭa also says that a word is that which have a semantic potential and a sentence is a group of such words ("*śaktaṃ padam. vākyam padasamūhaḥ*", *Tarkasaṅgraha*, 1971, p.151). Thus it can be concluded that *Naiyāyikas* accept sentence as a group of words having syntactic expectancy, congruity and proximity.

According to them, the collective form is not different from its units or parts and therefore a sentence is not different from the articulated alphabets. But how the articulated alphabets can be perceived as a

sentence is the problem to be solved. Vātsyāyana, in his *Nyāyabhāṣya*, tries to explain how the sentence is not distinct from the phonemes.

*vākyastheṣu khalu varṇeṣūccaratsu prativarṇam tāvat śravaṇam bhavati.
śrutam varṇamekamanekaṃ vā padabhāvena pratisandhatte.
pratisandhāya padaṃ vyavasyati. sambaddhāṃśca padārthān grhītvā
vākyārtham pratipadyate. (3.2.59)*

It is Jayantabhaṭṭa who discusses the matter elaborately in his *Nyāyamañjarī*. He says that initially, the cognition of the first phoneme is awakened and it is followed by its latent impression. Then the cognition of the second phoneme, followed by its latent impression takes place. In this manner, the latent impressions are awakened till the cognition of the last phoneme. In the end, when the last phoneme is heard, there occurs a single recollection comprehending all the phonemes and is the word. In the same way, there takes place the cognition of the first word followed by its latent impression and by the recollection of its significative relation to its meaning simultaneously. Thus the word-meaning is also cognised, followed by its latent impression. The same continues till the cognition of the last word. Thus due to the previous latent impressions, a recollection comprehending all the words is occurred and is the sentence. There happens another recollection based upon the latent impressions of all the word-meanings comprehending the meaning of the last word and is the

sentence-meaning (6.2). Similar view can be seen in *Nyāyalīlāvati* also as "*kiṃ tarhi prātipadikam? kramavadvarṇasamḥatiriti brūmaḥ*" (Quoted by Tatacharya, 2005, p.115).

Naiyāyikas, in contradiction with grammarians, do not accept the eternity of *śabda*. They refute the theory of *Sphoṭa* and the theory of sentence indivisibility, formulated by grammarians. Gautama refutes the view of *śabdanityatva* saying that *śabda* is not eternal, as it has a beginning and an end ("*ādīmatvāt-aindriyakatvāt kṛtakatvāt-upacārācca*", 2.2.13). As described, logicians accept sentence as an aggregate of phonemes. According to them, word is the meaningful unit of language ("*śaktam padam*", *Tarkasaṅgraha*, 1971, p.151). They refute the theory of *sphoṭa* and the theory of indivisibility of sentence because they hold that a word or a sentence becomes the source of valid knowledge when it is uttered by a trustworthy person. *Sphoṭa*, being eternal, does not owe its existence to a trustworthy person (Punitha Sarma, 1998, p.80).

2.3.3. Sentence According to the School of *Vyākaraṇa*

In the science of grammar, the early preceptors P, Kty and Ptj, also known as *Trimuni*, pointed out some aspects of sentence in their works. P has not given a vivid definition of sentence in his monumental work *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. But there are two occasions, where P hinted his views on

sentence. He refers to the term 'vākya' in the aphorism "*vākyaṣya ṭeḥ pluta udāttah*" (8.2.82). The whole idea of P about sentence can be traced in the aphorism "*samarthaḥ padavidhiḥ*" (2.1.1). Usually, *Mīmāṃsākas* are considered to be the first to promulgate the necessity of *ākāṅkṣā* among the meanings of the words in a sentence in order to bring about the unity of idea. But the necessity for interdependence of words to give a unified meaning was recognised even earlier by P, who conceived the concept of *ākāṅkṣā* by the word 'samartha' ("*samarthaḥ padavidhiḥ*, 2.1.1). This term has been variously interpreted by the commentators of P. Ptj states that according to some, the word *sāmarthya* denotes *vyapekṣā* or mutual connection pertaining to the meaning ("*parasparavyapekṣāṃ sāmarthyameke*", MB, 1991, p.365). This interpretation is similar to the concept of *ākāṅkṣā* given by the *Mīmāṃsākas*. Kty explains the term *sāmarthya* as *ekārthībhāva* or unification of meaning ("*prthagarthānām ekārthībhavaḥ sāmarthyam*, under P, 2.1.1). This implies the capability of words to make compounds in which, different words with different meanings are infused together to signify a unified meaning. This explanation of the term *sāmarthya* seems analogous to the condition of *arthaikatva* formulated by Jaimini, if it is interpreted as unity of meaning (Raja, 1963, p.155). Here P intends to say that the words are capable of forming either a sentence or a compound. When words possess

ekārthībhāvasāmarthya or the capability of giving a unified sense, they could make compound words, losing their individual meanings and acquire a special signification. Similarly when the words possess *vyapekṣārūpasāmarthya*, they could make sentences, in which they retain their own meanings, but are mutually related. Commentators like Kaiyaṭa are of this opinion; he says "*iha vyapekṣāyām samāso na bhavati, ekārthībhāve vākyaṃ neti*" (Under P, 2.1.1). Haradatta, in his work *Padamañjarī*, states that both *ekārthībhāva* and *vyapekṣā* are necessary in a compound word, because in the absence of mutual connection of meanings, words are not allowed to form a compound (Under P, 2.1.1). We can infer from these discussions that P has summarised all his ideas about sentence in the word *samartha*.

In Sanskrit Grammar, it was Kṭy, who did the first attempt to define a sentence. Ptj remarks that "*idam adyāpūrvam kriyate vākyaśaṃjñā samānavākyaādhikāraśca*" (MB, under P 2.1.1). Some scholars hold that because of this reason, Kṭy was also known as *Vākya-kāra* (Dr. Dhanurdhara Jha, 2002, p.5). Kṭy defines sentence in two perspectives as "*ekatiñvākyaṃ*" and "*ākhyātaṃ sāvyayakāra-kaviśeṣaṇaṃ vākyaṃ*" (Under P, 2.1.1). The former definition states that sentence is that which has one finite verb. But this definition is somewhat absurd in nature. There are obviously sentences having more than one finite verb like '*paśya mṛgo*

dhāvati" (behold, the animal runs). Later grammarians accept this as a single sentence as it gives a unified sense. Thus Kaiyaṭa interprets this definition in a different perspective as "*ekah, samānaḥ tiṅ yasmin tat ekatiṅ*" (Under P 2.1.1). Thus, from the formal surface level approach, such a sentence may be considered as a complex one made up of two simple sentences. But at the deep structure level, it has a semantic unity and thus it is considered as a single sentence. Thus Kṭy proposes the latter definition. According to this, there is only one verb in a sentence, the meaning of which is the primary substantive (*viśeṣya*) and the other words (including verbs) are adjectives (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the main verb. Thus in the above sentence, though there are two verbs, the meaning of the one (*paśya*) is the primary substantive and the meaning of the other (*dhāvati*) is only its attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*).

2.3.4. Sentence According to Other Schools

The subdivisions of the School of *Vedānta* viz. *Advaita*, *Viśiṣṭādvaita* and *Dvaita* Schools also deny the eternity of *śabda*, advocated by Bh and the concept of *sphoṭa*. Though any of these schools do not emphasise the concept of language and language analysis in the technical discussions, some glimpses can be found in several works of these schools. *Advaitins* admit that, letters, the objects of recollection, which results from the latent impressions born out of each letter, is the

word or sentence. Śaṅkara states that the letters generate the notion of a word thanks to their definite sequence (Under 1.3.28). This school also admit the necessity of syntactic expectancy etc. of words in a sentence. The *Viśiṣṭādvaitins* as well as *Dvaitins* also accept the same view as of Śaṅkara. According to them, letters constitute a word and the words constitute a sentence (Tatacharya, Introduction, 2005, p.xxx)

The *Sāṅkhya* system, like the *Naiyāyikas*, views sentence as the group of words and a word as the group of phonemes. The followers of this school reject the *sphoṭa* theory of the grammarians ("*pratītyapratītibhyām na sphoṭātmakaḥ śabdaḥ*", *Sāṅkhyasūtra*, 5.57) and the theory of eternity of letters, advocated by the *Mīmāṃsakas* ("*na śabdanityatvam kāryatāpratīteḥ*", *Sāṅkhyasūtra*, 5.58). In the Yoga system, the nature of sentence is explained in the aphorism "*śabdārthapratyayānāmitaretarādhyāsāt saṅkaraḥ tatpravibhāgasamyamāt sarvabhūtarutajñānam*" (3.17). According to this aphorism, the letters are uttered in a particular order and they become the content of a single cognition and thus constitute a single unit, word. Though the word is manifested by the final letter along with the latent impressions of previous letters, it does not have any reference to the sequence of letters. Thus the Yoga School accepts the nature of sentence similar to that of Grammarians (Tatacharya, Introduction, 2005, p.xxxiii).

2.4. Nature of Sentence-Meaning: Various Perspectives

Most of the Indian Schools of thought admit that a sentence is composed of words. They also accept that words have potentiality of expressing definite meanings. When they are connected together, a single cognition is awakened and is the sentence meaning. The preceptors of various branches of learning have been enquired this relation among the words in a sentence and their meanings, through which they are semantically connected to give a unified sense. This resulted in various theories regarding the cognition of the meaning of a sentence and is generally called theories of *śābdabodha* (verbal cognition).

If these theories of verbal cognition advocated by various philosophers are analysed, two distinct perspectives on the concept of *śābdabodha* can be found. They are *Khaṇḍaśābdabodha* (import by parts) and *Akhaṇḍaśābdabodha* (unitary import). In the first perspective, the import is produced by parts. Here, each word in the sentence is analysed on the basis of its attributives like *kartṛtva*, *karmatva* etc. The *Akhaṇḍa* school of *śābdabodha* implies the verbal import of the sentence as opposed to that by parts. Here, the entire meaning of the sentence is conveyed and thus in most of the *śāstra* works, the term *śābdabodha* refers only to the unitary import (Veluri Subba Rao, 1969, p. 4).

2.4.1. *Mīmāṃsakas'* View on Sentence-Meaning

Mīmāṃsakas generally maintain that sentence-meaning is the word-meaning related to another word-meaning. Śabara states that sentence-meaning is the aggregate of the meanings of its parts. He emphasizes that sentence-meaning is neither without any basis, nor is based upon the significative relation (Under Jaimini, 1.1.7). Again he stresses upon the point that sentence-meaning is not the significance of words. Thus, a word-meaning, which is not related to another word-meaning do not constitute the sentence-meaning (Under Jaimini, 3.2.1.1). According to him, a word conveys the universal (*sāmānya*) while a sentence conveys a particular (*viśeṣa*) (Under Jaimini, 1.1.24). This statement is explained in *Bṛhatī* as: a sentence conveys a particular, because of the interconnection of word-meanings. The state of words which are not connected to each other is universal (Under Jaimini, 1.1.24). When isolated, a word signifies its meaning, which is universal in nature. For example when one says '*śuklām gām ānaya*', the word '*śuklām*' in isolation signifies the white colour, which is universal. Similarly the word '*gām*' in isolation denotes any cow, which is not characterised by its colour. When these words come together to form a sentence they lose their universal significance and denote a connected sense, which is particular. Śabara repeats the same view in several contexts in his commentary

("viśiṣṭārthasampratyayaśca vākyārthaḥ", Under Jaimini, 1.1.25; "padārthaiḥ samskṛtaḥ piṇḍitaḥ arthaḥ vākyārthaḥ", 1.1.8.32). The conclusive view of Śabara on sentence-meaning is that, the meanings of words, which are universal in nature, when connected together, gives the sentence meaning, which is particular. Thus the meaning of a sentence is none other than *saṃsarga* (interconnection) of its constituent words.

In *Tantravārtika*, it is stated that "*ākṛtipadārthapakṣe śuklathvagotvayoḥ swarūpeṇa abhihitayoḥ sannidhānāt itaretarānurañjanam arthasidhabhedam vākyārthaḥ*" (2.1.14.46). Here, the word '*itaretarānurañjanam*' refers to *saṃsarga* (interconnection of words). Śālikanātha describes the nature of sentence-meaning from the point of view of Prabhākara. He states that a sentence is the collection of words and the word meanings together constitute the sentence-meaning. But it is to be noted that, one word-meaning is primary and when it is associated with the meanings of the other words in a sentence, which are secondary, gives the sentence-meaning (Tatacharya, Introduction, 2005, p.25).

After hearing the words in a sentence, the listener manifests a unitary sense, by the mutual association of word-meanings. Here, it may be doubted that, whether this unitary sense is manifested directly from the collection of the words, or indirectly through the recollection of the meanings of the individual words that comprises it. These two views give

rise to two theories of explaining the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence namely *Anvitābhīdhāna* and *Abhihitānvaya* theories. The *Prābhākara* School of *Mīmāṃsā* and its followers take the former view, while the *Bhāṭṭa* School of *Mīmāṃsā* and some of the *Naiyāyikas* accept the *Abhihitānvaya* theory of verbal comprehension.

2.4.1.1. *Abhihitānvaya* and *Anvitābhīdhāna* Theories of Sentence-Meaning

If every word has its own definite meaning, how is it possible for a sentence, which is only a collection of words, to have a unified meaning? The same problem arises in the case of compound words also (Raja, 1963, p.191). At this point, various philosophers hold different theses. Bh presents his views on these theories by presenting the *Vākyavādin-Padavādin* controversy discussed in the second canto of VP. Among them, *Abhihitānvayavāda* and *Anvitābhīdhānavāda* are the most important theories. These two views explain how a sentence is imported to cognize the meaning of it.

2.4.1.1.1. *Abhihitānvaya* Theory

According to this theory, each word in a sentence expresses a complete meaning, which can be comprehended separately. When a sentence is heard, the listener first understands the separate meanings of

the words one after the other. The isolated word-meanings, expressed successively by the words are put together by the collective memory of the listener which is termed as *samūhālaṃbanasmṛti*. The individual word meanings are remembered separately until all the words are heard. Then the simultaneous cognition of the sentence-meaning takes place by putting together these word-meanings according to the three factors namely *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *sannidhi*. The listeners can cognize the meaning of the sentence by this process. Thus the followers of this theory advocate that the meaning of a sentence is a concatenation of the individual meanings expressed by its parts (Raja, 1963, p.203).

Kunjunni Raja suggests that this theory is deep-rooted in the views of the great grammarian Vājapyāyana and thus it is one of the earliest theories about the nature of sentence-meaning. Vājapyāyana advocates that the meaning of the sentence is *saṃsarga* or the mutual association of the individual word-meanings (Raja, 1963, p.205). *Abhihitānvayavādins* argue that Śabara seems to refer to this theory when he says: "*padāni hi svam svam artham abhidāya nivṛttavyāpārāṇi, athedānīm padārthāvagataḥ santo vākyārthaṃ gamayanti*" (Under Jaimini, 1.1.25). In a sentence, words cease to function after expressing their own meanings. Then the meanings of the words, thus known, give rise to the sentence meaning. Kumārilabhaṭṭa, the founder of the *Bhāṭṭa* School propagated this theory

by giving it an important role in his philosophy. He affirms that the meaning of the sentence is always conveyed by the meanings of the words expressed by the individual words ("*padārthaiḥ padavijñātaiḥ vākyārthaḥ pratipādyate*", 1983, p.445). According to him, a sentence cannot signify a meaning, independent of its parts. Words in a sentence first express their meaning independently and then the connection among these word-meanings is established. This leads to the cognition of sentence-meaning and the three requisites *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *sannidhi* constitute the grounds of relationship among word-meanings (1983, p.455).

Many preceptors rightly observed that the sentence-meaning is something more than the sum of the individual word-meanings. Ptj is in favour of this view, when he states "*yadatrādhikyam vākyārthaḥ saḥ*" (MB, 1991, p.462). Bh also explains the nature of sentence-meaning in the similar manner.

saṁbandhe sati yattvanyadādhikyam upajāyate

vākyārthameva taṁ prāhuranekapadasaṁśrayam. (VP, 2.42)

Mammaṭabhaṭṭa describes this view vividly in his *Kāvya prakāśa*. He says that when the meanings of the different words in a sentence are related with one another on the basis of mutual expectancy etc. some

additional signification is known, which is distinct from the totality of the separate word-meanings

*ākāṅkṣāyogyatāsannidhivaśāt padārthānāṃ samanvaye tātparyārtho
viśeṣavapurapadārtho' pi vākyārthaḥ samullasatīti
abhihitānvayavādināṃ matam. (2.6)*

This additional meaning is called in various names such as *vākyārtha*, *saṃsarga* and *tātparyārtha*.

How is this *saṃsarga* conveyed? Where does this additional meaning come from? These vexed questions need to be explained to understand the *Abhihitānvaya* theory better. The individual words are not capable to convey the special signification, for they cease to function after expressing their individual meanings. Between the words and sentence-meaning, there lie the word-meanings and thus, word-meanings convey the sentence-meaning in the form of *saṃsarga*. This view of *Abhihitānvayavādins* is well explained in *Mānameyodaya* (93). The followers of *Bhāṭṭa* School claim that sentence-meaning is conveyed by the secondary power of words ("*vākyārtho lakṣyamāṇo hi sarvatraiveti naḥ sthitiḥ*", Kumārilabhaṭṭa, quoted in *Tattvabindu*, 1936, p.153).

Naiyāyikas also admit the theory of *Abhihitānvaya*, with slight differences. But according to them, the sentence-meaning is only the

mutual relation of word-meanings. *Navya Naiyāyikas* like Udayana and Gaṅgeśa reject the *Anvitābhidhāna* point of view and advocates the *Abhihitānvaya* theory of verbal cognition. But this view differs slightly from that of Kumābila. According to them, the word-meanings do not constitute the cause of verbal cognition, but the words alone constitute such a cause. The words give rise to the recollection of their meanings, which, owing to *ākāṅkṣā*, get themselves related to one another and the relation is the sentence-meaning (*Nyāyakusumāñjali*, 1980, p.216; *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, 1990, p.548-549). Jayanta examines both the views of verbal comprehension in his *Nyāyamañjarī* and records two views, viz. *anvīyamānābhidhāna* and *Abhidhīyamānānvaya*. Rejecting these two views, he sets forth his own view as: the words in a sentence convey their meanings and the words have the power of conveying the meaning of the sentence also, which is known as *tātparyā* (6.2). It is to be noted here that the cognition of specific relation of one word-meaning to another (*tātparyā*) cannot be treated as verbal. *Advaitavedānta* also admit the theory of *Abhihitānvaya*. Śaṅkara in his *Bhāṣya* on Brahmasūtra, expresses his preference to this theory (Under Brahmasūtra, 1.1.4). It is clear from the discussions that almost all systems thought, except the *Prābhākara* School of *Mīmāṃsā* and *Vaiyākaraṇas*, accept this view of comprehending sentence-meaning.

2.4.1.1.2. *Anvitābhīdhāna* Theory

As stated, this theory is held by the followers of the *Prābhākara* School of *Mīmāṃsā*. When a speech act is carried out, both the speaker and the listener are concerned with the meaning of the sentence, and not with the meanings of individual word-meanings. Thus Prabhākara opines that words do not convey a meaning except in the context of a sentence. Like the *Abhihitānvayavādins*, this school also upholds that the meaning of a sentence is cognized by the individual word-meanings and their mutual relation. But, what is peculiar to this view is that, the individual word-meanings and their relation are conveyed by the words themselves. They assert that it is impossible to comprehend the isolated meaning of a word apart from its relation in a sentence. The words convey their meanings only as related to one another in a sentence. Thus, each word denotes a connected meaning, and not its individual meaning, in the sentence. The *Anvitābhīdhānavādins* admit that the words are capable to convey its meaning as well as the relation. Hence the sentence-meaning is directly conveyed by the words themselves.

ākāṅkṣāsannidhiprāptayogyārthāntarasaṅgatān

svārthān āhuḥ padānīti vyutpattiḥ samśritā mayā.

(*Vākyaarthamātrkāvṛtti*, quoted by Raja, 1963, p.98).

This is the central idea of the theory of *Anvitābhidhāna* propounded by Prabhākara and his followers.

This can be well explained by an example. In the sentence '*gamānaya*' (bring the cow), the word 'cow' does not denote an isolated meaning of 'cowness'. But it signifies the cow, which is related to the action of bringing. Similarly, the word 'bring' does not signify the action of bringing in general, but related to the cow. Thus the words in this sentence express their own meaning, at the same time, the syntactical relationship between them also. It can be deduced that the words in a sentence directly convey the sentence meaning.

This view of comprehending a sentence is so close to the psychological analysis rather than the linguistic analysis in nature. Hence the psychological factors behind the language act can be analysed through this theory. The followers of this theory emphasize on the natural method of language analysis by which the children learn the meaning of words. They observe the speech act of elders and their activity following the utterance, and they come to know the significance of the words. When a person says to another 'bring the cow', the latter brings the cow accordingly. A child, who hears the sentence uttered by the former and observes the action that follows, understands that the sentence 'bring the cow' signifies an action of bringing the cow. Later, the speaker again says

'bring the horse' and the latter brings a horse. Observing this, the child again infers that the sentence 'bring the horse' signifies the action of bringing horse. By comparing these two sentences, he understands that the word 'bring' is common in the two sentences and it must denote the command to bring and the two different words 'cow' and 'horse' must refer to the two different animals. Thus, by the mental process of exclusion and inclusion (*āvāpa* and *udvāpa*), the child develop a general idea of the meaning of the individual words. Later, the child is able to understand the meaning of even a new sentence containing the words he has already come across. This is well explained in the *Śabdakhaṇḍa* of *Sidhāntamuktāvalī*.

*evam vyavahārādapi yathā prayojakavṛddhena ghaṭamānayetuktaṃ
tacchrutvā prayojyavṛddhena ghaṭa ānīstavadadhārya pārśvastho bālo
ghaṭānayanarūpakāryaṃ ghaṭamānayeti
śabdaprayojyamityavadhārayati. tataśca ghaṭaṃ naya gāṃ
badhānetyādivākyād āvāpodvāpābhyam ghaṭādipadānām
kāryānvi taghaṭādau śaktiṃ grhṇāti. ----- prathamataḥ
kāryānvi taghaṭādau śaktyavadhāraṇe' pi lāghavena paścāttasya
parityāgaucityāt. (1988, p.561-563)*

Kunjuni Raja opines that, the *Anvitābhidhāna* view is accepted by the ancient *Mīmāṃsakas* Jaimini and Śabara (1963, p.199). The passage from *Śabarabhāṣya*, which was argued by the *Abhihitānvayavādins* to

support their view, is criticized as fallacious, by the followers of this school (Under Jaimini, 1.1.25). They explain the same passage as supporting their view. According to this, words convey their meaning as qualified by one another. Abhinavagupta refers to this theory in his *Locana* as '*dirghavyāpāravāda*'. This is because in this theory, there is no limit to the extent of meaning that an expression can convey (Quoted by Raja, 1963, p.199).

These two theories of verbal cognition propounded by the *Sakhaṇḍa* School differ in many perspectives. The followers of these theories raise objection against each other. But modern scholars have tried to reconcile the two theories. Mukulabhaṭṭa says that, both these theories contain partial truth. When the comprehension of a sentence is analysed from the point of view of the words, the *Abhihitānvaya* theory seems to be preferable. But when it is viewed from the point of view of the sentence, the *Anvitābhidhāna* theory must be given the preference (Raja, 1963, p.212). Bh analyses these two theories when he discusses the definitions of sentence. He concludes that both the theories reveal only partial truth and thus sentence is indivisible *sphoṭa* and sentence meaning is *Pratibhā*, the undivided semantic unit flashes in the mind.

2.4.2. *Naiyāyikas'* View on Sentence-Meaning

Nyāyaśāstra is renowned as '*Pramāṇasāstra*', and hence, the concept of sentence and sentence-meaning are not the only concern of it. As Jayantabhaṭṭa states, the ancient *Naiyāyikas* did not give much importance to the discussions on language (1970, p.143). But it is to be noted that the School of *Navya Nyāya* took the matter seriously and made remarkable contribution in the study of language. For them, sentence is the collection of words and sentence-meaning is the collection of word-meanings. *Śābdabodha* is the term they use to represent the cognition of the meaning of a sentence. It is already discussed that *Naiyāyikas* also admit the theory of *Abhihitānvaya*, with a slight difference from that of the *Bhāṭṭa* School of *Mīmāṃsā*, to explain the process of verbal cognition. Thus, the mutual connection between the word-meanings or *saṃsarga* is the sentence-meaning. In *Kārikāvalī*, Viśvanātha expounds the complete process of verbal cognition in a single verse

padajñānantu karaṇaṃ dvāraṃ tatra padārthadhīḥ

śābdabodhaḥ phalaṃ tatra śaktidhīḥ sahakāriṇī. (1988, p.546)

Laugākṣi Bhāskara states that the meaning of a sentence consists in the mutual relation of the meanings expressed by the words ("*padopasthitānāṃ mithaḥ saṃsargaḥ vākyārthaḥ*", *Tarkakaumudī*, 1886,

p.44). According to Jagadīśa, sentence-meaning is the mutual relation of word-meanings, and in this relation, one meaning is correlated with another (*Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, 2002, p.22). Thus, it is obvious that almost all scholars in the School of *Nyāya* accept the mutual relation of word-meanings as the sentence-meaning. It must be noted that, according to this philosophy, sentence-meaning is not to be taken as the primary or secondary meanings of a sentence. It is because this school does not accept either the primary significatory power (*śakti*) or the secondary one (*lakṣaṇā*) in a sentence. To the *Naiyāyikas*, word is the meaningful unit of language and they express their primary meaning through *śakti*. *Śakti* is the will of God, which determines the meaning of the word ("asmāt padādayamartho boddhavya itīśvarecchā śaktiḥ", *Tarkasaṅgraha*, 1971, p.151). *Navya Naiyāyikas* describe *śakti* as the will of the speaker, which assigns the meaning to the word.

Though the ancient works of the *Nyāya* School did not emphasize on the discussions related with language studies, later texts like *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, *Vyutpattivāda*, *Nyāyamañjarī*, *Bhāṣāratnam* etc. give special stress on *Naiyāyika's* view about the complex phenomenon of verbal cognition. In the *Nyāya* tradition, Jayanta, the author of *Nāyamañjarī*, was the first, who elaborately discuss the concept of sentence-meaning. In this work, he discussed the theories of verbal

comprehension in detail. He refers to diverse views held by the preceptors ("*tatra vipratipattiśca bahurūpā vipaścitām*", 1970, p.300), and rejects all these views. Besides, he also refutes the Grammarians' theory of *Pratibhā*, *Anvitābhīdhānavāda* and *Abhihitānvayavāda* (1970, p.335). After rejecting all these views, Jayanta introduces a unique idea about the cognition of sentence-meaning, known as '*tātparyavāda*'. According to him, the word *tātparya* signifies the power of word which conveys the related meaning of the words in a sentence. Thus Jayanta states that *tātparya* is the cause of the cognition of sentence meaning. In *Navya Nyāya*, this power of words is called '*saṃsargamaryādā*'. In the School of *Navya Nyāya*, this term refers to the syntactic expectancy of words (*ākāṅkṣā*). Gadādharaḥaṭṭa remarks that the meaning of a sentence, which is the relation that exists among the individual meanings of the words, is put forth by the *saṃsargamaryādā* or the syntactic expectancy ("*ekapadārthe' parapadārthasya saṃsargaḥ saṃsargamaryādayā bhāsate*", *Vyutpattivāda*, 1973, p.1).

Thus *Naiyāyikas* reject all the different views regarding the verbal comprehension of a sentence presented by the other systems such as Grammar, *Mīmāṃsā* etc. They maintain that the verb in a sentence is not important, but the nominative substantive (*prathamāntārtha*) is the primary

substantive (*mukhyaviśeṣya*) in the sentence. All the remaining parts in a sentence are the qualifiers of that word⁶.

2.4.3. Sentence-Meaning in Other Systems of Knowledge

In the School of Grammar, ancient preceptors like P, Kty and Ptj have not explicitly discussed on the nature of sentence meaning. Still, some remarkable observations can be found in their works. P comprised all his ideas on the concept of sentence in the aphorism "*samarthaḥ padavidihīḥ*" (2.1.1). While commenting upon the aphorism "*prātipadikārthaliṅgaparimāṇavacanamātre prathamā*" (P, 2.3.46), Ptj observes that adjectival-substantive relation is something different from the word meanings and it is the sentence meaning (MB, under P, 2.3.46). Kaiyaṭa states that sentence is *mukhyaśabda* (prime word), and the sentence-meaning is the *mukhyaśabdārtha* (prime meaning). This view of sentence-meaning is in the nature of the relation among the word-meanings (Under P, 1.2.45). While commenting upon this statement, Nageśa points out that there is a relation between a sentence and its meaning, known as *śakti* (Udyota, under P, 1.2.45).

An ancient grammarian Vyāḍi has also presented some unique views on the nature of sentence meaning. He holds that the meaning of a

⁶ This view if Nayayikas will be explained later under 2.5.2

word is any particular of a class (*dravya*). According to him, the function of a word in a sentence is to distinguish the thing it signifies, from all the similar things. Thus, the meaning of a sentence cannot be taken as the mutual connection of the word-meanings, but the mutual exclusion of those meanings. The early stages of the *apoha* doctrine maintained by the Buddhists can be traced in these views of Vyāḍi (Raja, 1963, p.193).

The Buddhist tradition has remarkable contributions in the semantic analysis of words and sentences. The idea of the Buddhist logicians about the essence of meaning is known as *apohavāda* (the theory of *apoha*). They maintain that the essence of meaning is characterised by negation and that words have no direct reference to objective realities. Dinnāga, the famous Buddhist logician states that words deal directly with *vikalpas*, which are the conceptual images constructed in the mind. Therefore the relation between the words and the external object is not real. The conceptual image, denoted by a word is characterised by the negation of all its counter-correlates or *anyāpoha*. ("*vikalpayonayaḥ śabdāḥ vikalpāḥ śabdayonayaḥ*", Dinnāga, quoted by Raja, 1963, p.78fn). This is the core of the theory of *apoha*, developed by the Buddhists.

This concept of negative approach to the meaning is also admitted in the case of compounds and sentences, by the Buddhists. In the compound word 'blue lotus', the term blue excludes all lotuses that are not

blue, and the term lotus excludes all the blue things that are not lotuses. Thus the expression signifies the exclusion of non blue and non lotus. A sentence meaning is also imported in the same way. Though the meanings of the individual words are treated as negative, the import of a sentence is taken as positive in nature. This theory of negative approach towards meaning, has been criticised by the *Mīmāṃsākas* and *Naiyāyikas*. But in recent times, similar concepts about meaning have been developed by modern linguists like Ferdinand De Saussure (Raja, 1963, p.85).

2.5. Three Views on the Semantic Interpretation of Sentence

The semantic interpretation of a sentence is called verbal cognition or verbal import, through which, the relation among the meanings of the words in a sentence is comprehended. Among the meanings of individual words in a sentence, one is manifested as *mukhyaviśeṣya* (primary substantive). Different systems hold different views regarding the primary substantive in a sentence. Generally, there are three views on the semantic interpretation of a sentence. These three views differ from one another regarding the primary substantive in the sentence. These views are discussed here in a nutshell.

2.5.1. Theory of *Vyāpārārthamukhyaviśeṣyakaśābdabodha*

Grammarians generally accept *vyāpāra* or activity, which is the

meaning of the verbal root as the primary substantive. According to them, when the desired activity is performed, the goal is realized. Thus in a sentence, the root-meaning is the primary substantive and the meanings of remaining parts are treated as qualifiers. They refer to the statement in *Nirukta* "*bhāvapradhānamākhyātā*" (4), in which, the word *bhāva* denotes the root-meaning, and the root simultaneously denotes *vyāpāra* (activity) and *phala* (result) ("*phalavyāpārayordhāturāśraye tu tīnaḥ smṛtāḥ*", *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakārikā*, 1). Among them, *vyāpāra* is primarily qualified (*viśeṣya*) in a sentence, while the other meaning *phala* is only attributive (*viśeṣaṇa*) to the former. The suffix in the verb denotes *kāla* (substratum factor) and *āśraya* (number factor) and these two are (*viśeṣaṇa*) to the action (*kriyā*). Thus, the sentence, "*caitraḥ grāmaṃ gacchati*" (caitra goes to the village), gives rise to the cognition in the form '*caitrābhinnakārṭṛkaḥ grāmaniṣṭhasamyogānukūlaḥ vartamānakālikaḥ vyāpāraḥ*'. Even if the sentence is in passive voice, the cognition is the same.

2.5.2. Theory of *Prathamāntārthamukhyaviśeṣyakaśābdabodha*

Naiyāyikas uphold that the primary substantive (*mukhyaviśeṣya*) of the sentence is the meaning of the noun in the nominative case. The meanings of the remaining parts are only qualifiers. According to them,

the cognition that arises from the sentence "*caitraḥ grāmaṃ gacchati*", is as: '*grāmaniṣṭhasamyogānukūlavypārānukūlakṛtyāśrayaḥ caitraḥ*'.

2.5.3. Theory of *Akhyātārthamukhyaviśeṣyakaśābdabodha*

According to the *Mīmāṃsakas*, *bhāvanā* or the idea of action, which is the meaning of *ākhyāta* or verbal suffix is the primary substantive (*mukhyaviśeṣya*) of the sentence. Yāska states that "*bhāvapradhānamākhyātam*" (2002, p.4). *Mīmāṃsakas* explain the statement as: the word *bhāva* has reference only to the action or *bhāvanā* and not to the root-meaning as argued by the grammarians. Thus the sentence 'caitra goes to the village' can be explained as: '*caitraniṣṭhagrāmasamyogānukūlavypārānukūlā kṛtiḥ*'.

Apart from these three views, some scholars put forth their own perspectives regarding the primary substantive in the sentence. Jayantabhaṭṭa describes that *phala* (the result), the meaning of the verbal root is the primary substantive (*mukhyaviśeṣya*). The school of *Viśiṣṭādvaita* uphold that, the meaning of the verbal suffix is the agent (*kartā*) and is the primary substantive (*mukhyaviśeṣya*) in the verbal cognition (Tatacharya, introduction, 2005, p.43).

2.6. Requisites for Understanding the Sentence-Meaning

It is already discussed that *śābdabodha* is the term used by Indian

Linguists to map the process of cognition of sentence meaning. In the *Sakhaṇḍa* School, the sentence is an aggregate of its parts which are syntactically connected (*sākāṅkṣam*). The knowledge of this syntactic unity of sentence is mainly due to *ākāṅkṣā* or the mutual expectancy of words, *yogyatā* (congruity or consistency of the meaning) and *āsatti* or *sannidhi* (proximity) of words. These three inevitable conditions for the understanding of sentence-meaning were first introduced by the *Mīmāṃsākas*.

ākāṅkṣā sannidhānam ca yogyatā ceti ca trayam

saṃbandhakāraṇatvena kṛptaṃ nānantaraśrutiḥ. (Tantravārtika, 1984, p.455)

Later, these concepts were taken up by almost all the other systems of knowledge in the *Sakhaṇḍa* School of sentence, with slight changes. In addition to these three, a fourth condition known as *tātparyajñāna*, was also introduced. It is the intention of the speaker or the general purport of the sentence.

2.6.1. *Ākāṅkṣā* (Syntactic Expectancy)

The word '*ākāṅkṣā*' is derived from the root '*kāṅkṣ'* which signifies 'to desire'. Thus, the term literally means the desire to know something. Vācaspatimiśra defines *ākāṅkṣā* as the desire to know on the part of the

listener (Tatacharya, Introduction, 2005, p.44). It can be simply defined as the desire on the part of the listeners to know other words or their meaning to complete the sense. A word is said to have mutual expectancy for another, only if it cannot, without the latter, produce knowledge of its interconnection in an utterance (Raja, 1963, p.156). In a sentence, a word (noun or verb) always require another word to complete the meaning of the sentence. If one says "*gāmānaya*" (bring the cow), the verb 'bring' requires a noun in the nominative case to complete the sentence-meaning. At the same time, a series of words such as 'cow, horse, man, elephant' does not convey a unified sense, as there is no connection between them because of the absence of *ākāṅkṣā*.

Ākāṅkṣā can be of two types viz. *utthitākāṅkṣā* and *utthāpyākāṅkṣā*. The former is the actual expectancy of one word for the other to give a unified sense. The latter is the potential expectancy which could be awakened if necessary. For example, when one says to another "bring the cow", the latter may ask the question "which colour?" Then the speaker has to imply an adjective like 'white', 'black' etc. These potential expectancies have no limit because it can be awakened when the listener necessitates (S C Chatterjee, 1939, p.367). While expounding this concept, Raja refers to two types of *ākāṅkṣā*, described by the *Naiyāyikas*; one is psychological and the other is syntactical or grammatical (1963, p.163).

The grammatical expectancy between the words in a sentence necessitates the syntactic completeness of the sentence, while the psychological expectancy gives rise to the semantic unity of the sentence. It is well explained by Nāgeśa, the great grammarian, as; *ākāñkṣā* is the desire on the part of the listeners on hearing a word in a sentence to know the idea, which can be related to its meaning in order to get a complete sense (Paramalaghumañjūṣā, 1985, p.33). Here, the expectancy is on the part of listeners and is superimposed on words and their meanings.

2.6.2. *Yogyatā* (Congruity)

Yogyatā is defined as the logical compatibility of the words in a sentence for the mutual association ("*arthābādho yogyatā*", *Tarkasaṅgraha*, 1971, p.154). The sense or non sense of a sentence depends upon this concept. Sālikanātha gives a vivid explanation on the nature of *yogyatā* in his *Vākyārthamāṭṛkāvr̥tti*. He states that the capability of words in a sentence for mutual association and this competence is to be known from experience (Quoted by Raja, 1963, p.164). Almost all the philosophers explain this by illustrating the sentence '*agninā siñcati*' (He drenches with fire). When one says 'he drenches with water', there is *yogyatā* or the consistency of the meaning, since drenching is normally done with a liquid substance like water. Thus, the sense of drenching and that of water have no incompatibility. But in the sentence

'he drenches with fire', the idea of drenching is not compatible with that of fire. Thus we cannot say there is *yogyatā*.

There are combinations which are inconceivable and conceivable in the world. 'A circular square' is a combination that cannot be conceived in any way. The ideas like 'the rabbit's horn' or 'the son of an infertile woman' can be conceived anyway, but are against the experience. The latter example may be incompatible with reality, but it does not prevent the verbal comprehension. Bh and Kumārila are in favour of this view (V.P, 1.155; *Ślokavārtika*, 46). Sometimes the lack of *yogyatā* points to the metaphorical meaning of a word in the sentence. According to some scholars the apparent incompatibility of the expressed sense is an essential condition for *lakṣaṇā* (Raja, 1963, p.166).

2.6.3. *Sannidhi* (Proximity)

Sannidhi or *āsatti* is generally defined as the condition that the utterance of the words in a sentence should be contiguous in time ("*padānām avilambenocchāraṇam sannidhiḥ*, *Tarkasaṅgraha*, 1971, p.154). In other words, this is the uninterrupted utterance of words then they are in juxtaposition. When a person utters words at long intervals of time, they cannot establish any interrelation among them. What is worthy of note here is that the mere immediate sequence of utterance does not

give rise to *sannidhi*. Kumārilabhaṭṭa calls this immediate sequence of utterance as *anantaraśruti*. He distinguishes *sannidhi* from *anantaraśruti* as the continuous apprehension of words or their meaning in the mind (*Tantravārtika*, 1984, p.455). Prabhākara describes this concept in a different perspective. He believes that *sannidhi* is only the contiguity of cognition of the sense and not necessarily of words actually uttered (Raja, 1963, p.167). According to the *Navya Nyāya* School, even if the words are separated, there is *sannidhi* as in the case of a verse. They hold that the meanings of the words are recollected without any interruption through their expressive power. This recollection is termed as *samūhālaṃbanasmṛti* or collective cognition.

2.6.4. Tātparya (Import)

Apart from the three auxiliary causes of knowing the sentence meaning, described, some Indian Schools of thought like *Nyāya*, *Vedānta* etc accept the knowledge of the intention of speaker as the fourth cause. Generally, it can be defined as being uttered with the desire of producing a certain meaning. It is to be noted that different philosophers maintain different views in accepting *tātparya* or speaker's intention as the cause of comprehending the sentence-meaning. This difference is due to their views as to the nature of the knowledge derived from language. *Naiyāyikas* give great importance to the speaker's intention in fixing the

meaning of an utterance. The reason is that, they accept *śabda* as one of the means of valid knowledge, only when it is uttered by a trustworthy person. Thus, the intention of the trustworthy person is important for them. According to them, in Vedic sentences as well as in ordinary sentences, it is the intention that precedes the cognition of meaning. In the case of Vedic sentences, they assume the intention of God (even in the case of the parrot, imitating the utterance of people, *Naiyāyikas* assume the intention of God; "*śukavākye bhagavadicchaiva gatiḥ*", *Nyāyakośa*, 1978, p.326). It is again mentioned that, in ordinary sentences, the meaning is associated to the word by intention. The word '*ghaṭa*' in the sentence '*ghaṭamānaya*' signifies pot by the intention of the speaker.

*pare tu ghaṭādiśabdasthale' pi ghaṭapadam kumbhaparam lakṣaṇayā
paṭaparam veti samśāye ghaṭaśābdabodhābhāvāt sarvatra
tātparyaniścayaḥ kāraṇamityāhuḥ*, (*Nyāyakośa*, 1978, p.327).

If this extreme view is accepted, the normal signification of words would always depend on the intention of the speaker, which makes the linguistic communication impossible.

Thus, *Vedāntins* and *Mīmāṃsakas* reject this view of *Naiyāyikas*. They maintain that every word has an inherent capacity to express its meaning. Similarly a sentence is also capable of expressing a unified sense

in the form of the mutual association of the word-meanings. Generally, *Mīmāṃsakas* believe in the theory of '*apauruṣeya*', in which, the verbal comprehension has no reference to the speaker at all. They also maintain that the interconnection between word and meaning is inherent. Hence a sentence, though unintelligible to the speaker, has an inherent capacity to convey its meaning (Raja, 1974, p.213). Though the *Vedāntins* are against the views of *Naiyāyikas*, they admit, however, the role of speaker's intention in knowing the sentence-meaning. According to them, the speaker's intention has a vital role in comprehending the meaning of ambiguous sentences. Thus it can be assumed that, by the term '*tātparya*', *Naiyāyikas* refer to the meaning intended by the speaker. While *Mīmāṃsakas* and *Vedāntins* use the term to denote the meaning conveyed by the capacity of the words themselves.

It can be concluded that almost all Schools of Indian thought have recognized the importance of knowing the speaker's intention in understanding the speech. Speech is mainly purposive in nature and can do its function only if the listener understands the intention of the speaker. At the same time, language is accepted as an objective instrument of communication and thus, it must be independent of personal inclinations of the speaker.

Chapter 3

The Concept of Sentence and Sentence-Meaning: Gleanings from *Vākyapadiya*

3.1. Language Analysis in VP

As discussed, Bh presents a unique and complete analysis of the concept of language in VP. He analyses language in three levels viz. absolute level, communicative level and analytic level.

(i) Absolute level:- Bh explains the absolute level of language in terms of the concept of *Śabdabrahman*. This is the ultimate level of existence of language, which is beyond shape, time, qualities etc. At this level, word is a representative of the ultimate Truth. This perspective of language-essence is described in the opening verse of VP.

*anādinidhanam brahma śabdatattvaṃ yadaḥśaram
vivartate' rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ. (1.1)*

Here, it is described as the essence of the world, which is beyond the time-space limitations. Here, Bh uses the word *śabda* with deeper significance. Thus *śabda*, which is sequence-less in nature underlies the sequential language.

(ii) Communicative level:- This is the state of language when used as the speech act. Language is generally considered as the tool of communicating ideas. Ideas or thoughts are communicated in a language act. Thoughts are never bits and pieces, but appear as whole. So ideas and thoughts are also to be communicated as wholes. Thus, in communication, there must be a minimum possible unit of language. Bh argues that the unit of language is sentence, which conveys the complete thought or idea of the speaker⁷.

(iii) Analytic level:- Though Bh accepts the sentence as the unit of language, he mentions that language can be analysed into its various parts, for the purpose of studying grammar. In the third canto of VP, he explains each and every part and piece of language with their minute significances. Study of language at this level is an ideal tool to teach and learn language. The grammar level teaching and learning is significant at this analytic level of language.

⁷ This can be compared to the concept of *Gestalt*, which is used in modern psychology. *Gestalt* is a term, which signifies a 'unified whole'. *Gestalt theories* refer to theories of visual perception developed by German psychologists in 1920s. These theories put forth an idea that in our visual perception, we organise visual elements into groups or unified wholes. Psychologists define *Gestalten* as a configuration or organised field that cannot be derived from the summation of its components rather it is a unified whole.

Thus, it can be deduced that Bh has a unique and complete vision on the concept of language and the speech act. The whole language theory of Bh is erected on the concept of Sentence-holism, which is emphatically described in the second canto of VP.

After the three sages P, Kty and Ptj, it was Bh, the great grammarian and philosopher, who discovered the depth and breadth of Sanskrit grammar. Aklujkar rightly observes that VP is chronologically the fourth surviving work in the Pāṇinian grammatical tradition (2007, p.125). As stated, Bh examines language in three levels. In the first canto, it is conceived as *śabdabrahman*, which is the ultimate inner level of language. He also perceives language in the level of communication, which is discussed in the second canto. The entire second canto of VP is dedicated for discussing the basic unit of communication, sentence. There are different opinions as to whether word is expressive or sentence. Bh opines that individual words and individual word meaning are not real when compared to sentence. An idea can be expressed only by a sentence; neither by words nor by syllables and thus, sentence is considered as the basic unit of language.

3.2. Definition of Sentence

Bh interprets the concept of sentence in a two-dimensional way. On

one side, he gives a working definition of sentence as the group of syntactically connected words, while on the other side, the term *vākya* as a synonym of *śabda*. Bh begins his discussion on sentence by presenting available theories and definitions of sentence from various schools of thoughts. In the first two verses of the *Vākyakāṇḍa*, he enumerates eight different views about sentence held by the ancient thinkers.

ākhyātaśabdaḥ saṅghāto jātiḥ saṅghātavartini
eko' navayavaḥ śabdaḥ kramo budhyanusamḥṛtiḥ.
padamādyam pṛthak sarvaṃ padaṃ sākāṅkṣamityapi
vākyam prati matirbhinnā bahudhā nyāyavādinām. (2.1-2)

According to various views, sentence may be defined as 1) the verb, 2) the collection of words, 3) the universal inhering in the collection of words, 4) the one indivisible word, 5) the sequence of words, 6) the unification in the mind, 7) the first word and 8) each word requiring the others. (VP, 2.1-2, trans. KAS Iyer). These definitions may not describe all the aspects of sentence, but they can be taken as different ways of looking at sentence by different thinkers.

3.2.1. *Saṅghātaḥ Vākyam*

The word '*Saṅghāta*' literally means 'a collection of something'. In the present context, *saṅghāta* can be taken as a group of words, the

meanings of which are interconnected. Thus, according to this view, sentence is the *saṅghāta* or the group of words. This view can be traced in the aphorism "*samarthaḥ padavidhiḥ*" of P (2.1.1), which says that the *vidhi* related with the words depends on *sāmarthya* or the capability. While commenting this aphorism, Ptj remarks that words are equally capable of forming sentences and compounds⁸. Bh sets forth his view on this definition in the following verses:-

kevalena padenārtho yāvānevābhidhīyate
vākyasthaṃ tāvato' rthasya tadāhurabhidhāyakam.
sambandhe sati yattvanyadādhikyam upajāyate
vākyarthameva taṃ prāhuranekapadasamśrayam. (VP, 2.41-42)

K A S Iyer translates these verses as

It has been declared that a word, as part of a sentence, expresses the same extent of meaning as it does when it is in isolation. Whatever extra meaning is understood when the words (in a sentence) are connected together, is the meaning of the sentence and it rests on many words. (VP, 2.41-42).

A word, which expresses its meaning when it is in isolation, expresses the same individual meaning in the sentence also. But in a

⁸ The interpretation of Ptj has already been elaborately discussed under 2.3.3 in this thesis.

sentence, it is connected syntactically as well as semantically with the other words in the sentence and thus we understand the meaning of the sentence as a whole. Here, it should be noted that, when we understand the complete meaning of a sentence, it is different from the aggregation of individual word-meanings. Therefore, Bh calls it as *ādhikyam* in the above verse. According to this view, just as the cooking can be done with many instruments and as a vehicle travels with the help of its parts, interconnected words together denote the meaning of a sentence. Ptj also says what we get from a sentence as 'extra' can be treated as its meaning (*yadrādhikyam vākyārthaḥ saḥ*, MB, under P 2.3.50).

3.2.2. *Kramāḥ Vākyam*

This view is well explained by Bimal Krishna Matilal as the sentence is nothing but the 'sequence' of words and the sentence meaning belongs to this sequence (1992, p.95). The followers of this school argue that, there is no separate entity called sentence, but the mere sequence of the words is expressive. Bh gives a clear picture of this definition in this verse:

santa eva viśeṣā ye padārtheṣu vyavasthitāḥ

te kramād anugamyante na vākyam abhidhāyakam. (VP, 2.49)

The particularizations which exist already in the word-meanings are

understood from their sequence and there is no expressive sentence beyond that (VP, 2.49, KAS Iyer). In fact, a sentence refers to the proper placement of words. Since this is not possible without accepting a definite order, *Krama* or the sequence of words is to be accepted as a sentence. What is worthy of note here is that the sequence is a property of time.

But how can the sequence of words alone be expressive? A word also is nothing other than the sequence of phonemes and audibility is also common for phoneme and word. Then why can't we say that sequence of phonemes is also expressive? Bh criticizes this view upon this point. He says "*padākhyā vākyasamjñā ca śabdatvaṃ neṣyate tayoh*" (VP, 2.52). While commenting this verse, KAS Iyer clarifies that "The phoneme and the word are audible but mere audibility does not entitle them to be called *śabda*. For that, they must convey the meaning, they must be *vācaka*. They are not. Only sequence is so." (VP, 2.52). Both phonemes and words are audible entities and hence both of them can be treated as *śabda*. But sequence of phonemes cannot express the sentence meaning. It is understood only from the sequence of words. Thus, sequence is the sentence and sentence meaning is understood by the inter connection of word meanings. Puṇyarāja also supports this view in his commentary on *Vākyakāṇḍa* (*tat kramaścaiva vākyam, samsargo vākyārtha iti*, VP, 2.53).

3.2.3. *Ākhyātaśabdaḥ Vākyam*

The word *ākhyāta* literally means *kriyā* or verb. Yāska also states "*bhāvapradhānam ākhyātam*" (2002, p.4), which can be translated as: *ākhyāta* is that word, in which *kriyā* has prime significance. The word *bhāva* signifies *kriyā*. Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita supports this view, saying that "*vyāpāro bhāvanā saivotpādanā saiva ca kriyā*" (*Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakārikā*, 1.5). The words *vyāpāra*, *bhāvanā*, *utpādanā* and *kriyā* are used synonymously. Hence the above definition says that, a sentence must have a finite verb or in several contexts, the finite verb is the sentence. The verb is considered to be the prime factor in a sentence as all the other words in the sentence are connected to the verb to give a unified sense. Because of this prime position of the verb in a sentence, Bh puts forth the view that *ākhyātaśabda* or the verb can be called a sentence. He explains this in the verse:-

vākyam tadapi manyante yat padaṃ caritakriyam.

antareṇa kriyāśabdaṃ vākyādeva hi darśanāt. (VP, 2.325)

This verse gives a vivid picture about the word '*ākhyātaśabda*'. He says that even a noun impregnated with the idea of action can be treated as a sentence. According to Bh, the word '*ākhyāta*' signifies not verb, but the idea of an action. Hence a sentence need not be consisted a verb, but an

idea of action should be present there. This is evidently known from the verse:-

yāvat sidham asidham vā sādhyatvenābhidhīyate

āśritakramarūpatvāt sā kriyetyabhidhīyate. (VP, 3.8.1)

Bh describes verb as a group of actions performed in a sequential manner. No matter it is *siddha* or *asidha* or *sādhya* and hence a verb or *kriyā* is that word, which signifies an action.

By defining sentence as "*ākhyātam sāvyaayakāarakaviśeṣaṇam vākyam*" (Kty, under P, 2.1.1), Kty also seems to be in favour of this view. He opines that a verb qualified by *avyaya*, *kāraka* and *viśeṣaṇa* can be called a sentence. Sometimes even in the absence of these qualifiers, a single verb also can be a sentence. In the absence of qualifiers, they can be supplied naturally through a device called *adhyāhāra*. In most of the cases, a sentence will not be complete without a verb. At this point Bh puts forth a different dimension that a sentence can make sense even in the absence of verb, but the idea of action should be present. Anyway,

3.2.4. *Padamādyam Vākyam*

Those who hold the view that the first word is sentence opine that a word in an expression or sentence is not a separate entity but it is syntactically connected with other words in the sentence or it is

sākāñkṣam. Hence words in a sentence do not convey their individual meaning, but a connected meaning which arises from their mutual connection. Each word expresses a meaning in connection with another word which can be called a connected meaning. Bh explains this view as:

vīśeṣaśabāḥ keṣāñcit sāmānyapratirūpakāḥ

śabdāntarābhisambandhād vyajyante pratipattṛṣu. (VP, 2.17)

A word does not convey its individual meaning in the sentence, though it seems to be the same as in another expression. It conveys a meaning as connected with the other words in the expression. So the meaning of the sentence is already contained in, though only vaguely, the first word. Thus the first word in a sentence can also be treated as a sentence.

An objection may be raised here that, if the very first word itself denotes the meaning of the sentence, the remaining words would be useless. Bh answers this saying that the remaining words in the sentence make the sentence meaning expressed by the first word clearer. Hearers understand the meaning better when all the words are uttered. This is explained in the verse:-

teṣāṃ tu kṛtsno vākyārthaḥ pratibhedam samāpyate

vyaktopavyañjanā sidhirarthasya pratipattṛṣu. (VP, 2.18)

This verse states that the whole of the sentence meaning is contained in each word and hearers understand the meaning better when all the words in the sentence are uttered (VP, 2.18, trans. KAS Iyer). Hence we can say that the meaning of a sentence is the meaning of its first word as connected with the meanings of other words (*sākāṅkṣam*). Here, the *Vṛtti* says that the very first word expresses its meaning as connected with the meanings of the other words and hence the remaining words denote no new meaning apart from the connected meaning of the first word. But they only make the meaning of the sentence clearer which is already expressed obscurely by the first word. Thus from the hearer's point of view, the sentence meaning is clear only when all the words are uttered. The followers of this view state that no word conveys a meaning which is not connected with the meanings of the other.

3.2.5. Pṛthak Sarvaṃ Padaṃ Sākāṅkṣam Vākyaṃ

This definition of sentence is only a modified view of the above, which says that each word in the sentence contains the whole sentence-meaning and hence each word can be called a sentence. Bh puts forth this view in the same verse, which is cited above (VP, 2.18). Those who hold this view says that the whole sentence-meaning is concentrated not only in the first word, but in each word in a sentence.

3.2.6. *Eko' navayavaḥ Śabdaḥ Vākyam*

Bh introduces this view saying that a sentence is not formed by the mere aggregation of words. A sentence is an indivisible unit of language. It is for the sake of convenience as well as for facilitating our learning and understanding of a language, that we split the indivisible sentence into smaller parts called words and phonemes⁹. Hence, even though a sentence appears to have sequence, it is really without any. This indivisible sentence is either internal or external to the language-user¹⁰. When it exists within the speaker before utterance, it is internal and as it is manifested through speech process, it is external also (VP, 2.19). This indivisible unit, which is expressive of meaning, might be understood as the indivisible *sphoṭa*. Here, Bh elaborately expounds his views of sentence *sphoṭa*.

According to this view, sentence is the indivisible external *sphoṭa*, which is eternal. To explain this unique concept, he describes an example

⁹ Bh introduced a unique method for the analysis of a sentence into its parts, which is named as *apoddhāra*. This is a mental process, through which, words are differentiated from the sentence. In reality, sentence is a unified whole, but when the meaning of the sentence is cognised; the hearer differentiates the words from it afterwards.

¹⁰ Modern scholars explain the concept of *sphoṭa* as the language symbol or as an 'auditory image', which is sequence-less and underlies the uttered speech. The listener first grasps this language symbol through the uttered speech, which is sequential nature. This is known as the external *śabda* or *sphoṭa*. Later, this language symbol or *sphoṭa* transforms into meaning as a flash of understanding known as *Pratibhā*. This intuitive level of *śabda* is the internal *sphoṭa*.

of *citra-jñāna* or the cognition of a multi-colored picture. In Bh's words:-

citrasyaikasvarūpasya yathā bhedanidarśanaiḥ

nīlādibhiḥ samākhyānam kriyate bhinnalakṣaṇaiḥ. (VP, 2.8)

Just as a multi-colored picture is explained through its different colors which belong to its parts, the sentence, which is self-sufficient and complete, is explained through individual words which require one another (VP, 2.8-9, trans. K A S Iyer). A picture can convey a complete sense of understanding in its whole, but can be explained through the different colors in it. The same is happening in the cognition of a sentence also. A sentence is self-sufficient and self-expressive of a complete thought, but is explained through individual words. Hence the appearance of divisibility of sentences and sentence-meanings is deceptive. Matilal mentions that this view is like the 'cognition of multiplicity' (Matilal, 1992, p.97).

This view gets clear as we go through the commentary of Puṅyarāja on the verse 2.7. It says

Bh really wants to set forth the following view; the sentence is the *sphoṭa* either external or internal. It is external when it is clearly uttered.

Till then, it is internal. In any case, it is indivisible. It has two aspects: the sound aspect and the meaning aspect, which are identified with one

another. It is essentially in the nature of knowledge or consciousness because it illuminates an object. Because of articulation, it assumes the form of sound. Though indivisible, it appears to have divisions just as our complex cognition, though one, it appears to have inner differentiation because of the objects in it. The picture is one, but we seem to see different colors within it. That is what happens with the sentence and the sentence-meaning. Both are indivisible like the flavor of a cold drink, or the juice in a pea-hen's egg, or the form of a picture, the *narasiṃha*, the *gavaya* and our perception of a picture. The indivisible sentence is *sphoṭa* and the indivisible sentence-meaning is *Pratibhā*. But both appear to have divisions. (VP, 2.7, trans. K A S Iyer).

Grammarians accept this view as the *Akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa* theory. They accept *sphoṭa*, which is manifested through uttered sounds and is indivisible. According to them, words and syllables are only imaginary tools for explaining the sentence. Bh clearly states his view about sentence-*sphoṭa* in the first *kāṇḍa* itself: -

pade na varṇā vidyante varṇeṣvavayavā na ca

vākyāt padānām atyantam praviveko na kaścana. (VP, 1.73)

What we can deduce from this verse is that the syllables in a word and words in a sentence are not real, but only conceptual. So we cannot

differentiate a sentence into words. Nāgeśa also refers to this theory in his

Paramalaghumañjūśā as:

tatra prativākyam saṅketagrahāsambhavād vākyaṅvākhyānasya
laghūpāyenāśakyatvācca kalpanayā padāni pravibhajya pade
prakṛtipratyayabhāgān pravibhajya kalpitābhyāmanvayavyatirekābhyāṃ
tattadarthavibhāgaṃ śāstramātraviśayaṃ parikalpayanti smācāryāḥ.
(1985, p.6).

3.2.7. *Jātiḥ Saṅghātavartinī Vākyaṃ*

In this view, Bh states that the universal of the constitutive group of words can be assumed as a sentence. It is well described by Bh as:-

yathākṣepaviśeṣe' pi karmabhedo na grhyate

āvṛttau vyajyate jātiḥ karmabhirbhramaṇādibhiḥ. (VP, 2.20)

Bh explains this view by elucidating an example of rotating an object. A movement like rotating or turning consists of a series of momentary movements. While rotating an object, it starts from a point and ends at the same point and the next rotation replaces it. Each rotation is unique in their speed etc. and hence they cannot co-exist and form a whole, of which they would be parts. Hence we may consider the universal of the movement called rotation for the cognition of the whole. There are other movements such as lifting etc occurs during the process,

but because of the resemblance between these actions and rotation, this universal is capable of producing the cognition of the whole rotation. The process is similar in the cognition of a sentence also. In an utterance, syllables, words and sentences are expressed by *Dhvanis* and the listener grasps the whole meaning of the utterance. Though the listener grasps the *sphoṭa* of phonemes, words and sentences, which may differ from another, the manifesting sound appear to be the same. It is clearly stated in the *Vṛtti* of VP as:-

*śabdajātereva vākyatve bhramaṇatvādayo dṛṣṭāntatvenopanyastāḥ.
varṇatvapadatvavākyatvāni hi tulyātulyopavyaṅjanāni yāvat
tulyopavyaṅjanasannipātaḥ tāvat buddhibhedam kurvanti. katham?
apacitadhvanivyāṅgyastāvad eko varṇaḥ, tasyābhivyaktinimittaiḥ
sadṛśairanyaiśca śrutibhinnairekam niravayavam ca padam vyajyate
thataiva tulyātulyaiḥ pracitatamairvākyamiti. (2.21).*

Puṅyarāja opines that this definition is what Bh elaborates as *Jātisphoṭa* while the former as *Vyaktisphoṭa*.

3.2.8. *Budhyanusamhṛtiḥ Vākyam*

Both the above definitions refer to the external *sphoṭa*, which is described under 2.1.7. Among the definitions explained above, the former (*Eko' navayavaḥ śabdaḥ*) regards the sentence as a particular whole while

the latter views it as a universal (*Jātiḥ Saṅghātavartini*). The later grammarians called them as *vyakti-sphoṭa* and *jāti -sphoṭa* respectively. This is evidently stated by Puṅyarāja as:- "*evaṃ tāvad bahīrūpaṃ vyaktisphoṭaṃ jātisphoṭaṃ vā vācakam āśrītya vākyaṃ vyākhyātam*" (VP, 2.29).

The view that sentence is *Budhyanusamhṛti* represents the internal *sphoṭa*. In this definition, the term '*budhyanusamhṛti*' can be explained as '*anukrameṇa samhṛtiḥ anusamhṛtiḥ, kalpitānām padabudhīnām anusamhṛtiḥ budhyanusamhṛtiḥ*', which means the words in a sentence are only imaginary and are dissolved or unified in the cognition. The sentence is the real word and the words are only for the purpose of analysis (*apoddhāra*). This real word is an inner entity which is one, indivisible and without any inner sequence. This inner entity cannot be separated as sentence and meaning; while it consists of consciousness. All these views are discussed by Bh as:-

yadantaḥ śabdatattvaṃ tu nādairekaṃ prakāśitam

tamāhurapare śabdaṃ tasya vākyaḥ tathaikatā (VP, 2.30)

What is peculiar to this view is that the thoughts or ideas, which are communicated by uttered words, are also referred to as language by Bh.

Thus, he enunciates a psycho-linguistic perspective of language in this view of sentence.

The external aspects of the word, *Jāti* and *Vyakti* have already been pointed out under the definitions '*Jātiḥ saṅghātavartiniḥ*' and '*Eko' navayavaḥ śabdaḥ*' respectively. It can be seen in the *Vṛtti* that this external sentence is like the written symbols (*akṣaracihnavat*). Sometimes we mistake these symbols to the real word. It is only a symbol of the real sentence which is an inner entity and is an indivisible unit (VP, 2.30).

Bh again points out that not only sentence, but the meaning of sentence is also indivisible ("*arthabhāgaistathā teṣām āntaro' rthaḥ prakāśyate.*" VP, 2.31). It says that the inner meaning or the sentence-meaning is manifested by the parts of the sentence. Word and meaning are inseparable divisions (*apṛthaksthitau*) of the one inner principle (VP, 2.31). Hence both sentence and its meaning are inner entities and are identical. After explaining this, Puṇyarāja puts forth a relevant question. It is well known and accepted by all the philosophers that word is 'the expression' and meaning is 'what is expressed'. According to the verse cited above, if both the inner entities and identical, how can they said to be distinguished as expression and expressed to each other? Bh, keeping this doubt in mind proceeds to next verse:-

prakāśakaparakāśyatvaṃ kāryakāraṇarūpatā

antarmātrātmanastasya śabdatattvasya sarvadā. (VP, 2.32)

The inner word-principle has got both the powers of being expressive (*prakāśaka*) and of being expressed (*prakāśya*). In other words, the same word-principle can be the cause as well as the effect. In short, the 'One Word-Principle' contains the seeds of all manifestations (VP, 2.32). This is well stated in the first *kāṇḍa* of VP:-

ekasya sarvabījasya yasya ceyamanekadhā

bhokṛbhoktavayarūpeṇa bhogarūpeṇa ca sthitiḥ. (VP, 1.4)

The language principle *śabdatattva*, which acts as the cause of all utterances is one, but manifested as many, like *bhoktā*, *bhoktava* and *bhoga*.

We may have a vivid perception of this view as we go through the *Vṛtti* of 2.31, which interprets the process of hearing and understanding of an utterance. When an utterance is heard, the process of understanding is like this:

It is well known that the word principle is mainly the indivisible inner entity and that it is grasped through its indefinable and unreal parts. Similarly, the meanings reflected in the intellect are experienced as identical with the external objects. This is according to the view that it is

eternal; it manifests itself according to the power of sequence of the intellect. An external object is not fit for practical purposive usage without the intellect with which it is wrongly identified. All worldly usage is done with objects which have been grasped in the intellect. Thus both the word and the object are in the intellect. (VP, 2.31, trans. K A S Iyer).

It is clear from this description that ultimately the external form of word and external objects are transient as well as unreal, but at the same time they inspire the intellect. Even though intellect is without any sequence, it has the power to grasp things in a sequential manner. Hence when an external object is perceived, it inspires the intellect, where meaning and word are identical.

3.3. *Sakhaṇḍa* and *Akhaṇḍa* Schools of Sentence

Indian scholars have tried to expound the real nature of sentence and sentence-meaning by analysis, synthesis and abstraction (a method introduced by Bh called *apoddhāra*). Whether sentence can be analysed or not, remained a debated issue from ancient times. Bh notes that there are two schools regarding the notion of the sentence and sentence-meaning viz. *Akhaṇḍapakṣa* and *Sakhaṇḍapakṣa*.¹¹ The controversy between these

¹¹ Matilal describes the former school as 'sentence-holism' and the latter as 'atomism' (1992, p.106).

two schools is mainly regarding the primary units of meaning; whether it is sentence or word. An earlier reference can be found in *Ṛgvedaprātiśākhya*, in which it is stated as "*saṃhitā padaprakṛtiḥ*" (2.1). This statement is explained in two different ways by the followers of *Akhaṇḍa* and *Sakhaṇḍa* Schools of sentence to authenticate their theses. The term '*saṃhitā*', in this statement, denotes 'sentence' and the word '*prakṛti*' refers to 'origin'. If the compound word '*padaprakṛtiḥ*' is analysed as *Tatpuruṣa* compound, the derivation would be like '*padānāṃ prakṛtiḥ*'. Then, it signifies that the sentence or *saṃhitā* is the origin of words. Here, sentence is the unit of language and words are differentiated later, from this unit. If the statement is taken as *Bahuvrīhi* compound, it can be described as '*padāni prakṛtiḥ yasyāḥ sā, padaprakṛtiḥ*'. This gives an idea that words are the units of meaning and sentence is nothing more than the collection of words.

Among the definitions of sentence explained above, some definitions come under the view that sentence is the aggregation of its parts (*Sakhaṇḍapakṣa*). *Saṅghāta* (the collection of words), *Krama* (the sequence of words), *Ākhyataśabda* (the verb), *Padamādyam* (the first word) and *Pṛthak sarvaṃ padaṃ sākāṅkṣam* (each word requiring others) – these five definitions come under this view. Almost all the the philosophers except grammarians follow the *Sakhaṇḍa* School of

sentence. The *Mīmāṃsakas* are of the view that sentence and sentence-meaning are produced by joining the words and the word-meanings together. There are two schools of *Mīmāṃsakas* viz. *Bhāṭṭa* School, propounded by Kumārilabhaṭṭa and *Prābhākara* School, founded by Prabhākara. The two schools have different views on the concept of sentence and sentence-meaning. *Abhihitānvayavāda* and *Anvitābhīdhānavāda* are the two theories of verbal import (*śābdabodha*), held by these schools respectively¹². Puṇyārāja, The famous commentator of VP mentions that two among the five definitions which come within the *sakhaṇḍa* view viz., the collection of words (*Saṅghāta*) and the sequence of words (*Krama*), are held by the *abhihitānvayavādins*, while the other three definitions are accepted by *anvitābhīdhānavādins* (VP, 2.1-2). Thus, the first two definitions under *sakhaṇḍa* view can be ascribed, later on, to the *Bhāṭṭa* School of *Mīmāṃsā*. The essence of the *abhihitānvaya* theory can be stated as follows:- '*abhihitānām padārthānām anvayaḥ*'. The words in a sentence first designate their meanings and then the word-meanings are brought together to give the sentence-meaning. Though Puṇyārāja ascribes the *saṅghāta* view, to the *Abhihitānvayavāda*, Kumārilabhaṭṭa, the founder of this School refutes the *saṅghātavāda* in his *Ślokavārtika*.

¹² These theories on verbal import are expounded under 2.4.1.1. in this thesis.

*evam ādyantaṃ sarveṣāṃ pṛthak saṅghātakalpane
anyonyānugrahābhāvāt padānāṃ nāsti vākyatā.*

(*Vākyādhikaraṇa*, 4)

He refutes *saṅghātavāda* saying that, the ability of words to favor each other, cannot be established in a group. Bh criticized this view saying that just as the individual letters in a word are treated as meaningless, the individual words in a sentence also have no individual meaning.

The other three definitions under the *sakhaṇḍa* view - *Ākhyātaśabda* (the verb), *Padamādyam* (the first word) and *Pṛthak sarvaṃ padaṃ sākāṅkṣam* (each word requiring others), are supportive of a sort of contextualism, where the word's contextual meaning is considered, to understand the sentence-meaning. This is ascribed later on to the *Prābhākara* school of *Mīmāṃsā* and also named *Anvitābhīdhānavāda*. The idea is that a word's meaning cannot be known in isolation. When a sentence is heard, the word's contextual meaning or its meaning in connection with the meanings of other words in the sentence is understood by the hearer. In this way, each word in the sentence gives a connected sense and hence each word can convey the whole meaning of the sentence. The followers of the theory of *Abhihitānvaya* believes that the sentence meaning is the inter connection of the meanings conveyed by the individual words, while those who accept the *Anvitābhīdhāna* theory, hold

the view that sentence meaning is not derived from the interconnection of individual words, but each word connotes a meaning that is already connected with the meanings of the others. In addition to these definitions, Bh also discusses the definitions of sentence by Jaimini, the founder of the *Mīmāṃsā* School and Kty, the author of *Vārtikas* in the School of *Vyākaraṇa*.

Among the definitions of sentence, *Jātiḥ saṅghātavartini* (the universal inhering in the collection of words), *Eko'navayavaḥ śabdaḥ* (the one individual word) and *Budhyanusamhṛtiḥ* (the unification in mind) – these definitions come under the view that sentence is indivisible (*Akhaṇḍapakṣa*). The followers of this school consider sentence as a single unit, which has no divisions such as words or syllables. Ancient grammarians like Vyāḍi, Ptj etc. are in favour of this view. They accept sentence-*sphoṭa* as the minutest level of language. According to these three definitions, sentence is considered as a single unit, which cannot be taken as the group of words as in *Sakhaṇḍapakṣa*.

All the notions of the *Sakhaṇḍa* School on sentence and sentence-meaning are refuted by Bh, as they cannot explain the philosophy of sentence wholly. These definitions manifest the concept of sentence from corners only; none of them depicts a complete idea about the philosophy of sentence. Bh sets forth instead a holistic framework and argues that a

sentence might be understood as an indivisible *sphoṭa*, which is either external or internal. On a shrewd analysis of the *Vākyakāṇḍa* of VP, it can be concluded that Bh never accepted the *Sakhaṇḍapakṣa*, as he advocates syllables and words in a sentence are not real, but only imaginary.

pade na varṇā vidyante varṇeṣvavayavā na ca

vākyat padānāmatyantam praviveko na kaścana. (VP, 1.68)

3.4. The Concept of Sentence Indivisibility and *Sphoṭa*

The concept of *sphoṭa* is one of the most important contributions of Indian thinkers to the crucial problem of general linguistics. It was Bh, who brought to light the breadth and depth of this concept beyond its linguistic features in his VP. But, some of the ideas underlying this theory can be found in earlier grammatical and philosophical literature in Sanskrit. It can be stated emphatically that, the whole superstructure of Bh's language theory is erected on the concept of *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*, which is already described. He used this fundamental concept in the study of language, which was successfully developed by later grammarians. This concept paved new pathways in the language studies in India. As discussed, the concept of *sphoṭa* was no new idea for the predecessors of Bh. But the Idea of sentence-indivisibility, introduced by Bh, has some unique features when compared to the concept of *sphoṭa* in general.

Before proceeding into the characteristics of the concept of sentence-indivisibility, Bh's perspectives on *sphoṭa* doctrine has to be discussed.

In the School of Grammar, the word or sentence, when taken as an indivisible meaning-unit, is the *sphoṭa*. Ptj distinguishes *sphoṭa* and *dhvani* in MB as "*sphoṭaḥ śabdaḥ, dhvaniḥ śabdaguṇaḥ*" (Vol.1, 1991, p.181). Thus *sphoṭa* is the real *śabda* (speech or language), while *dhvani*, the audible part is a quality of speech. Indologists like A B Keith mistakenly treated this as a mysterious entity and overlooked its linguistic significance, probably due to its association with Bh's *śabdabrahman* (Matilal, 1992, p.84). Later scholars like J Brough, K A S Iyer, Kunjuni Raja etc. mention *sphoṭa* as a linguistic entity. They described it as the language-symbol or an 'auditory image' of the uttered speech as well as the meaning bearing unit¹³. Matilal, examining all these views, describes *sphoṭa* as an auditory impression of the meaning (1992, p.85). Bh begins his discussion about *sphoṭa* referring to two aspects of language.

¹³ The word '*sphoṭa*' is derived from the root '*sphuṭa vikasane*', which signifies 'to burst' or 'to shine forth'. Thus it can be described in two ways; if it is explained as '*sphuṭati, vikasati, arthaḥ asmāt iti sphoṭaḥ*', then *sphoṭa* is that from which the meaning shines forth and hence it can be taken as the meaning-bearing agent. If it is described as '*sphuṭyate anena iti sphoṭaḥ*', then it can be defined as an entity which is manifested by the uttered speech. According to this view, *sphoṭa* is the auditory impression manifested by *dhvanis*.

dvāvupādānaśabdeṣu śabdau śabdavidō viduḥ

eko nimittaṃ śabdānām aparō'rthe prayujyate. (VP, 1.44)

Here, Bh analyses the speech act from the speaker's point of view, which has two dimensions. In the language act, one is the causal root of articulated sounds (*nimittaṃ śabdānām*) while the other is the manifested or applied, to convey the meaning (*arthe prayujyate*). From the speaker's point of view, the articulated sounds are produced from the 'word-principle' which is present in the intellect (*Buddhithaśabhaḥ*). Thus the causal root of audible sound *Nāda* is the '*Buddhithaśabdaḥ*' or the word-principle in the intellect (VP, 1.46). Bh calls this *Buddhithaśabda* as *sphoṭa*. This gets transformed into utterance, when a person intends to speak (VP, 1.108). Though the uttered language is sequential, its source, the language faculty in the intellect (*Buddhithaśabhaḥ*), is devoid of any sequence or parts. But, the listener grasps the *śabda* produced by the speaker in a sequential manner, but not as whole. Thus, he may experience the *sphoṭa* as having sequence while hearing. Bh solves this problem by differentiating *dhvani* or the audible sound into *Prākṛtadhvani* and *Vaikṛtadhvani*¹⁴. The *Vaikṛtadhvani* is the actual sound spoken by the speaker and heard by the listener. Hence it includes all the peculiarities

¹⁴ Bh's analysis of language encompasses three aspects viz. *Vaikṛtadhvani*, *Prākṛtadhvani* and *Sphoṭa*.

and differences in the utterance of the speaker like intonation, tempo etc. (Brough , 1951, p.40) The *Prākṛtadhvani*, which is indicated by the *Vaikṛtadhvani*, is a stage just before the articulated sounds come into existence. It represents the phonological structure or the sound pattern of the form. All the non-linguistic personal variations are absent in this stage. But, the time sequence is still present in this. This actually manifests the internal *sphoṭa*, the integral linguistic symbol. The *Prākṛtadhvani* is so close to the integral linguistic symbol *sphoṭa* that the characteristics of *Prākṛtadhvani* is superimposed on *sphoṭa*. Thus we may experience the *sphoṭa* as sequential or having parts. Brough discusses these three stages in his "Theories of General Linguistics in Sanskrit Grammar" vividly.

The later grammarians like Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita and Nāgeśabhaṭṭa enumerated eight different types of *sphoṭa*. This differentiation is based on two fundamental principles, viz. indivisibility and meaningfulness. Thus we get *Varṇasphoṭa*, *Padasphoṭa* and *Vākyasphoṭa* respectively, when we consider either the letter or the word or the sentence as *vācaka* or meaning-bearing unit (Śabdakaustubham, 1933, p.10). These three are again classified into *Jāti* and *Vyakti*. If word and sentence are considered as indivisible symbols denoting the meaning of the whole without any reference to the parts, they are known as *Akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa* and *Akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*. These are the eight types of *sphoṭa* described by

later grammarians. Though Bh does not enumerate these eight classes of *sphoṭa*, he seems to have held the *Akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa* as the real *sphoṭa* (Brough, 1951, p.45). This is evident when he emphasizes on the definitions of sentence that come under the *Akhaṇḍa* School of sentence, which is already discussed. Thus, according to Bh, the concept of *sphoṭa* in general, forms the philosophical outlook of his language theory. To Bh, the theory of *sphoṭa* is part of his monistic and idealistic metaphysical theory according to which, the *śabdatattva* is the eternal principle of the universe. His *magnum opus* VP is also begun with the statement that the whole phenomenon of material existence is only the *Vivarta*¹⁵ of this speech principle (1.1).

The concept of indivisible sentence, expounded in the second canto of VP, forms the basis of his psycho-linguistic analysis of language. The idea of 'sentence-indivisibility' deals with how language is used and grasped. This explains sentence as the real linguistic unit, which is devoid of any sequence or parts. Puṇyarāja points out that Bh is not the first to introduce the idea of indivisibility in the School of Grammar. P and Ptj have recognized the indivisibility of sentence ("*sūtrakārasya tu atīṅgrahaṇāt ekameva akhaṇḍam vākyam arthaikatvāt ākhyātabhede' pi*

¹⁵ *Vivarta* is a concept, developed by the *Advaita Vedānta* system, which is described as the process of manifestation by which the one becomes many.

abhipretamiti gamyate, VP, 2.1-2). But it must be admitted that Bh is the first to establish logically the concept of indivisibility of a sentence. He emphatically states that the sentence is 'a single undivided utterance' (*eko' navayavaḥ śabdaḥ*). Sibabjiban Bhattacharya explains this view as the phonetic completeness of the sentence and is not merely the aggregation of the words occurring in it. What is worthy of note here is that the whole sentence is an individual, and is not the aggregate of its parts (1984, p.28).

The grammarians consider the sentence to be indivisible because the opposite theory of division would result in infinite regress or in the acceptance of atomism (Punitha Sarma, 1998, p.77). If it is held that the words in a sentence are those very ones which are found independently somewhere else and if the phonemes are those which are found independently, there would be no essence of the sentence or the words other than phonemes. If the *Sakhaṇḍa* view of sentence is accepted, the phonemes also can be divided even into smaller parts like an atom and this division would be carried out infinitely. Thus ultimately, there would be no unit, which would be looked upon as the expressive element. Therefore the grammarians put forth the sentence as an entity over and above the phonemes and words.

*padāni vākye tānyeva varṇāste ca pade yadi
varṇeṣu varṇabhāgānām bhedaḥ syāt paramāṇuvat.*

bhāgānām anupaśleṣeṇa na varṇo na padaṃ bhavet

teṣānavyapadeśyatvāt kimanyadapadiśyatām. (VP, 28-29)

Modern scholars like Kunjunni Raja, J Brough, KAS Iyer and Gaurinath Sastri etc. hold that, the *sphoṭa* is the auditory impression of the uttered speech as well as the meaning-bearing agent. But, this concept is not enough to solve the problem of the cognition of the sentence-meaning. Hence, they hold that the *sphoṭa* in general and *Vākyasphoṭa* in particular has been assumed as a solution to the problem of the meaning of the sentence¹⁶

3.5. The Concept of Sentence-Meaning

Almost all Indian schools of thought have given primacy to the process of understanding the sentence-meaning, which is known as '*śābdabodha*' in their philosophies. *Śābdabodha* can be simply defined as the cognition of the meaning of a sentence. A sentence is composed of words; whether their existence is considered real as in the case of logicians, *Mīmāṃsakas* and others or mythical as in the case of grammarians. It is already known that words have potentiality to express definite meanings. The relation between these words that binds them to form a single sentence is the syntactical relation. Various philosophers

¹⁶ This view is explained in 4.7.2 of this thesis.

have explored this syntactical relationship between the words in a sentence which forms various theories of *śābdabodha* or verbal import (V S Rao, 1969, p.1).

The eight views on sentence, which are ascribed to various preceptors, follow different views on *śābdabodha*. In *Nyāyabodhinī*, which is a commentary on *Tarkasaṅgraha*, *śābdabodha* is defined as "*padajñānakaraṇakaṃ jñānam*" (1971, p.39). V S Rao translates this as "*śābdabodha* is the cognition effected by the efficient instrumentality of the cognition of words" (1969, p.2). In *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*, the *Śabdakhaṇḍa* begins with the verse:

padajñānaṃ tu karaṇaṃ dvāraṃ tatra padārthadhīḥ
śābdabodhaḥ phalaṃ tatra śaktidhīḥ sahakāriṇī. (4.81)

This also gives the same idea that the cognition of the meaning of a sentence is caused by the cognition of the individual word-meanings in it. Hence to cognize the meaning of a sentence, word meanings are to be cognized. Thus, the concept of sentence-meaning among these eight different views on sentence, can be ascribed into six various views.

3.5.1. Six Views on Sentence- Meaning

Bh tries to converge different ideas on the concept of sentence-meaning in the second canto of VP. The definitions of sentence, discussed

by Bh, naturally points to the nature of sentence-meaning. Puṇyarāja, enumerates six views on the meaning of a sentence held by the followers of these definitions. They are *Pratibhā*, *Samsargaḥ*, *Samsargavaśāt nirākāṅkṣo viśeṣāvasthitāḥ padārthaḥ*, *Samsṛṣṭa evārthaḥ*, *Kriyā* and *Prayojanam* (VP, 2.1-2). In the *Akhaṇḍa* School, which perceives the sentence as indivisible into parts, the sentence-meaning is accepted as *Pratibhā*. The followers of the remaining five definitions come under the *Sakhaṇḍa* School, admit that the sentence-meaning is the result of the aggregation of individual word-meanings. These views are to be discussed elaborately.

3.5.1.1. *Kriyā Vākyārthaḥ*

For those who view sentence as the verb, meaning is in the nature of action or *Kriyā*. Bh explains this in the verse

kriyā kriyāntarādbhinnā niyatādhārasādhanā

prakrāntā pratipatrṇām bhedāḥ sambodhahetavaḥ.(VP, 2.414)

In most cases, a complete sentence contains at least a subject, predicate and verb. There are sentences which have no parts other than a verb. In anyway, the verb or the idea of an action is an inevitable part of a sentence. Bh says that each action is different from one another as it is with specific accessories as its substrata (*niyatādhārasādhanā*). Puṇyarāja

also describes the *kriyā* or action as '*viśiṣṭā*', that which is particular or qualified. Thus *kriyā* is the key factor in a sentence which differentiates it from all the other sentences. It is again mentioned in this verse that when a sentence is heard, the listener first grasps the sense of action. But it cannot be argued that the other parts in a sentence except the verb are insignificant, as they are for the vivid understanding of the listener.

Puṅyarāja quotes another verse also in his commentary, the source of which is yet to be found.

pratibhā yat prabhūtārthā yāmanuṣṭhānamāśritam

phalam prasūyeta yataḥ sā kriyā vākyagocaraḥ (VP, 2.1,2).

Here it is stated that the *kriyā* in general is not to be treated as sentence-meaning. But the *kriyā*, when characterized by some qualifiers, gives the meaning of the sentence. The verb should be qualified with its accessories like *Kartā* (subject), *Karma* (predicate) etc and should give rise to indivisible sentence-meaning *Pratibhā*. This qualified verb can only stimulate action. An action cannot be taken place unless there is a subject and predicate. If one says "close", pointing towards the door, we may understand that the door is to be closed. Here the verb is impregnated with the subject and the predicate. Thus the *kriyā*, qualified with these characteristics represents the sentence-meaning. This view is a sort of

word-atomism, put forth by the *Anvitābhīdhāna* School, which says that each word in a sentence represents a connected meaning.

3.5.1.2. *Saṃsargaḥ Vākyārthaḥ*

Among the definitions of sentence, those who believe sentence as the collection of words (*Saṅghāta*) and as the sequence of words (*Krama*), accept *samsarga* or the interconnection as the sentence-meaning. According to this view, sentence-meaning is the interconnection of the meanings of the individual words. This view belongs to the *Abhihitānvaya* School, accepted by the *Bhāṭṭa* School of *Mīmāṃsā*. This is well stated in the verse:-

saṃbandhe sati yattvanyadādhiyam upajāyate

vākyārthameva taṃ prāhuranekapadasaṃśrayam (VP, 2.42)

When a word is connected with another in a sentence, which is mutually expected (*sākāṅkṣam*) with the first word, an extra meaning over and above the individual meanings of the words is derived. This extra meaning cannot be treated as the meanings the words, but it is the sentence-meaning. In the expression '*vīraḥ puruṣaḥ*', there are two distinct words *vīraḥ*, which denotes 'courage' and *puruṣaḥ*, which signifies 'a man'. When these words are uttered in a way they are mutually expected (*sākāṅkṣam*), it signifies 'a courageous man'. This extra meaning of adjectival-

substantive relation, evolved as a result of the interconnection between the word-meanings, is the sentence-meaning. This view is pointed out in the MB, where Ptj states that the adjectival-substantive relation is different from the individual word-meanings, but it is the sentence-meaning ("*yadatrādhikyam, vākyārthaḥ saḥ*", under P, 2.3.46).

Bh says that this view of sentence-meaning can be perceived in two different ways. The first view is of the universal or *Jāti*, which is supposed to exist in full in each individual of the species. Similarly, if sentence is said to be the collection of words and sentence-meaning rests on many words, then the sentence-meaning exists in full in each word. The second perspective is of number, which exists in the totality of the group. In this view, the sentence-meaning rests on the totality of words (VP, 2.43).

3.5.1.3. *Samsr̥ṣṭa evārthaḥ Vākyārthaḥ*

It is already discussed the view that the sentence-meaning is *samsarga* or the interconnection of the meanings of the individual words. Bh explains this view in another perspective also. In the former view, it was stated that a word in a sentence denotes its individual meaning only and when the meanings of the words are connected together, a qualified meaning emerges, which is the meaning of the sentence. Here, in this perspective, it is stated that the individual word conveys a general

meaning which is potentially capable of being connected with the meanings of other words. When it is actually connected with the other words, it really conveys a meaning connected with the particular meanings of other words. This view differs from the former in the manner that, the word meaning here, is so general and at the same time it is adaptable to all the particulars. The general meaning and the particular meaning are those of the individual word and not of the sentence and is not conveyed by *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *sannidhi*. (VP, 2.44-46). What is peculiar to this view is that, the *saṅghāta* view is explained here, from the point of view of the School of *Anvitābhidhāna*.

3.5.1.4. *Viśeṣarūpāpannaḥ Padārthaḥ Eva Vākyārthaḥ*

Those who define the sentence as 'the first word' (*Padamādyam*) and 'each word requiring the others' (*Prthak Sarvam Padam Sākāṅkṣam*), accept sentence-meaning as the connected meaning. According to them, the whole of the sentence meaning is concentrated in each word (VP, 2.18). But here, we may doubt if the other words in the sentence are of no use. Bh solves this problem, saying that, the other words are not useless, but they make listeners understand the meaning better. If in the very beginning, a connected meaning involving an action and all its accessories are understood, why the accessories are restated in the sentence is also

explained by Bh. It is for specifying the substrata of the powers of the accessories (VP, 2.411-412, trans. K A S Iyer).

3.5.1.5. *Prayojanaṃ Vākyārthaḥ*

Puṅyarāja states that for some, the sentence meaning is *prayojanam* or is in the nature of purpose. This is supposed to be common to all the views on the nature of sentence-meaning. According to this view, the sentence-meaning is neither derived from the interconnection of the meanings of individual words as in the school of *Abhihitānvya*, nor is the connected meaning of each word as in the school of *Anvitābhidhāna*. Here, the word-meaning is the expressed sense and the sentence denotes purpose. What is understood on hearing a sentence is nothing but *abhidheya* or the expressed sense. The sentence-meaning is the purpose, which fulfills the speaker's intention

abhidheyaḥ padasyārtho vākyasyārthaḥ prayojanam

yasya tasya na sambandho vākyānāmupapadyate. (VP, 2.113)

The definition of sentence, propounded by Jaimini, who authored the *sūtras* of *Mīmāṃsā*, also supports this view. He defines sentence in the aphorism "*arthaikatvādekam vākyam sākāṅkṣam ced vibhāge syāt*" (2.1.46). In this aphorism, the term '*arthaikatva*' is explained by Śabara in the sense of 'serving a single purpose' ("*ekaprayojanatvādupapannam*",

2.1.46). Later *Mīmāṃsakas* like Kumārilabhaṭṭa, Pārthasārathimiśra etc are also in favour of this view.

Bh refutes this view, pointing out its defects. He says that if the sentence has no *abhideya* (expressed meaning), there would be no connection between sentences. Such connection is established only through the expressed meaning. He also mentions that this defect can be removed or solved according to the concept of *Anvitābhidhāna* (VP, 2.113)

3.5.1.6. *Pratibhā Vākyārthaḥ*

Bh emphasizes on the *Akhaṇḍa* School of sentence, which holds the indivisibility of the sentence and the sentence-meaning. Bh termed this all-inclusive and indivisible sentence-meaning as *Pratibhā*. In the *Akhaṇḍapakṣa*, sentence-meaning is not derived from the meanings of words in it. Bh introduces the concept of *Pratibhā* in the following verse.

vicchedagrahaṇe'rthānāṃ pratibhānyaiva jāyate

vākyārtha iti tāmāhuḥ padārthairupapāditām (VP, 2.143)

When the meanings of the individual words in a sentence have been understood separately, a flash of understanding takes place. This is the meaning of the sentence, brought about by the meanings of the individual words. In the School of Sentence-Indivisibility, though individual words

and their meanings are considered unreal, they serve the purpose of bringing the sentence-meaning to the mind. In other words, they manifest the sentence-meaning. The listener receives the uttered sounds in a sequential manner and hence the meanings of the parts of a sentence may be perceived in the listener's mind. But as soon as a sentence, the complete linguistic unit, is perceived, a sudden flash of understanding takes place. This flash of understanding is termed as '*Pratibhā*'. The whole semantic exposition of Bh has been developed on this unique as well as original concept.

3.5.2. Various Means of Ascertainment of Meaning

According to Bh, sentence is the primary conveyor of meaning in a communication. Words and word-meanings are only manifesters of the meaning of sentence. In certain situations, word-meanings are even insignificant also. Bh says that to console a crying child, one may threaten him that a tiger would eat him. Here, the intention of the speaker is not to threaten the child, but to put off his crying (VP, 2.321). Sometimes, the intention may be far away from the chief meaning of the sentence. Bh cites some examples for such ambiguities in the meaning. When one says to other 'look at the sun, we have to go', it really indicates the time, even though it says something about sun. (VP, 2.310) Similarly, when a boy is told 'save the butter from the crows', the speaker intends to keep the butter

away from all the birds and animals. Thus, Bh intends to say that the meaning of a sentence does not depend on the meanings of its parts. But it is a flash of understanding. Speakers use the words to express the literal sense and also to express some intended sense. The speaker's intention, embedded in the sentence, cannot be understood through its parts. Bh says that the meanings of words are determined according to the sentence, situation, meaning, propriety, place and time, but not according to its mere external form.

vākyāt prakaraṇādarthaucityāddeśakālataḥ

śabdārthāḥ pravibhajyante na rūpādeva kevalāt. (VP, 2.314)

Besides these factors, he gives an account of contextual and syntactic factors, which helps to determine the precise meaning of an expression.

They are stated in the following verses:-

saṃsargo viprayogasca sāhacaryaṃ virodhitā

arthaḥ prakaraṇaṃ liṅgam śabdasyānyasya sannidhiḥ

sāmarthyamaucitī deśaḥ kālo vyaktiḥ svarādayaḥ

śabdārthasyānavacchede viśeṣasmṛtihetavaḥ. (VP, 2.315-316)

Vṛtti and the commentary of Puṅyarāja makes this view clear by citing examples. K A S Iyer opines that these verses may be quotations from some unknown work (VP, 2.314). Anyway this list has been adopted by

the later philosophers to discuss about the problems of ambiguous expressions.

(i) *Samyoga* (Association):- Some words are used in more than one meaning. The meaning in which it is used in a particular context can be determined by its association with other words. The word *hari* can be taken as the example. This word is used to denote various meanings like 'Lord *Viṣṇu*', 'monkey', 'lion' etc. When this word is associated with the words *śaṅkha* (conch) and *cakra* (discus), it denotes Lord *Viṣṇu*.

(ii) *Viprayoga* (Dissociation):- The meaning of words, which denotes more than one meaning, can be determined by dissociation also. The sentence '*akiśorā dhenurāṇīyatām*' is the given example. The word *dhenu* may denote a 'cow' or a 'mare'. But here, the phrase *akiśorā* (without calf) implies dissociation, which makes it clear that a cow is referred to.

(iii) *Sāhacaryam* (Mutual association):- When somebody says '*Rāma* and *Lakṣmaṇa* went to forest', it is unambiguous that the son of *Daśaratha* is referred to here, but not *Balarāma* (the brother of *Kṛṣṇa*). This meaning is determined on the basis of mutual association of *Rāma* with *Lakṣmaṇa*.

(iv) *Virodhitā* (opposition):- It is stated that the word *Rāma* refers to the son of *Daśaratha* when associated with the word *Lakṣmaṇa*. Similarly

when the same word *Rāma* is used in the compound word *Rāmārjunau* (*Rāma* and *Arjuna*), it obviously denotes *Paraśurāma* (incarnation of Lord *Viṣṇu*). It is because of the hostility between *Paraśurāma* and *Kārtavīryārjuna*.

(v) *Arthaḥ* (Purpose):- The word *Sthāṇu* means a 'pillar' or 'Lord *Śiva*'. When someone is asked to 'worship *sthāṇu*', the purpose of the speaker is to worship Lord *Śiva*, not the pillar. Thus the purpose of the speaker helps the listener to determine the latter meaning of the term.

(vi) *Prakaraṇam* (Context):- The well-known example is the expression '*Saindhavam ānaya*', in which the word *saindhavam* signifies both 'salt' and 'horse'. Here, the meaning is determined by the context. If it is the time of eating, the term denotes 'salt' and it denotes 'horse' at the time of travel.

(vii) *Liṅga* (Indicatory sign):- Matilal explains this as follows; "some sign may be present in the larger context (within the passage), and this may help to resolve the ambiguity" (1992, p.25). An example is taken from a Vedic passage, which reads as "*aktāḥ śarkarā upadadhāti*", means 'the wet pebbles are placed on the altar'. Here, the word *aktāḥ* signifies 'wet'. To make the pebbles wet, they can be soaked in any liquid, because it is not specified in the sentence. Since the context mentions 'clarified butter', we

have to understand that it is an indicative sign that the pebbles should be wetted by the clarified butter.

(viii) *Śabdasyānyasya sannidhiḥ* (Proximity with another word):-

This is also a sort of association, but differs from *Sāhacaryam* or *Virodhitā*. Here, it is not the psychological association as in the case of *Sāhacaryam* or *Virodhitā*, but perhaps a physical proximity or a syntactical connection is meant (Matilal, 1992, p.26). The example given by Matilal is the word *Purārāti*, which literally means 'destroyer of cities'. Though any king can be denoted by the word, it obviously refers to Lord *Śiva*,

(ix) *Sāmarthyā* (Capacity):- When one says "*abhirūpāya kanyā deya*", it is clear that the girl has to be married to a handsome groom. Though the word groom is not said by the speaker, the listener understands it. Similarly when one says "I am intoxicated with madhu", the word *madhu* would mean wine, not the spring season.

(x) *Aucitī* (Propriety):- This is a variation of the former concept. In a poetic context, the same word *madhu* can also signify the spring season. In that particular situation, it may proper to say "I am intoxicated with the advent of the spring season".

(xi) *Deśa* (Place):- In the expression '*Bhātīha paramēśvaraḥ*', which means 'here shines the master', the word '*paramēśvara*' signifies 'the king'

and not Lord *Śiva*. The reference to the place 'here' helps to attribute this meaning to the term.

(xii) *Kāla* (Time):- When one says "*citrabhānu shines now*", the word *citrabhānu* refers to sun if it is said at daytime and it refers to fire or light if it is uttered at night.

(xiii) *Vyakti* (Grammatical gender):- It is well-known that the term '*Mitra*' in Sanskrit signifies 'sun' when it is used in masculine gender. And the same word means 'friend', if it is used in neuter gender.

(xiv) *Svara* (Accent):- A well-known example is cited in MB that the word '*Indraśatru*' with accent on the last syllable means 'one who kills *Indra*'. When the first syllable of the word is accented, it means 'the one, whose killer is *Indra*'. Thus in Veda, a word may denote a different or opposite meaning if the accent used is improper.

These are the contextual factors that help to determine the meaning of an expression unambiguously. Bh says that even many more factors are there, which influence the meaning of a word. Thus, it is obvious that Bh takes into account the grammatical, syntactical, psychological and contextual factors for determining the intended meaning. These factors are not related to a specific language, but they are universal in nature. Thus it becomes clear that he deals with the problems of communicability of language and word-meaning relationship in a comprehensive manner.

Chapter 4

The Concept of *Pratibhā* and its Implications

4.1. Origin and Development of the Concept of *Pratibhā*

The concept of *Pratibhā* is discussed elaborately in almost all schools of thought in India and the preceptors perceive this concept in different dimensions. Normally, In Indian philosophy, the concept of *Pratibhā* might be conceived as the 'supersensuous and suprarational apperception for grasping the truth directly'. (Gayathri Rath, 2000, p.141). Even though there are a few references to the term *Pratibhā* in Vedic literature, we can trace the concept in RV and *Nirukta*. In RV, the term *Pratibhā* is referred to as '*pratibabhau*' ("*tritām kūpe' vahitam etat sūktam pratibabhau*", 1.105.17). Here, the word '*pratibabhau*' denotes revelation or a quick understanding of insight or a sudden thought (Gayathri Rath, 2000, p.142). In *Nirukta*, it is stated as *pratibabhau*, which signifies 'it was revealed'. Yāska uses the word in a different sense also as 'image', 'light' or 'splendour' (2002, 4.6; 14.4)

The word *Pratibhā* is etymologically derived from the root '*bhā*', which means 'to shine' (*dīptau*). The prefix *prati* and the suffixes *kaḥ* and *tāp* are added to the root. The suffix *kaḥ* is added in the sense of either

'*karma*' or '*bhāva*'. Hence the meaning of the word *Pratibhā* can be taken as '*Pratibhāti, śobhate iti Pratibhā*' (to shine) or '*Pratibhāti arthaḥ anayā iti sā Pratibhā*' (that which gives the meaning). Dasgupta remarks that in its ordinary non-technical use, the term *Pratibhā* refers to an intuition of what may occur in future. It also includes the power of understanding of all kinds of sounds without effort, all that may be communicated by any animal in the world and the power of having heavenly visions (1975, p.342). Various Indian schools of thought used this concept in their technical discussions in different dimensions. It may be discussed here at some length and afterwards Bh's conception of *Pratibhā* will be discussed elaborately.

4.2. The Concept of *Pratibhā* in Indian Philosophy

In general, Indian schools of thought use the term *Pratibhā* as a concept which indicates any kind of knowledge, which is not sense-borne. As it implies a super sensuous knowledge, the prime characters of this concept are immediacy and intense clarity. Hence it is described as a flash or the sense of wisdom characterised by immediacy and freshness (*nanavonmeṣaśālinī prajñā*). It is because of the super sensuous nature, *Pratibhā* is transcendental and non-empirical. It is always free from the limitations of time and space. In this sense, it is rather equivalent to intuition. In Indian systems of thought, the concept of *Pratibhā* is

described both as an inherent power and as an act of voluntary consciousness (Gayatri Rath, 2000, p.141). As an inherent power of wisdom, it can be sublimated to the intuitive knowledge of the self. As an act, it has the capacity to put someone into creative forms such as poetry or art. Thus, Dr. Padma Sudhi puts forth that *Pratibhā* as the intuitive knowledge, gives expressions to the art forms as talent or genius. Thus artistic talent or genius is nothing but *Pratibhā* and its spiritual quest (Vol.3, 1983, p.124). In short, the concept of *Pratibhā* is omnipresent in all novel ideas in any area of science, art, literature or philosophy etc. In other words, they are inspired by *Pratibhā*.

In one way or other, almost all Indian philosophies have included this super sensuous knowledge or intuition in their technical discussions. The doctrine of *Pratibhā*, in the same form or other, has ever been an article of universal acceptance in India. Except Cārvākas, all other philosophers describe a super-natural perception, which enables one to directly grasp the real nature of things. Most of these schools may not name this unique perception as *Pratibhā*, but the Schools of Yoga, Vedānta and Buddhism exclusively discussed the characteristics of it. Cārvāka system, being a materialistic philosophy, denies any sort of super-natural perception. According to them, sense perception is the only source of knowledge. Coward opines that in the Cārvāka system, everything is

derived from material elements which are judged to possess their own *svabhāva* or the immanent life force. (1980, p.50). It has to be noted that, Bh recognises *Pratibhā* as *Svabhāvaja* (*Pratibhā*, that derives from the *svabhāva* or nature), while describing the six kinds of it¹⁷(VP, 2.152). Thus, the omnipresence of *Pratibhā* in the Cārvāka School cannot be denied completely. In Jainism, we may find no direct reference to this concept. Still they implicitly discussed similar notions while they describe the concept of *avadhijñāna* or *kevalajñāna*. The followers of *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* school do not accept any kind of super-natural perception and therefore they refute the *Pratibhā* theory. But Kumārila, in his *Ślokavārtika*, invokes *Mahā Deva* (Supreme Being), who possesses a *Divya cakṣus* (Divine Eye) in the form of three Vedas (1). Here, the *Divya cakṣus* (Divine Eye), which has a capacity of super-natural perception, in its essence, is equivalent to *Pratibhā*. There is no direct reference of this concept in the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy also. But we may find some description of intuitional consciousness while discussing about *Kaivalya* (J Prasad, 2010, p.17). *Nyāya* philosophy also uses this term to signify the intuitive consciousness from which, fresh and novel ideas are awakened. M B Jhalakikar points out that the concept is defined in the *Nyāya* School as "*sphūrtyākhyo budhiviśeṣaḥ*" ('a special mode of forming and retaining

¹⁷ Six kinds of *Pratibhā* are explicated under 4.6 in this thesis.

conceptions of the quivering or sudden appearance of description', trans. Gayatri Rath, 2000, p.147) or "*prajñā navanavonmeṣaśālinī Pratibhā matā*" (intuitive consciousness abounding in always new awakenings). (Quoted by Gayatri Rath, 2000, p.147)

Yoga discusses the concept of *Pratibhā* exclusively so as to describe the super-natural perception or omniscience that a yogi attains in contemplation. Here, the term *prajñā* is often used in the sense of *Pratibhā*. The most significant reference is seen in the third chapter of Ptj's *Yogasūtra*, which states that "*Pratibhādvā sarvam*" (3.33). One who practises yoga can attain the real nature of all because of *Pratibhā* or the innate capacity. Here, *Pratibhā* is described as a spontaneous flash of insight, which is awakened with the practise of concentration. This state is termed as '*sasmita samādhi*', in which, one becomes self-conscious as well as 'all-conscious'. Once *Pratibhā* is awakened, one attains the power of super normal perception of hearing, touch, sight, taste and awareness of events of the subtle, concealed, remote whether past or future. ("*prātibhaṃ nāma tārakam. tadvivekajasya jñānasya pūrvarūpam. tena vā sarvameva jānāti yogī prātibhasya jñānasyotpattāviti*", *Vyāsbhāṣya*, 3.33) Thus in the Yoga school, all sort of omniscience can be explained through this unique concept of *Pratibhā* and hence it is considered as an important thesis by the followers of this school.

The word '*Pratibhā*' is seen in earlier Buddhist literature itself. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, one of the oldest canonical works of Buddhists, refers to four types of poets, among which the last one is '*Pratibhānakavi*' (quoted by Gayatri Rath, 2000, p.147). We can assume that the *Pratibhā* theory of Bh influenced Diṅnāga, the famous Buddhist logician. He mentions in his *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* that meaning of a sentence is *Pratibhā* under the influence of VP¹⁸.

apoddhāre padasyāyaṃ vākyād artho vivecitaḥ
vākyārthaḥ pratibhākhyo yaṃ tenādāvupajanyate.

(Quoted by Coward and Raja, 2007, p.28, fn.26)

4.3. The Concept of *Pratibhā* in Indian Poetics

The concept of *Pratibhā*, as a source of innovative and fresh ideas, has been placed at its core by rhetoricians in their literary theories. The semantic as well as psychological study of *Pratibhā* by Bh, the famous philosopher cum linguist, inspired rhetoricians much. Bh's conception of *Pratibhā* as eternal, undivided and of the nature of continuous intuition, has given a new perspective to the rhetoricians to pave new pathways in

¹⁸ Many scholars of modern times have rightly observed the indebtedness of Diṅnāga to Bh in his main work *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*. He quotes three verses of VP in this work to support his arguments. Masaaki Hattori argues that the Buddhist theory of language, *anyāpoha* resembles Bh's concept of *Jāti* discussed in the *Jāṭisamuddeśa* of VP. (Coward and Raja, 2007, p.27)

the Alankāraśāstra. Almost all the preceptors of the School of Poetics in India have tried to define this concept in various perspectives. In general, Alaṅkāraśāstra has taken it as the root of all poetic creations. It is an intuition or intellect of a poet from where fresh and creative sparks are bloomed. It is the power of intellect whereby the poet sees the subjects of his poem as steeped in beauty and gives a vivid and beautiful picture of what he has seen.

This innate capacity of a poet has been called in various names such as *Pratibhā*, *Śakti* etc in Indian Poetics. In *Kāvyaḷaṅkāra*, Bhāmaha states that "*kāvyaṃ tu jāyate jātu kasyacit pratibhāvataḥ*"(1.5). He opines that *Pratibhā* is the most important equipment for a poet to compose poetry. Later preceptors of Poetics also maintain almost the same view as of Bhāmaha. Rudraṭa, who also authored a work named *Kāvyaḷaṅkāra*, calls it as *śakti*, which is characterised by extraordinary innate attribute of soul and poetic imagination shines forth on it (1.15). Vāmana, one of the prominent *Ālaṅkārika* in the pre-*dhvani* period, emphasises in his treatise *Kāvyaḷaṅkārasūtravṛtti* that *Pratibhā* is the sole cause of poetry. His perspective of *Pratibhā* is clear in these words; "*kavitābījaṃ pratibhānaṃ, yasmāt vinā kāvyaṃ na niṣpadyate, niṣpannaṃ vā hāsyāyatanam syāt*" (1.3.16). The germ of poetry is *Pratibhā*, in the absence of which, poetry

does not originate and even if composed, it will be ridiculed by the society.

Ānandavardhana, the foremost thinker in Indian poetics as well as the founder of *Dhvani* School of literary criticism, has given a prime position to the concept of *Pratibhā* in his *magnum opus Dhvanyāloka*. He was much influenced by Bh's perspectives of *Pratibhā* as well as *sphoṭa*. Bh's concept of *Pratibhā* is all-inclusive that the scope of this concept reaches all the aspects of universal activities. Ānandavardhana restricts this concept to the poetic imagination and extends its scope in the realm of Aesthetics and Poetics. Thus, he acknowledges the indebtedness to the views of the grammarians in developing the theory of *Dhvani*. ("prathame hi vidvāṃso vaiyākaranāḥ, 2006,p.138). Ānandavardhana builds up his whole theses of literary criticism with the *Pratibhā* at its core. He and the followers of the School of *Dhvani* reiterate the supremacy of imagination and *rasa* in their theses. Poet's imagination is deeply rooted in *Pratibhā* or it is the manifestation of *Pratibhā*. It needs no external guidance or requirements to manifest the poetry. This can also be equated with the famous definition of poetry by William Wordsworth as "all good poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful emotions" (Brett and Jones, 1963,p.266). Ānandavardhana views that without *Pratibhā*, poetry cannot be composed. He also adds that *Pratibhā* can make up the lack of learning

or scholarship, but the lacking of *Pratibhā* can be substituted by none. *Pratibhā* as a poetic flash transforms an ordinary man into a poet having a vision or *darśana*. It is said that a seer (*Rṣi*) having a *darśana* only can be a poet. Rhetoricians have no dispute among them in the view that a poet should be capable of expressing that which he 'sees' (*varṇanānipuṇaḥ*). But this poetic expression flashes forth only with the help of *darśana* or *Pratibhā*, as mentioned.

According to Rājaśekhara, *Pratibhā* is the creative faculty of the poet as well as the reader. Hence he conceives *Pratibhā* in two ways; *Kārayitṛī* and *Bhāvayitṛī* respectively. Thus, earlier as well as later rhetoricians accept *Pratibhā* as the inherent wonderful faculty of natural disposition and inborn gift of the poet (Gayatri Rath, 2000,p.149). In other words, it is the intelligent faculty of intellect where new and novel blooming of ideas arise.

4.4. The Concept of *Pratibhā* in VP

As discussed, *Sphoṭa* is the auditory impression of the sentence uttered and *Pratibhā* is its meaning. According to Bh, sentence is the basic meaningful unit in a communication and we understand the meaning as a flash of understanding in the light of *Pratibhā*. The sentence theory of Bh

is to be understood from the context of his general theory of knowledge, *Pratibhā*. Bh defines the very concept as:-

vichedagrahaṇe'rthānām pratibhānyaiva jāyate.

vākyārtha iti tāmāhuḥ padārthairupapāditām. (VP, 2.143)

When the meanings of the individual words in a sentence are understood separately, a flash of understanding takes place, which is different from the word-meanings and is called sentence-meaning. This meaning is brought about by the meanings of the individual words, but at the same time, it is unique as well as devoid of parts. Each utterance reveals the *sphoṭa* (an auditory impression) while *Pratibhā* immediately translates it into meaning. Bh conceives the concept of *Pratibhā* in a unique manner that, he envisages it both semantically as well as psychologically. *Pratibhā* in the semantic perspective is the sentence-meaning. From the psychological point of view, it may be perceived as an 'intuitive instinct', which has intuitive powers ranging from instinctive knowledge of animals or birds to super-natural perceptions of yogis.

4.5. Characteristics of *Pratibhā*

Bh expounds the characteristic features of this concept in several verses. He states that though *Pratibhā* is experienced by everyone within

himself, it cannot be explained to others as 'it is this'. Even the subject, who experienced it, is not able to render an account of it to himself.

idaṃ taditi sānyeṣāmanākhyeyā kathañcana

pratyātmavṛttisiddhā sā kartrāpi na nirūpyate. (VP, 2.144)

K A S Iyer explains this verse by citing an example of a drink made up of many ingredients. It is difficult to explain the taste of such a drink to others, even by the one who tastes it (VP, 2.146). Thus, Bh calls the *Pratibhā* as 'Avicārita' or indefinable.

upaśleṣamivārthānāṃ sā karotyavicāritā

sārvarūpyamivāpannā viṣayatvena vartate. (VP, 2.145)

Puṇyarāja explains that, this flash of understanding brings about an amalgamation (*Upaśleṣa*) of the meanings of the individual words, which were not connected before (*Asaṃsrṣṭa*).

Bh suggests that *Pratibhā* would be revealed when the speech faculty comes into action. *Pratibhā* is produced either through the words or through the *Bhāvana*, one's predispositions.

sākṣācchabdena janitāṃ bhāvanānugamena vā

itikartavyatāyāṃ tāṃ na kaścīdativartate. (VP, 2.146)

Thus, there are two possibilities in the production of *pratibhā*. If it is

manifested by the uttered speech, it can be produced here and it should be inherited from previous births, if produced by the *bhāvanā*. Bh argues that none can avoid its presence in his/her activities. Each and every activity is motivated by the *Pratibhā*. People indulge in their activities only when they are motivated either by mental stimulation or from the previous impressions acquired (even from previous births). A mental stimulation is the idea originated in the mind or inspired by the audible sounds. What is worthy of note here is that, the flash of understanding is always preceded by the linguistic faculty or *śabdabhāvanā*.

Pratibhā is the cause of any sentient being indulged in any activity. In other words, any action in this world presupposes a will to act. When it is impregnated with words, it becomes cognizable by the listener. Thus Bh opines that the whole world considers *Pratibhā* as an authority.

pramāṇatvena tāṃ lokaḥ sarvaḥ samanuśyati

samārambhāḥ pratāyante tiraścāmapī tadvaśāt. (VP, 2.147)

No activity of a living being is possible without the precedence of *Pratibhā*. Bh argues that *Pratibhā* is the reason behind the transformation of the voice of male cuckoo during the spring season. The same *pratibhā* teaches animals and birds to build nests. *Pratibhā* motivates the stimulations of hunger, thirst, love etc. in animals and birds (VP, 2.148-

151). Here, Bh says that *Pratibhā* or *śabda* is present in every living being by birth itself. In living beings other than human beings, it is not fully developed. In new born babies, it is the reason behind their communication through crying, laughing etc. They cannot speak, only because their speech organs are not mature enough.

4.5.1. *Pratibhā*: A Semantic Concept

Pratibhā is the semantic unit of communication, where sentence-meaning shines forth. The semantic characteristics of *Pratibhā* have been glimpsed elaborately in the previous chapter (under 3.5.1.6). The whole discussions of Bh on sentence-meaning is to be understood on the basis of the concept of *Pratibhā* elucidated by him. *Sphoṭa* and *Pratibhā* are the two major linguistic components underlying the synactico-semantic analysis of sentence in VP. "According to Bh, sentence is the meaningful linguistic unit. Every expression consists of three elements i.e. *dhvani* (*nāda* or the physical sound), *sphoṭa* (intermediary mental word) and *artha* (meaning)" (Gayatri Rath, 2000, p.149). Thus apart from the physical sound *dhvani* and the intermediary auditory image *sphoṭa*, there is another knowledge which prevails in the intellect. This transforms *sphoṭa* into meaning in a flash and is known as *Pratibhā*. This transformation takes place so fast that the gap between the flash and the understanding of the sentence-meaning cannot be noticed.

4.5.2. *Pratibhā*: Indivisibility of meaning

Bh advocates that sentence cannot be divided into smaller parts rather it is a single unit. Modern scholars also suggest that the whole expression should be taken into account in a conversation to understand the meaning. Bh's *Akhaṇḍa* school considers sentence as a unified whole, which cannot be derived from its parts viz. words or syllables (VP 1.73). Though the words in a sentence are grasped successively, the perception of the sentence is simultaneous, when the meaning is flashed in the listener's mind. (Raja, 1962, p.134-135).

According to the *Akhaṇḍa* School, *Pratibhā* is also devoid of parts or sequence. It cannot be divided into word-meanings. In other words, sentence-meaning is not evolved as a result of the summation of individual meanings of the components. *Mīmāṃsakas* as well as *Naiyāyikas*, who belong to the *Sakhaṇḍa* school advocate that the sentence-meaning is evolved from the word-meanings. Here, word is considered as the unit of meaning and not a product of sentence analysis. According to Bh, the concept of sentence can be perceived from both the levels of communication and grammar. In the level of communication, sentence is the meaningful unit of language and is a unified whole or devoid of components. Sentence-meaning is also grasped as a whole by the hearer. Thus words and word-meanings have no independent status in

communicating a thought or an idea. While sentence is analysed for the purpose of grammatical studies, words are only abstracted from the sentence (*apoddhāra*). In linguistics and grammar, words and word-meanings abstracted from sentence have great importance. Thus according to Bh, components of a sentence are significant only for studying grammar (*śāstra vyavahāra*) and they have no independent status in communication.

As the sentence-meaning *Pratibhā* is grasped as a whole, it lacks any sequential nature. Bh states that *śabda*, which is devoid of divisions, is also devoid of any sequence (VP, 1.48). To quote A N Hota:-

According to Bh, sequence which belongs to the phonological act is imposed upon time. Intellect gets expanded along with sequence of sounds it perceives and so sequence leaves its marking on intellect. Intellect has a dual ability, namely to grasp wholes with or without sequence, and so becomes capable of perceiving one object in 'singleness' and diversity. Lastly, since sounds appear in our notion with a sequence, the meaning which comes from sounds also appear to have a sequence in our notion, although it is indivisible. These are presuppositions for understanding the character of meaning (1985, p.143).

4.5.3. Extra-lingual Meaning

Bh rightly observes that apart from the ordinary meaning, sentences express some extra lingual meanings very often in verbal communication (VP, 2.310-313). Some philosophers call it as '*Lakṣaṇa*' or secondary meaning, which is either depending upon speaker's intention or on contextual factors. Even though sentence is considered as the meaningful unit of language, in most of the cases, a sentence cannot be analysed apart from the context in which it is uttered. The circumstances, in which the communication takes place, obviously influence the meaning. Here, the word 'context' includes not just the environmental surroundings of the speaker, but it signifies several factors that help the hearer to fix the meaning. Bh refers to a list of several factors, which influence the meaning of a sentence (VP, 2.316-317) and these are elucidated in the previous chapter. Thus, the coalescence of word-meanings cannot determine the sentence-meaning. This supports the indivisibility theory of sentence-meaning.

School of *Vyākaraṇa* accept only the primary sense which is based on lexical meaning. But even in the conversations of our daily life, we use expressions and phrases whose meaning cannot be understood by knowing the sentence-meaning or word-meanings. In these situations, the primary sense fails to convey the meaning of the expression. Philosophies like

Nyāya, *Vedānta* etc. as well as the school of *Alaṅkāraśāstra* accept several levels of meanings beyond the lexical meaning like *lakṣyārtha* (secondary meaning), *vyañgyārtha* (suggestive meaning), *tātparyārtha*, *prakaraṇārtha* etc. They are the extra-lingual meanings which are over and above the ordinary meanings of the sentence. Bh's concept of *Pratibhā* includes these infinite levels of meaning that shines forth from a conversation.

4.5.4. *Pratibhā*: An Intuitive Instinct

Bh emphasises that nobody can avoid *Pratibhā* in one's activities, which is produced either through words or through *bhāvana*.

sākṣācchabdena janitāṃ bhāvanānugamena vā

itikartavyatāyāṃ tāṃ na kaścīdativartate. (VP. 2.146)

Each and every activity of living beings is preceded by this intuitive knowledge. In communication, it is produced by the words while it is born with a predisposition (*itikartavyatā*) in the case of children or animals. The day-to-day activities of all animals develop because of this *Pratibhā*. It is not only comprehension or manifestation of an idea, but also the knowledge of how to act. Here, *Pratibhā* is conceived at the level of instincts of animals and birds. As we know, all animals have a tendency to act according to the nature of their classes of beings. Sometimes they tend to act in response to the stimulations from the outer environment also. But

from where does this tendency arise, is the central problem. Zoologists as well as Psychologists show their interest in this field. They suggest that animals act according to their instincts. Without instincts the organism would be an inert lifeless mass only. They are the motivators and shapers of all individuals and their social life. Instincts are inborn complex patterns of behaviour that exist in most members of the species. Any behaviour is instinctive if it is performed without being based upon prior experience, and is therefore an expression of innate biological factors. Sea turtles, newly hatched on a beach will automatically move towards the ocean. Communication of honeybees by dancing in the direction of food source is another example. Other examples include animal fighting, animal courtship behaviour, internal escape functions and the building of nests. In general, it is defined as:-

largely inheritable and unalterable tendency of an organism to make a complex and specific response to environmental stimuli without involving reason. (<https://www.merriam-webster.com/instinct>)

These instincts or behaviour patterns are inherited or inborn and manifested in response to certain stimuli.

Bh tries to answer these complex behaviours and instincts of animals through the concept of *Pratibhā*. He remarks that intuitions are

produced just as some substances acquire the power to intoxicate without the help of any external efforts. According to him, *Pratibhā* is an intuitive knowledge and this transforms the voice of the male cuckoo in spring season as well as teaches animals to build nests etc. *Pratibhā* stimulates animals and birds on to actions like eating, loving, hating, swimming etc. associated with particular species (VP, 2.148-150, Trans. K A S Iyer). Puṅyarāja compares this intuition to the conscience of good people (*sajjana*), which enables them to decide what is right and what is wrong quite instinctively. To support this argument, he also quotes Kālidāsa's famous verse "*satām hi sandehapadeṣu vastuṣu pramāṇamantaḥkaraṇapravṛttayah*" (VP, 2.147). Kālidāsa tries to convey the idea that 'for good people, their own conscience is the guiding force or authority, in matters of doubt'. Puṅyarāja remarks that these intuitions are caused by predispositions, peculiar to every living being of different species and these are deeply rooted in the intuitive knowledge *Pratibhā*.

Bh again puts forth an idea that this intuition is the result of *āgama* (tradition), accompanied by *bhāvanā*.

bhāvanānugatād etad āgamād eva jāyate

āsattiviprakaṣābhyām āgamastu viśiṣyate. (VP, 2.151)

In this verse, the words *āgama*, *bhāvanā*, *āsatti* and *viprakaṣa* are not

clear. It is difficult to decide what Bh meant by these words. Puṅyarāja understands the word '*āgama*' as *śabda* or the word. Therefore, *śabda*, either proximate or remote is the cause of intuition. *Bhāvanā* is the tendency to act according to the nature of the different classes of beings. Thus *Pratibhā* arises from *āgama*, which is assisted by *Bhāvanā*. Raghunatha Sarma explains this verse as follows:-

bhāvanāśahakāreṇa Pratibhāyā hetubhūtaḥ āgamaḥ dvividhaḥ - āsanno viprakṛṣṭaśca. tatrāsanna iha janmani, viprakṛṣṭo janmāntare ityevamāsattiviprakaṣābhyām śabda eva Pratibhāheturiti. (VP 2.151)

It gets clear from this explanation, that the word or *śabda* is the root of *Pratibhā*. It is proximate if it arises in this very life and is remote when it is inherited from the previous births. K A S Iyer have some pertinent suggestions in this regard. He doubts when Puṅyarāja says that the word '*āgama*' signifies *śabda*, whether he has the words of Veda in mind. Similarly, by the word '*bhāvanā*', does Bh mean what he calls '*śabdabhāvanā*' in VP 1.114 (VP, 2.151, Trans. K A S Iyer, 63). Bh's theory of *śabdabrahma* can also be conjoined here. He says that:-

*na so' sti pratyayoloke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte
anuviddhamiva jñānam sarvam śabdena bhāsate. (VP, 1.123)*

Every cognition in this world is associated with *śabda* and nothing is

omitted from the light of *śabda*. Thus the intuitive knowledge *Pratibhā* and the instincts are all deeply rooted in *śabda* or the word. This clearly indicates the all pervasiveness of Bh's language theory which intrudes into the deeper levels of human thoughts.

4.6. *Pratibhā*: its sources

To Bh, *Pratibhā* is '*anirvacanīya*', or that cannot be described to others as 'it is this'. But he tries to explain the ways through which *Pratibhā* is manifested. Though the very concept is peculiar to his theory of sentence meaning, Bh uses the word in a broad general perspective, which can be manifested in six different ways and thereby he admits six kinds of intuitions or *Pratibhā*. The six sources of *Pratibhā* are *Svabhāva*, *Carāṇa*, *Abhyāsa*, *Yoga*, *Adṛṣṭa* and *Viśiṣṭopahita*.

svabhāvacaraṇābhyāsayogādrṣṭopapādītām

viśiṣṭopahitām ceti pratibhāṃ ṣaḍvidhāṃ viduḥ. (VP, 2.152)

Bh does not give elucidation and examples for each kind of *Pratibhā*, while some explanations are seen in the *Vṛtti* and the commentary of Puṇyarāja. Both these commentaries differ at some points in giving examples of six kinds.

(i) The first kind of *Pratibhā* is caused by *svabhāva* or nature. The word '*svabhāva*' refers to the instinctive knowledge of animals, which

enables them to engage in activities appropriate to their species. Puṅyarāja illustrates this with an example of monkey and its activities (VP, 2.152). A slightly different opinion is described in the ancient commentary, the *Vṛtti* of VP. It mentions an example of natural tendency of *Prakṛti* (primordial matter) to evolve into *Mahat* and our natural tendency of waking up from deep sleep (VP, 2.152).

(ii) The second cause of *Pratibhā* is *carāṇa*, which generally denotes a Vedic School. But here, it signifies *śiṣṭācāra*. This kind of *Pratibhā* is awakened, if one strictly follows the duties or *karma* according to his Vedic school. Puṅyarāja gives no more explanations except for the first kind, saying that all the others are clear and they need no elucidations ("*carāṇādiṣūdhāraṇānyūhyāni*", VP, 2.152). The knowledge of the great seer Vasiṣṭha who acquired special illumination by strictly observing the prescription of his Vedic school is the example given in the *Vṛtti* ("*carāṇanimittā kācit pratibhā. tadyathā - ācarāṇenaivāvadṛtaprakāśaviśeṣāṇām vasiṣṭhādīnām*", VP, 2.152). Raghunatha Sarma also explains the special illumination of Vasiṣṭha through which he could know the events in past, present and future. It indicates that through such observance, one may achieve a spiritual power resulting in a special capacity to perceive things that others are not able to know.

(iii) The third cause of intuition is *Abhyāsa*, which is generally translated as repeated practice. The declaration of expert hydro geologists and jewellers are prominent examples. Here, the *Vṛtti* suggests an example of the knowledge of a man, who can tell the existence of water for digging a well. All are not able to say where is the suitable place for digging a well, so also the knowledge of the genuineness of precious stones. This knowledge is not identical with inferential knowledge. According to Bh, knowledge of genuineness cannot be identified with inferential knowledge for it requires long practice which enables them to attain that skill. All such knowledge tends to reach a higher stage by practice. The expert knowledge of precious stones and metals is *asamākhyeya* or inexplicable to others and is caused by *abhyāsa* (regular practice) only. It cannot be achieved by means of *anumāna*. Such an expertise is inherited from a long cultural tradition. This intuition is the result of *āgama* (tradition) accompanied by *bhāvanā*, the tendency to act according to the nature of the different classes of beings. If one gets some instances of referring a particular word with a particular applied meaning due to *Abhyāsa*, that word starts indicating that particular meaning, at least for that individual. Thus *Abhyāsa* is also one of the causes of *Pratibhā*.

(iv) Yoga is another cause of *Pratibhā*. Through Yoga, one can imagine what is going on in others mind. The self-consciousness, which is

all consciousness, is *Pratibhā* and in the light of which, all things are revealed simultaneously and in all their aspects (Gopinath M Kaviraj, 1924, p.11). The vision of Vasiṣṭha about the real nature of *Rāma* can be treated as an example for this kind of *Pratibhā*. Unable to see *Rāma* wearing *valkala*, while getting ready to go for forest, Vasiṣṭha closed his eyes for a while. In the meantime he could see the real nature of *Rāma* (J Prasad, 2010, p.60).

(v) The fifth cause of *Pratibhā* is *adr̥ṣṭa*. It is the power of *Rakṣas* (demons) and *Piśāca* (the evil spirit) which enables them to enter the bodies of others and make themselves invisible (VP, 2.152, comm. *Vṛtti*). An individual is able to perform some unique activities led by some potency which he requires from his part *karma*. This invisible power is *adr̥ṣṭa* and due to this power, one can perform super sensible things.

(vi) Lastly, *Pratibhā* is manifested due to *visiṣṭopahita* or the grace of special person. The example illustrated in the *Vṛtti* is the special knowledge which *Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana* gave to *Saṅjaya* and others; thereby they could see the *Kurukṣetra* war as such. Again, Lord *Kṛṣṇa* gives the mystic insight to *Arjuna* to see his cosmic form in the same context.

Thus it is very clear that *Pratibhā* has been conceived in a very comprehensive way in VP. *Pratibhā* exists in every living being

accompanied by *bhāvanā*. The manifestations of *Pratibhā* range from the basic instincts of animals and birds to the superhuman perceptions of *Ṛṣis* ("*ṛṣīṅāmapi yajñānaṃ tadapyāgamapūrvakam*", VP, 1.30). Thus, we can conclude that the genius of a poet or a scientist or an *Ṛṣi* has no quantitative difference from the average man's intuition or instincts of animals.

4.7. The Concept of *Pratibhā* and its Implications

4.7.1. *Pratibhā* and Vāk

The whole second canto of VP highlights the semantic nature of *Pratibhā*, which has been discussed in detail. But Bh treated the concept beyond its linguistic characteristics. He revealed the philosophic as well as psychological outlook of this concept. Bh explains the process of cognising the meaning in a language act in two perspectives. He analyses the speech act both from the points of view of the speaker and the hearer. To him, a linguistic communication can be said complete when the speaker expresses his intention through sounds and the hearer understands what the speaker intends to mean. In this context, what K A S Iyer remarks, is relevant. He puts forth the view that Bh perceives *Pratibhā* from two different dimensions i.e. from the point of view of the speaker's experience before utterance and that of the hearer's experience after

hearing the utterance. When *Pratibhā* is analysed from the hearer's point of view, it is a linguistic entity, which gives rise to the cognition of the sentence-meaning. *Pratibhā* transforms the sentence heard into meaning. This explains the semantic feature of *Pratibhā*, where the sentence-meaning shines forth as a flash. When it is analysed from the speaker's angle, *Pratibhā* precedes the utterance. Here, *Pratibhā* is not conceived in the form of any language and thus the units of language, either in the form of sentence or words are not important. Coward identifies this state of *Pratibhā* with *Paśyanti* stage of *Vāk*, after which, comes the utterance (1980, p.14-15). The *Vṛtti* also points to this aspect of *Pratibhā* (VP, 1.14).

According to Bh, the speech principle *Vāk* has three stages in the course of its manifestation viz. *paśyanti*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī* (VP, 1.144, citation). Later grammarians like Nāgeśa and Kaundabhaṭṭa adds another division known as *parā* to this list. This fourfold classification of speech principle is developed in *Tantraśāstra* and the *Pratyabhijñā* School of philosophy. According to Bh, *parā* and *paśyanti* are identical. Gaurinath Sastri argues that Bh accepts no stage higher than *paśyanti* (See Gowrinath Sastri, 1959, chs.1-4). Among these three stages, *Vaikharī* form of speech is the first level of speech act, which is called as *dhvani*. This is the physical sound that which is really heard by the sense of hearing and can be differentiated as phonemes, words and sentences. This

word is sequential in nature and all the peculiarities of speaker are also present in this state. As the name indicates, *madhyamā* form of speech is an 'intermediate' as it lies in between *vaikhari* and *paśyanti*. The language and the thought conveyed by it are undifferentiated in this state. Bh says that it is located in the *buddhi* and is accompanied by *prāṇa* (breath). Thus it is psychological in its nature and can be comprehended by the intellect (VP, 1.144). This corresponds to *Prākṛtadhvani* described in the first chapter of VP. The third and supreme stage *paśyanti* is the *śabdabrahman*, which is explicated in the opening verse of VP. This purest as well as subtlest form of *śabda* is abstract in nature and has no sequence. It is indivisible and beyond worldly use. This has been identified with *Pratibhā*, the flash of insight. Vṛṣabhadeva expounds this form of *Vāk* in his *Paddhati*, an ancient commentary of VP as:- comm. on VP, 1.14 reads as follows. "*Pratibhām iti - yeyaṃ samastaśabdārthakāraṇabhūtā buddiḥ, yaṃ paśyantītyāhuḥ, yataḥ śabdāḥ prāṇavṛttim anupatanti, tam anuparā iti anugacchati*" (VP, 1.14). If one tempts to realise this stage of speech, he passes through various stages and ultimately arrives at an undifferentiated state known as *Pratibhā*. In this regard Kunjunni Raja observes that "the complete utterance or the *vākyasphoṭa* indicates this principle of consciousness, *paśyanti* or *Pratibhā*. There is no real distinction between speech and thought at this stage (1963, p.147-148).

4.7.2. *Pratibhā* and the Sentence *Sphoṭa*

As discussed, Bh's whole theory of language act is firmly rooted in three basic concepts of language, namely *dhvani*, *sphoṭa* and *Pratibhā*. These are three different levels of language, which are interconnected to complete a language act. Among the definitions of sentence mentioned in VP, Bh gives emphasis to the definitions held by those, who believe in the indivisibility theory of the sentence. In their perspective, sentence is defined as sentence-*sphoṭa* and sentence-meaning is *Pratibhā*. Thus it is clear that sentence-*sphoṭa* and sentence-meaning *Pratibhā* are two distinct concepts coined by Bh. *Sphoṭa* can be taken as an auditory impression manifested by articulated sounds or *dhvani* whereas *Pratibhā* refers to the meaning conveyed by the sentence. Meaning is understood only after the auditory perception of sound. Thus *Pratibhā* is aroused only after the *sphoṭa* is manifested.

Different opinions are held by scholars in this regard. Scholars like J. Brough, Kunjunni Raja and KAS Iyer argue that *sphoṭa* is the linguistic sign in its aspect of meaning-bearer. According to them, *sphoṭa* is not a mystic entity as suggested by A B Keith (1928, p.387), but they consider the *sphoṭa* doctrine as the theory of language-symbolism. This concept of *sphoṭa* explains the problem of how language is grasped in a verbal communication. But the problem of meaning of the sentence is yet to be

unravelling. They maintain that *sphoṭa* in general and sentence-*sphoṭa* in particular has been assumed as a solution to this problem. On the contrary they opine that *Pratibhā* as a flash of understanding is the sentence-meaning. These two arguments are self-contradictory. Here what Matilal remarks, seems to be more agreeable. To quote him

For Bh, however, this is a wrong term: 'meaning-bearing unit'. *Sphoṭa* is the real substratum, proper linguistic unit, which is identical also with its meaning. Language is not the vehicle of meaning or the conveyor-belt of thought. Thought anchors language and language anchors thought. *śabdanā* or 'languageing', is thinking; and thought vibrates through language. In this way of looking at things, there cannot be any essential difference between a linguistic unit and its meaning or the thought it conveys. *Sphoṭa* refers to this non differentiated language-principle. Thus I believe that it is sometimes even incorrect to ask whether *sphoṭa* is or is not the meaning-bearing speech unit in Bh's system (1992, p.85).

If the *sphoṭa* theory arose as a solution to the problem of understanding language, Bh would not have introduced the concept of *Pratibhā* as sentence-meaning. Thus, it can be comprehended that Bh puts forth the concept of sentence-*sphoṭa*, which explains the language principle so as to how language is used and grasped. While, the concept of *Pratibhā* is

introduced to solve the problem of how language is understood (Gayatri Rath, 2000, p.164-165). The auditory impressions are transformed into meaning in the mind by the virtue of *Pratibhā*.

4.7.3. *Pratibhā* and the Concept of Transformations in Modern Linguistics

Recent researches in the field of syntax and semantics have presented various theories regarding the analysis of sentence. The psycholinguistic approaches of transformational linguistics¹⁹ revolutionised the scientific study of of sentence and its meaning. The two major prosoects of thansformational grammar are 'linguistic competency' and 'generative grammar'. These two concepts are

¹⁹ The linguist's approach towards the analysis of a sentence is mainly of four types: Traditional, Comparative and Historical, Structural and Descriptive and Transformational. The traditional grammarians break up the word order to analyse the relationship between the words such as nouns and adjectives. On the other side, linguists like Otto Jespersen tried to analyse language in a historical and comparative methodology. They hold that language undergoes constant change and thus the prototypes can be traced through the historical and comparative analysis. As scholars focused more on language and less on history, they introduced a new methodology in analysing language. These scholars approach language in two ways; Synchronic and Diachronic, which focus on the structural analysis of language. This methodology has been developed by a group of linguists called structuralists. The goals, methods and assumptions of transformational grammarians are unique and different from those of descriptive lingistics. In contrast with the structuralists, they consider grammar to be a system of rules that generate exactly those combinations of words which form grammatical sentences in a given language. They developed the concept of 'transformations' which helps the user to produce new sentences from the existing ones.

developed by the later cognitive linguists such as Noam Chomsky²⁰, Ronald Langacker²¹ etc. In contrast with the structuralists, transformational linguists believe that the proper object of linguistic study is the knowledge that the native speaker possesses, which enables them to produce and understand various sentences. This knowledge is termed as 'competence'. According to Chomsky, this is innate and he called it as 'innate linguistic knowledge' or 'innate language competency'. The concept of generative grammar tries to define rules that can generate the infinite number of grammatical sentence possible in a language. This method of grammar uses the concept of 'transformations' which helps people to produce new sentences from the existing ones. To explain this concept, Chomsky sets forth the idea that each sentence in a language has two levels of representation; a deep structure and a surface structure. The deep structure represents the core semantic relations of a sentence and is mapped on to the surface structure via transformations. Thus deep structures can be perceived as a universal grammar underlying the language act and corresponding to the linguistic competence.

On a shrewd analysis of the concept of *Pratibhā*, conceived by Bh, it can be stated that *Pratibhā* is the prototype of 'transformations'. In a

²⁰ 1957. *Syntactic Structures*.

²¹ 1987. *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar*.

conversation, the listener first grasps the speech in terms of words, one after the other. This manifests the internal *sphoṭa* (*buddhisthaśabda*), which is the auditory impression of the uttered speech. At this level it resembles the concept of 'deep structure' presented by the transformationalists. Sudden after the manifestation of the internal *sphoṭa*, *Pratibhā*, the intuitive instinct transforms it into the meaning. Similar process is adopted by the cognitive linguists, when they explain that the deep structure is mapped on to the surface structure via transformations.

It has been a topic of debate among the scholars of linguistics as well as psychology that how a child acquire its first language. Some of them accept the role of instinct as not so useful in the child's language acquisition, while some others hold the view that child's language is a product of instinct (Gayatri Rath, 2000, p.151-152). Chomsky answers this vexed problem by his notions of generative grammar and innate linguistic knowledge. In his cognitive theory, Chomsky suggests that, language acquisition is based on various rules and regulations. A child, who comes in contact with various language features, makes his own rules though unconsciously. Earlier it was believed that the children grasp their preliminary words from either the parents or the other elders.

But recent linguistic trends do not accept that parents 'teach' children their first language. The reason is no parent has the necessary

explicit knowledge to do so, and children anyway acquire the knowledge of their first language long before they are in a position to understand the relevant instructions of their parents (Neil Smith, 2004, p.116). In his theory of 'cognitive capability', Chomsky argues that people possess a kind of language faculty which is a part of human natural biological qualities. This idea is known as 'Innate language faculty', which has a basic grammar system which is termed as 'Universal Grammar' (Jyothirmayi P C, 2009, p.283). This innate linguistic knowledge enables a child to acquire the notion of structure, which helps the child to learn any language.

Bh, also holds similar view with Chomsky and he emphasises on the role of intuition in child's language acquisition. He opines that it is *śabdabhāvanā* that enables a new born baby to make the first movements of vocal organs. Stimulated by this *śabdabhāvanā*, air coming out of baby's mouth is able to strike at certain points of articulation and produce sounds. The *Vṛtti* again mentions that there is no other reasons than *Pratibhā* to make these movements

ādyah karaṇavinyāsaḥ prāṇasyordhnaṃ samīraṇam

sthānānāmabhighātaśca na vinā śabdabhāvanām. (VP, 1.122)

This theory of word impregnatedness of Bh akin to the innate language

competency of the transformationalists. Even though Chomsky's concepts of language are different from that of Bh, there are resemblances between *Pratibhā* and Chomsky's 'Innate Language Faculty'. Both are innate and instinctive in nature and explain the process through which children gain the knowledge of language.

In Indian scenario, *Mīmāṃsakas* and *Naiyāyikas* also present a similar concept in the child's language acquisition, with slight changes. They also state that children first understand the sentence as a whole and later, by the process of inclusion and exclusion (*āvāpa* and *udvāpa*), they come to know about the individual meanings of the words. Later they are able to understand and produce new sentences. The process is elaborated in *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* as:-

*evam vyavahārādapi yathā prayojakavṛddhena ghaṭamānayetiyuktaṃ
tacchrutvā prayojyavṛddhena ghaṭa ānītastadavadhārya pārśvastho bālo
ghaṭānayanarūpakāryaṃ ghaṭamānayeti śabdaprayojyamitya
vadhārayati. tataśca ghaṭaṃ naya gāṃ badhānetyādivākyād
āvāpodvāpābhyāṃ ghaṭādipadānāṃ kāryānvitaghaṭādau śaktiṃ grhṇāti.
----- prathamataḥ kāryānvitaghaṭādau śaktyavadhāraṇe' pi lāghavena
paścāttasya parityāgaucityāt. (1988, p.561-563)*

The sum total of this discussion is that Bh was the first to introduce the instinctive innate knowledge of a person called *Pratibhā* into the realm

of linguistics. This innate capacity enables a person to understand and produce various sentences and is manifested by the indivisible-sentence-*sphoṭa*. The concept of transformations introduced by the modern cognitive linguists akin to Bh's *Pratibhā* in several aspects.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

Language is generally perceived as the medium for communicating one's ideas to the other. Thus, language faculty includes not mere linguistic factors, but psychological as well as social factors are also significant. This communication or transference of thought takes place through meaningful linguistic units and each meaningful unit represents a complete thought. This meaningful linguistic unit is in the form of sentence and thus, linguists and grammarians accept sentence as the unit of communication. Therefore the study of sentence and sentence-meaning has drawn the serious attention of linguists, grammarians and philosophers. The ancient scholars in India called this meaningful linguistic unit as *śabda* and it was accepted as one of the means of valid knowledge (*śabdapramāṇa*). As a result of this serious attention given to the concept of sentence, by the eastern scholars, various theories and concepts have evolved in the realm of language studies.

In the present study titled "The Treatment of Concept of Sentence - a Study based on *Vākyapadiya*", emphasis has been given to the various propositions of the concept of sentence and sentence. Here, a humble

attempt is made to understand the ways in which these concepts are envisaged in the different systems of thought in India. While going through the detailed discussions on the perspectives of different thinkers on these concepts, the following observations are made.

1. Almost all Schools of thought accept *śabda* as a distinct means of valid knowledge as it unveils the knowledge hitherto unknown. The term *śabda* is used to denote the meaningful linguistic unit and it is generally defined as in the form of sentence.
2. The concept of sentence is defined in manifold ways by the preceptors of different schools of thought. In general, the sentence is defined in two perspectives; *Sakhaṇḍa* and *Akhaṇḍa*. The former school treat sentence as a collection of semantically connected words. Though sentence is an aggregation of its parts, it denotes a unified sense and thus, is considered as a unified entity, which is distinct from the parts. The factors that constitute the unity of sentence are *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *sannidhi*. The individual words in the sentence are interconnected by these factors. Sanskriticians give emphasis to these factors in their discussions on the concept of sentence. On the other side, a group of philosophers hold that sentence is an indivisible unit of language (*Eko' navayavaḥ śabdaḥ*), devoid of any parts. This is the *Akhaṇḍa* School of sentence.

3. If sentence is defined as the aggregation of words, the meaning of sentence is also decided by the meanings of the individual words. The individual words are associated semantically to denote a unified sense. This particular meaning is distinct from the meanings of the parts. This process of the cognition of sentence-meaning, derived from the semantic association of words is generally termed as '*śābdabodha*' or 'verbal cognition'.
4. There are two subdivisions under *śābdabodha* viz. *khaṇḍaśābdabodha* and *akhaṇḍaśābdabodha*. In the first variety, the import is produced by the parts of the sentence while in the latter, it is produced as a unitary whole. Almost all Indian thinkers are in fond of *khaṇḍapakṣa* of verbal import, while Bh and his followers set forth the theory of *akhaṇḍaśābdabodha*.
5. There are two major theories in the *khaṇḍapakṣa* of verbal import viz. *Abhihitānvayavāda* and *Anvitābhīdhānavāda*. The followers of the *Bhāṭṭa* School of *Mīmāṃsā* and a group of *Naiyāyikas* are the major followers of the *Abhihitānvaya* theory. The essence of this theory is that, the words in a sentence first designate their meanings and then the word-meanings are brought together to give the sentence-meaning. While Prabhākara, the founder of the *Prābhākara* School of *Mīmāṃsā*, and his followers believe in the latter theory

of verbal import. According to them, each word in the sentence gives a connected meaning and hence the meaning of the sentence can be comprehended from each word.

6. Bh, who upholds the theory of indivisibility of sentence and sentence-meaning, accepts *Akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa* as the real nature of sentence and *Pratibhā*, a flash of understanding, as the sentence-meaning. These concepts are elaborately discussed in the *Vākyakāṇḍa* of VP.
7. Bh examines language in three levels viz. analytic level, communicative level and ultimate level. As a method of communication, language is the carrier of thoughts and thoughts cannot be communicated in bits and pieces. Thus sentence is the unit of communicating ideas and it is also indivisible in nature.
8. Bh is a staunch believer of the indivisibility theory of sentence and sentence-meaning and he provides a number of arguments to support this theory. Just like the perception of a multi-coloured picture, which is evolved as a unity in spite of subsequent analysis into its component coloured parts, a cognition presenting different jobs as its contents is a unitary entity in reality (VP, 2.8-9). It is indivisible into several individual cognitions. Though a sentence

has various components in subsequent analysis, it is cognised as unitary whole by the speaker as well as listener. If a sentence is divisible into words and words into phonemes, then this division has to be carried out further. Therefore, the sentence is accepted as undivided into constituent parts and conveys one single meaning.

9. The individuality of the subsequent words in the sentence is also explained by Bh in the analytic level of language. For the purpose of grammar, sentence can be analysed into its parts such as noun, verb etc. This is not real, but is carried out in the mind. Bh termed this unique concept as '*apoddhāra*'. Though the listener grasps the sentence as the sequence of words, the sudden flash of understanding *Pratibhā*, cognizes the meaning of the sentence as a whole. After the cognition of sentence-meaning, he identifies the individual words and their meanings by the process '*apoddhāra*'.
10. While discussing about the meaning of the sentence, Bh introduces the theory of *Pratibhā*, which states that the sentence conveys its meaning in a flash. To explain how sentence is comprehended, Bh goes beyond the level of uttered speech. In order to explain the problem of linguistic communications, he introduces this very concept, which signifies the intuitive linguistic disposition. From both the point of views of the speaker and the listener, the sentence

meaning cannot be accepted as, that which is built up gradually on the basis of word meanings. It is grasped through an instantaneous flash of insight. This instantaneous understanding is neither spatial, nor particular, nor dependant on the peculiarities of a particular language. It is the instinctive power of the mind. Thus, *Pratibhā* can be experienced, but cannot be expressed to others in terms of 'it is this'.

11. Bh expounds the important characteristics of *Pratibhā* in several verses. From the listener's point of view, *Pratibhā* is the meaning of a sentence and thus, it is the semantic unit of language. But Bh also explores the deeper levels of this concept. From the speaker's point of view, it is identical with the *Paśyanti* state of *Vāk*. This unravels the psychological as well as the philosophical outlook of *Pratibhā*.
12. Bh explains six kinds of *Pratibhā* and thus, is conceived in a very comprehensive way. The manifestations of *Pratibhā* range from the basic instincts of animals and birds to the superhuman perceptions of *ṛṣis*. Thus, the concept of *Pratibhā*, introduced by Bh goes beyond the level of communicating the sentence meaning. He conceives it as an intuitive instinct, the implications of which, can better explain several philosophical and psychological aspects of human language and thoughts.

13. But this innovative way of thinking introduced by Bh was not developed by the later scholars over the centuries. Later in modern linguistics, structuralism and behaviourism tried to analyse only language performance. They overlooked the idea of language competence and the cognitive grammar of language. The transformational or cognitive way of thought developed by Bh remains stagnated till the second half of 20th century. It was in 1970s that scholars like Charles Fillmore²², George Lakoff²³, Ronald Langacker and Leonard Talmy²⁴ etc, who did not follow the prevailing tendency to explain linguistic patterns by means of appeals to structural properties internal to and specific to language, tried to rediscover the cognitive principles of language. Later, the basic concepts of Chomskian school of linguistics tried to bring back a rich tradition of generative grammar and cognitive philosophy of language. It was Noam Chomsky, who tried to identify the theories behind language competence and put forth unique and innovative theories regarding the relation of language and mind. Thus modern linguists tried to develop the innovative

²² 1993. *Construction Grammar Coursebook*.

²³ 1977. "Linguistic Gestalts."

²⁴ 1978. "The relation of grammar to cognition."

ideas of Bh and explore new horizons in the field of linguistics and psychology.

14. Recent trends in Linguistics point to the necessity of deconstructing the views of Bh in the light of the revolutionary concepts of Modern Transformational Linguists. The major theories of transformationalists are 'generative grammar' and 'language competency'. These theories resemble Bh's concepts of sentence and sentence-meaning in manifold ways.

Modern linguistics has become a fast developing area of study encompassing various other fields of learning such as Psychology, Sociology, Philosophy, Cognitive Sciences and Information Technology etc. Linguists have different opinions on vexed questions like what is a sentence? What constitutes the sentence meaning? How is sentence constituted? How is the meaning of a sentence cognised as a whole by the listener? These problems have emerged into the realm of Semantics very recently. Transformational linguists and cognitive linguists contributed much in the field of Syntax and Semantics. The revolutionary ideas of modern cognitive linguists such as Chomsky and Langacker were erected upon the studies of the concept of sentence and cognition of the sentence-meaning.

In the light of these revolutionary developments of transformational and cognitive linguistics, the so called 'mystic' ideas of Bh on sentence and sentence-meaning can be deconstructed. The concept of sentence as a unitary whole and *Pratibhā*, an intuitive instinct as the meaning of sentence can be analysed beyond their linguistic characteristics. The psycho-linguistic analysis of the concept of *Pratibhā*, in the light of modern cognitive linguistics, has a wide scope to study further. In addition to this, Bh states that the sentence-meaning is a flash of awareness, which happens in memory (*smṛti*). This aspect of *Pratibhā* can also be taken up for further study connecting neuroscience and psycho-linguistics. Thus it can be concluded with the remarks of Jan Houben:-

Modern cognitive linguists and construction grammarians, on their part, may find to their surprise an extensive amount of investigations in Bhartṛhari's work and in the Bhartṛharian way of Pāṇinian grammar that directly pertain to basic issues in their research programme. A rapprochement between Bhartṛhari studies and cognitive linguistics is therefore expected to be most fruitful and stimulating for both parties. (2009, p.539)

Many modern scholars are endeavouring in this area of studies, but Bh and his VP still remain the sources of endless innovative and scholarly speculations even in this era.

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